



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.


We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search


Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

WIDENER



HN P1CN F

OC 4530.10



THE
WAR IN NEW ZEALAND.


To Ferdinand Merce Ball
with W R Watts
Compliments

Wanganui 3^d January
1870

PLAN & SECTIONS
OF THE
PAH AT ORAKAU.

Reference.

Parapets. 
Ditches. 



0

THE WAR IN NEW ZEALAND.


BY
WILLIAM FOX, A.M., OXON,
LATE COLONIAL SECRETARY AND NATIVE MINISTER OF THE COLONY.

ERRATA.

At page 85, omit the words, "3—Colonel Austin, of the 14th."
" 185, in Note, *for* "A," *read* "C."
" 239, in Note, *for* "C," *read* "A."

WITH TWO MAPS AND A PLAN.

LONDON:
SMITH, ELDER AND CO., 65, CORNHILL.
1866.



0

THE WAR IN NEW ZEALAND.

BY

WILLIAM FOX, A.M., OXON,

LATE COLONIAL SECRETARY AND NATIVE MINISTER OF THE COLONY.

"It might be well thought, a countrie so faire, and a people so tractable, would long ere this have been quietly possessed, to the satisfaction of the adventurers, and the eternizing of the memory of those who effected it. But because all the worlde do see a defailement, this following treatise shall give satisfaction to all indifferent readers, how the business hath been carried; where, no doubt, they will easily understand, and answer to their question, how it came to pass that there was no better speede and success in those proceedings."

Travels of Captain John Smith of Virginia. Book III. c. 1.

WITH TWO MAPS AND A PLAN.

LONDON:
SMITH, ELDER AND CO., 65, CORNHILL.
1866.

OC 4530.10

Harvard College Library

June 24, 1919

J.J.Lowell fund

[The Right of Translation is reserved.]

PREFACE.

A GREAT many persons in England are tired of hearing about New Zealand. It is very seldom that any good news comes thence ; and, good or bad, it is very difficult to understand. Still, there are many who have friends and relations there ; many who sympathize with the Maori race ; many who have an idea that what has been going on there for some time past, means a penny in the pound on the income-tax ; so that sufficient interest is felt in the colony to make any one newly arrived from it the subject of much cross-examination. " Tell us all about New Zealand," is, however, a request not easily responded to,

unless the person who makes it is prepared to listen to a tale a good deal longer than that which the Ancient Mariner inflicted on the spell-bound wedding guest ; and I have been often obliged to tell my inquiring friends that unless I should write a book, I despaired of making them understand the subject. That is one reason for my taking up my pen. Another reason is, that I venture to think that many persons besides my own friends will be glad to have a more connected outline of events in the colony during the entire period of disturbance than any which has yet appeared. At present there is none. The Governor's despatches are within the reach of few ; and, except when they relate to disputes between himself and the general, or himself and his ministers, are meagre and unexplanatory to the last degree. The military despatches are no more accessible than the Governor's, and scarcely intelligible to general readers, their principal object apparently being

to enrol in the Valhalla of the Horse Guards the name of every officer who took part in a skirmish, or "stood ready to tender his valuable services, if wanted." The *Times*' newspaper has a very able correspondent; but the *Morning Post* and *Daily Telegraph*, and half a dozen other papers, have correspondents also, who seem to see things with very different eyes. The result is, that even those persons in England whose duty it is to study such matters, and still more, those who profess to have done it *en amateur*, fall into great misapprehensions, and often very ludicrous mistakes. One noble Lord, a Member of Parliament, giving a summary of events on a public platform,* misdates the arrival of Governor Grey in the colony by nearly two whole years. Another speaks of events happening at Waikato as if they had occurred at Taranaki, 200 miles away; while a third, hearing of the campaign at Tauranga, asks, "Who is this Tauranga; I never

* Ab. Pro. Soc. Report, 1855, p. 21, at top.

heard of him before?" Misapprehensions like these may seem of little consequence, and would be so if they existed only in private circles; but when the state of mind which they indicate is met with among those who influence the counsels of Parliament and the action of the Colonial Minister, the matter becomes serious. The noble Lord who did not know whether Sir George Grey arrived in New Zealand after the Oakura murders, or nearly two years before, could scarcely have given that attention to the subject which would make him a safe adviser. The Member of Parliament who thought that a district as large as an English county was a New Zealand chief, had probably no very clear ideas as to the origin or justice of the war. If these few pages should be instrumental in removing such misapprehensions where they exist, or in conveying information where it is wanting, I shall feel that the time spent in writing them has not been wasted.

In doing so, I trust I shall not be accused of presumption. I have been a colonist of New Zealand almost from its foundation as a colony. I have been a Member of the Legislature for many years, and during a great part of the present struggle I filled the offices of Colonial Secretary and Native Minister. I have probably had better opportunities of obtaining accurate information, and observing current events in the colony than any other person, at least any other person now in this country. It may be alleged that, as an actor in some of those events, I may have prejudices. But the same might certainly be said of any one who has had the personal opportunities of acquiring the information requisite for the task. I am not aware, however, that I have any prejudices on the subject: I have strong convictions; but convictions are not prejudices. My convictions may possibly be the means of removing the prejudices of some who have had no sufficient opportunity of study-

ing the subject. My object, however, is not to enforce my own convictions, but to state facts as they happened ; and in order to enable my readers to judge of the fairness of my narrative, I shall, wherever possible, give references to authentic printed documents.

In describing the operations of the military campaigns, I have relied for the main facts chiefly on the despatches of General Cameron, or of his subordinate officers who may have reported to him. I have also referred to the cotemporary reports of the correspondents of the local newspapers, who were with the forces in the field, and were many of them professional reporters thoroughly up to their work. I am myself acquainted, more or less, with all the country in which operations were carried on, and as regards the Northern campaigns, I have visited all the places where the principal engagements occurred, many of them several times, and most of them in the company of officers who

were in the engagements, and described them to me on the spot.

I do not pretend to have the smallest personal knowledge whatever of military affairs. I know absolutely nothing of "the disciplines of the wars," and am entirely ignorant whether a force should be taken into action at quick march, at the double, in line, in echelon, in fours, or deployed in skirmishing order. On these matters I have had quite as little experience as most of the special correspondents of the English press who reported the events of the Crimean war, or even perhaps as the distinguished historian of that great struggle. I have observed that when these writers are at a loss how to justify some movement which may not have ended satisfactorily, they are in the habit of saying, "no doubt it was done for excellent military reasons." When I attempt to criticise the details of the New Zealand campaigns, I confess I am very often reduced to the same con-

clusion; and being entirely unable to discover any other reason for some particular step, I am compelled to adopt the solution of "excellent military reasons." It will be admitted, however, that there are many events connected with military operations on which a civilian is quite as well qualified to form an opinion as a soldier can be; and when those occasions arise in course of my narrative, I have not hesitated to express my own convictions, subject of course always to the charitable salvo in behalf of the military mind, that what I think a blunder or an oversight, may have been done for "excellent military reasons," of which I know nothing whatever.

The references which I have given are generally to C. P. P., or papers of the Colonial Parliament. A few to P. P., or papers of the Imperial Parliament. Any others explain themselves.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

	PAGE
Arithmetic of the War—Statistics of Native and European Forces—Exposure of current Fallacies.....	1

CHAPTER II.

Origin of previous Wars in New Zealand—Effect on Native Mind—They accumulate Arms and Ammunition—Apparent Peace at period of Governor Grey's leaving the Colony—The Land League—The King Movement	19
---	----

CHAPTER III.

Purchase of Waitara by Governor Browne—Hostilities at Taranaki, 1860–61—Truce arranged by W. Thompson—Governor Browne prepares to Invade Waikato—Probable Consequences of Invasion—Governor Browne recalled—Governor Grey appointed—Peaceful Solution anticipated	34
---	----

CHAPTER IV.

Important Events overlooked—Thompson and King Natives hold aloof—Governor Grey visits Lower Waikato—His Reception—Offer made to refer Waitara Question to Arbitration refused—Further Attempts at Pacific Solu-	
---	--

	PAGE
tion—Governor goes to Taranaki—Determines to give up Waitara—Takes Possession of Tataraimaka—Natives murder Escort, 4th May—Governor gives up Waitara—Distinction between Governor Browne's War of 1860, and that which now commenced	43

CHAPTER V.

Alarming State of Affairs in Waikato—Suppression by Force of Government Printing Establishment—Obstruction of Buildings at Kohekohe—Expulsion of Resident Magistrate—Attempts made by Waikatos to rouse Rebellion in the South—Thompson's Complicity—Commencement of Waikato Campaign—The first Step taken by the Rebels—Attack on Escort, and Fight at Koheroa—Defeat of Rebels—Long Delay	55
---	----

CHAPTER VI.

Description of Waikato Country—Causes of long Delay before Meri-Meri—Defective Transport—Neglect of River Transport.....	71
--	----

CHAPTER VII.

Meri-Meri evacuated—Rangiriri captured—Natives retreat up River—Ngaruawahia occupied—Negotiations for Peace—Troops advance up Waipa River—Pikopiko and Paterangi—Rebel Position outflanked—Awamutu, Rangioawhia, and Kihikihi taken—Orakau captured—Maungatautari evacuated—Termination of Campaign in Waikato	77
--	----

CHAPTER VIII.

The Tauranga Campaign undertaken at request of General Cameron—Reasons for—Condition of Natives there—Unfortunate Repulse of our Troops at the Gate Pah—Successful Affair at Te Ranga—Submission of Tauranga Natives	106
--	-----

CONTENTS.

XV

CHAPTER IX.

	PAGE
Events at Taranaki during Period of Waikato Campaign—	
Origin of Pai Marire or Hau Hau Fanaticism—First	
Appearance at Sentry Hill Redoubt—Attack of Rebels	
on Sentry Hill—Hepaniah the Prophet killed—They	
attempt to attack Wanganui—Gallant Conduct of Wan-	
ganui friendly Natives—Battle of Moutua between Hau	
Haus and Wanganui Friendlies	124

CHAPTER X.

A Lull in the War—Time arrived for Political Action—	
Policy explained—All Parties agreed—Assent of Duke	
of Newcastle—Aborigines Protection Society interferes	
—Mr. Cardwell's Despatch—Governor wavers, and holds	
back—Difference with his Ministers, about Confiscation	
—They Resign—He eventually Confiscates for their	
Successors—Moral Effect of Vacillation on Natives—	
Mr. Cardwell's Despatch, its Effect to support Minority	
against Majority—The Result, the Prolongation of the	
War	146

CHAPTER XI.

The Prisoners taken in the War—How they escaped	158
---	-----

CHAPTER XII.

Wanganui and Taranaki Campaign of 1865—Why under-	
taken—Number of Rebels in the District—Number of	
Troops—Distance over which Operations to be carried	
on—Attack by Rebels on Road Party at Waitotara—	
Attack on General Cameron's Camp at Nukumaru—	
Advance up the Coast towards Taranaki—Reaches	
Waigongoro—Campaign closed for the Season—General	
Cameron goes to Auckland—Quarrel between Governor	
and General Cameron.....	168

CHAPTER XIII.

	PAGE
Serious Differences between Governor Grey and General Cameron—1. As to asking for Reinforcements—2. The War denounced by General Cameron as an "Iniquitous Job"—3. Question of Removal of the Troops—4. The Expediency of capturing Wereroa Pah—5. About Colonel Warre's Expedition—6. Secret Correspondence and Private Letters—How Mr. Cardwell disposes of the "Difficulty"	178

CHAPTER XIV.

Wanganui River and Interior—Gallant Behaviour of friendly Natives at Ohoutai—Capture of Pehi and eighty Rebels—Pehi released by Governor—Joins the Rebels again—Captain Brassey's brave Defence of Pipiriki—Governor throws away Advantages by issuing a foolish Proclamation—Murder of Kereti and Mr. Broughton	209
--	-----

CHAPTER XV.


Campaign on East Coast—Murder of Rev. C. S. Völkner—Murder of Mr. Fulloon and others—Colonial Force and Native Contingent sent to punish the Murderers—Great Successes—Evacuation of Pukemaire—Storming of Hungahungatoroa—Five hundred Prisoners taken—Gallant Action between the Arawas and Rebels near Matata	221
---	-----

CONCLUSION.

Present Relations between Imperial and Colonial Governments—Prospects of Self-reliance and Removal of Troops—Finance—The Future of the Maori Race	239
---	-----

APPENDIX	263
----------------	-----





Published by Smith, Elder & Co., Corahill, London.

THE
WAR IN NEW ZEALAND.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

Arithmetic of the War—Statistics of Native and European
Forces—Exposure of current Fallacies.

BEFORE proceeding with the tale of the War in New Zealand, there are a few figures and facts which I wish to get into the reader's mind, and a few fallacies and errors which have been current in England which I wish to get out of it.

First, as to figures ; it may conduce to a better appreciation of the merits of the military operations if the numbers on the two sides are known.

The total number of natives in New Zealand,

according to a government census taken in 1858, was 31,667 males and 24,303 females ; together 55,970 of all ages and sexes and in both islands. The proportion of children being exceedingly small, not less than 20,000 of the males may be taken as fighting men, and it must be borne in mind that the women do much work connected with war, and, when pressed, fight like the men. Of the 20,000 fighting men, however, according to Governor Grey's estimate, we never had 2,000 in arms against us at any one time, and it is shown by an examination of the General's despatches, that the troops were never actually engaged with more than 600, and not often with more than 200 to 400. The natives had, however, two great advantages ; they were in the centre and we on the circumference ; which enabled them to move with facility to attack any of our settlements or camps they thought proper ; and they were not concentrated in one district, but scattered in many.

It should also be remembered that of the total number of natives, not more than two-thirds have joined the rebel movement ; all the natives

north of Auckland (about 8,000 to 10,000), remaining loyal, and considerable bodies (say 5,000 to 6,000 more) in Cook's Straits, Hawkes Bay, and other parts. The loyalty of some of these, however, could not have been relied upon in case of our meeting with great reverses.

The natives had no artillery except three old carronades which they had got from wrecked ships, and which they only fired three or four times, and they had no better shot than steel-yard weights and similar substitutes for cannon balls. These they abandoned at the evacuation of Meri Meri, from which time they never had a big gun. Their small arms consisted of old Tower muskets, many flint and steel (*temporis* George III.), single and double fowling-pieces, such as are made for colonial trade, and a very few rifles, not perhaps one in a thousand. At the close quarters at which the engagements generally took place, these weapons were actually better than the Enfield rifles of our troops, as being more easily reloaded, and their double barrels giving two shots for one man. The natives had no cavalry.

The European population in both islands, in December, 1864, was 171,931 ;* but more than half of these were in the middle island, and those in the north could not be moved about for military purposes at any distance from their homes, for the obvious reason that by so doing their homes would have been left unprotected, and aggression by rebels have been an immediate consequence. They were all, however, armed, enrolled, and drilled as militia and volunteers, and in some instances for a length of time relieved the Queen's troops, and enabled them to take the field in greater force.

The actual military force serving under General Cameron was, in round numbers, 10,000 Queen's troops, including a troop of field artillery ; 5,000 military settlers, enlisted for three years, under regular training, and, if rightly handled, capable of being formed into a first-rate Zouave force ; several small corps of volunteers and bush-rangers. Five frigates and sloops of war of the Royal Navy, which furnished a naval

* Now estimated at 200,000.

brigade of more than 300 men, and were constantly employed in shelling pahs on the coast, blockading harbours, carrying troops, and other operations. Two steamers belonging to the commissariat, and seven or eight sea and river going steamers belonging to the Colonial Government—one an iron-clad with turrets, another ball-proof against small arms. Besides the field artillery, one large 110 lb. Armstrong, and two 40 lb. Armstrongs, with a great number of smaller guns, mortars, and cohorns, were used by us whenever necessary. We had four or five well-mounted and very active cavalry corps, amounting in all to about 500 men. Not nearly so much use was made of them as might have been.

So much for the arithmetic of the war.

Of the numerous fallacies which are current in connection with the war and the natives in their relations to the colonists I shall notice but a very few.

1. *It is inferred from the pertinacity with which the Maories have fought, that some deep-seated wrong has been inflicted upon them by the Europeans.*—This supposition shows very little acquaintance with the

Maori race. For centuries past, as far as we know, till the colonization of the country by us, the several tribes waged constant and internecine war with each other. They had a phrase similar to one which is used in the Old Testament : " The time when kings go to war," which indicated their practice. As soon as their crops were in the ground they began fighting, and generally fought till they were ripe. Nor was it necessary that there should be any " deep-seated wrong " to fight about. The most trivial cause would give rise to the most bloody war, and the feud would be handed down from father to son. The habit of fighting, and disregard of life, had become a second nature with the Maori ; and if Cuvier be correct in saying that it takes forty generations to make a wild duck a tame one, we need not be surprised that thirty years of partial peace have not eradicated the military propensities of the Maori, or caused him to forget how to build a pah, or squint along the groove of his " tupara," or double-barrelled gun. To prove that there is no foundation for this theory of " deep-seated wrongs," I may put Bishop Selwyn into the

witness-box. In a sermon preached at Nelson, in 1862, he said:—"In defence of the colonists of New Zealand, of whom I am one, I say most distinctly and solemnly, that I have never known, since the colony began, a single act of wilful injustice or oppression committed by any one in authority against a New Zealander. It may have been difficult to persuade some few individuals that the natives were entitled to equal rights as with ourselves; BUT IN PRACTICE THEIR LIBERTIES HAVE BEEN MAINTAINED INVIOLETE." *

2. *That the natives have no proper tribunals before which their disputes, particularly relating to lands, can be settled.*—This is a very great mistake. As early as 1849, a system of resident magistrates' courts was established in Maori and mixed districts. These courts are presided over by European resident magistrates, assisted in native cases by paid Maori assessors. There are, at present, at least twenty-five such courts, in which an aggregate of many thousand cases, civil and criminal, are annually disposed of, to the gene-

* *Ch. Miss. Register*, June, 1862, p. 194.

ral satisfaction of the native suitors. I know of no instance in which any native district is without such a court, unless when the resident natives have refused to have one, or have driven the magistrate away, as in the cases of Mr. Gorst, Mr. W. Baker, and some others.*

As regards a court for the settlement of land disputes, that department was, till 1861, absolutely in the hands of the Imperial Government, and during that period there was no competent tribunal of the sort. An attempt made by the Stafford Ministry, in 1858, to legislate on the subject by a "Territorial Rights Bill," was defeated by Governor Browne, who vetoed the measure when it had passed both Houses of Assembly. But in 1862, the Assembly passed another measure, which received the Royal Assent, and which has been brought into operation in the north for two years past. It establishes a tribunal before which all questions of native title can be settled; an amending act has since been passed on the same subject; and I believe it is in full

* C. P. P. 1864, E. 7.

operation in all parts of the country, except where the rebels stand in the way of the establishment of law and order of any sort.

3. *That the natives have been debarred the franchise and electoral privileges which the colonists enjoy under the Constitution Act.**—This is also an error. Subject to the almost universal suffrage qualification which applies to Europeans equally—an occupation franchise of 5*l.* per annum in the country, and 10*l.* in the towns—the Maori can register and exercise his vote as freely as the colonist; and the doors of the Houses of Assembly are equally open to him. In the province of Wellington, very many Maories vote at all the elections. I have been present at the Registration Court where the sufficiency of their qualifications was scrutinized like those of Europeans, and the general test of 5*l.* value was fixed by the registration officer, at a wooden door, a brick chimney, or glass windows to the claimant's house. I have attended public election meetings

* So stated by Sir Wm. Martin, in letter P. P. "On Confiscation," 23rd May, 1864. Also by Ab. Pro. Soc. in Petition to the Queen, 1865, *et passim*.

at native villages, presided over by Maori chairmen, and where better order was kept than among Europeans. And I have known several Members of Assembly, of provincial councils, and at least one superintendent, whose majorities, if not created, were considerably swelled by Maori votes.

It is true that two lawyers in England, before whom a case was laid some years ago, prepared by a private individual, gave an opinion adverse to the right of the Maories to exercise the franchise; but a lawyer's opinion I need not say is of no practical weight in such a matter, and has never, that I know of, had any weight given to it in the colony, either by any registering officer, or by the Supreme Court. If the natives generally have not exercised the privileges conferred by the Constitution Act on both races, it has been because they did not value them, nor care to exercise them. What they have habitually done for years all over the Province of Wellington, they could have done in every part of the colony. Even the shadow of a doubt, created by the lawyer's opinion referred to, has been now, I

believe, removed by a special act of the last session of Assembly.

4. *That the interests of the natives are systematically disregarded by the Colonial Government.*—

The shortest reply to this is to be found in a return recently laid before the Assembly. It appears that before responsible Government was bestowed in European affairs, the amount annually expended on native purposes was just 5,000*l.* a year. During the period of divided Government, up to 1861, it increased to 17,000*l.*; and since the establishment of responsible Government in native affairs, that is, since its transfer to the Colonial Ministry, it has reached the very large sum of 61,071*l.* The whole number of officials employed specially on native work, including the administration of justice, is no less than 505 (including 68 Maori pensioners), of whom at least 341 are natives. The salaries of many of the assessors and policemen are small, but so are their duties.

Now the contribution of the natives towards the Colonial revenue, in 1856, was estimated by the Colonial Treasurer, Mr. W. C. Richmond,

at 15,000*l*. Since the war it must have fallen probably one-half. But taking it at the higher amount, the Government expends on special native objects, including schools, police, assessors, &c., more than four times the amount they contribute to the revenue ; besides all the advantages they derive from the expenditure on roads, public works, and other operations of Government in which the Europeans share.

5. *That the war has been "got up" by the colonists for the sake of the military expenditure.*—As not a soldier can be employed, or kept in the country, except by the express orders of the Governor, this charge against the colonists might seem to have very little probability in it. The colonists cannot "get up" wars. The facts which I shall presently record will show, I think, beyond all doubt, that this war was and is a Governor's, and not a colonist's war. The allegation, when made by General Cameron, of its being "got up for the sake of military expenditure," was at once indignantly denied by Governor Grey, who told him that his object in fighting was to punish persons guilty of great

atrocities, and to render it possible for Europeans and loyal natives to live in the country.* The charge is very absurd. One hears of large fortunes made in England by contracts for victualling and clothing her Majesty's forces, and furnishing other supplies for the public service ; but military expenditure is to the bulk of the population of New Zealand a thing never thought of, or wished for. Indeed if the colonists had been more anxious for it than they were, they would have been much disappointed ; for great part of the supplies were got direct from other countries by the commissariat ; flour from Adelaide, horses from Sydney, hay (much of it worthless) and corn from England, while the meat contract was held for a long time by a grazier in Gipps' Land, Victoria. A very small number of persons in the colony could derive any pecuniary advantage from the expenditure of troops. They are not persons of influence, and could probably not control a single

* Correspondence between Grey and Cameron. C. P. P., A. No. 4, p. 20.

vote in the Assembly. The bulk of the colonists know that the war is a grievous pecuniary loss to them. The middle island settlers, who could by no possibility derive the benefit of a single shilling from the army expenditure, supported Governor Browne in his war, while a majority of north island members in the Assembly, who are supposed to profit by it, opposed him to the utmost of their power. It is only necessary to compare the wonderful progress of the middle island, where there has been no military expenditure, with the comparative stagnation of the northern, where it has gone on, to satisfy every colonist that war expenditure affords no compensation for the evils which war brings. With the exception of half-a-dozen persons of little or no influence, I do not think there is a colonist who would not gladly see the troops sent away, if they felt it was consistent with the maintenance of peace. There will always be sutlers and camp-followers with every army, but they could not get up a war in New Zealand.

6. *That the colonists covet the lands of the natives, and are determined to have them "recte si*

possunt, si non quocunque modo."*—If this charge means that individual colonists desire to appropriate the lands of the natives for their own profit, it is, I believe, entirely untrue. But there is a sense in which it is partly true. The colonists do desire, and very earnestly, to get possession, for colonizing purposes, of those large tracts of fertile land which lie waste and unimproved in the hands of the natives, over which they even prohibit our making roads, or running a steamer on the rivers by which they are watered. We went out to colonize ; not to " grub for money," but to convert the wilderness into farms and gardens, and spot it all over with smiling villages and pleasant homesteads. Districts which, in the hands of the colonists, might maintain millions of industrious and civilized men, lie absolutely unoccupied, and put to none of the uses for which the Creator intended them. The colonists do desire to people these districts ; to create out of them a flourishing country, instead of a barren uninhabited desert. But the assertion that they

* The syntax is Governor Browne's. P. P. 1860.

desire to possess them "quocunque modo" is absolutely untrue, much less that they would take them at the point of the bayonet. Every acre occupied by Europeans in New Zealand has been bought, and at prices quite equivalent to any value the land had, or ever could have had, if we had not gone there to give it value by our capital and our labour. Even during the war large tracts have been purchased from the friendly natives, and great heaps of sovereigns paid to them for their interest in lands they never used. For one tract alone in Wellington Province (Manawatu), they received about two years ago 12,000*l.* in cash ; for another (Waitotara) in the same province, more than 3,000*l.* ; and other large sums about the same time were paid in Auckland Province. The colonists don't stick at the price ; and they have never had any desire to take an acre without paying for it, or against the consent of the owners. And I am certain that had the rebel natives not attempted to "drive the Pakehas into the sea," not an acre of their lands ever would have been taken by Europeans, but in the same fair and legitimate manner in which it

has been bought from friendly natives hitherto. If a portion of it be now taken as a punishment for "unprovoked outrages," to use the words of Governor Grey, and to afford a material guarantee for the future, they have themselves only to thank for the fact.

7. A source of very wide-spread misapprehension on the subject of the origin and justice of the war, has been the letters of green ensigns (and I am sorry to say of mature colonels) to their friends in England. These gentlemen, some of them before they had been three weeks in the colony, and having certainly not one particle of authentic information on the subject, wrote home denouncing the war as "iniquitous," and as having been got up by "Auckland attorneys" for the purpose of seizing the lands of the natives. They spoke as positively as if they had been judges in a court of law, and had listened for a month to the arguments of forty counsel discussing the merits of the case. I should not have alluded to the subject, but that many of their letters were produced in Parliament, and printed in the "leading journals," and even men in high

places quoted them as authorities. It is quite certain that the writers knew absolutely nothing of what they were writing about; and that such letters were the result of a desire to get out of a war which held out little prospect of glory, and none of loot. Considering that they amounted by implication to the gravest charges against the Governor who had initiated the war, it is rather remarkable that the writers do not appear to have received the reprimand they merited from the authorities at the War Office, who must have discerned in them the evidence of what is technically termed a "demoralized" army. There cannot be a doubt that the unchecked growth of such opinions, led at last to that state of affairs which caused General Cameron to declare that 200 Maories could stop 500 of the Queen's troops and that it was altogether "unsafe" for the latter to follow the former to the bush.

CHAPTER II.

Origin of previous Wars in New Zealand—Effect on Native Mind
—They Accumulate Arms and Ammunition—Apparent Peace
at Period of Governor Grey's leaving the Colony—The Land
League—The King Movement.

It is commonly asserted by writers in England on New Zealand affairs, that all the hostilities with the natives which have occurred in the colony have originated in disputes about land. No statement can be further from the truth. The first war we had was in the year 1844, with John Héke, and a section of the Ngapuhi tribe at the Bay of Islands. It had absolutely no reference at all to any question about land, but originated solely in the personal ambition of Héke, and his belief that the introduction of law, order, and customs duties under British rule, were driving away the whaling vessels with which he had carried on a not creditable trade. The

war in the Hutt and West Coast of Wellington, in 1845, may be said to have involved a shadow of a dispute about land, the principal aggressor making a claim to a district which had been sold to us and occupied for years, and which he endeavoured to enforce by the murder of unarmed and unoffending settlers. But his claim, whatever it was, was not generally supported by the other natives of the district, the majority of whom took our side and carried arms on our behalf. The next collision was at Wanganui, in 1845. The pretext for it by the natives was an accidental discharge of a pistol in the hands of a midshipman in H.M. Navy, by which a chief was wounded in the cheek. Five young men of the tribe "took payment" for the injury to their chief, by barbarously murdering the family of Mr. Gilfillan, an unoffending settler who lived in the neighbourhood. The murderers were tried under martial law by Captain Laye of H.M. service, and hanged. A portion of the Wanganui tribes took up arms—another portion took our side, and a very uneventful war of some months' duration ensued. These were all the wars we had before

that of 1860. None of them were very serious ; each lasting only a few months, and rather dying out of inanition on the part of the natives, than being terminated by any very decisive victory on our part. The reasons for this no doubt were that there was really nothing to fight about ; while the tribes with which we came into collision were divided among themselves, and quite as many sided with us, as became our opponents. In these respects these wars differed from those in which we have been engaged since 1860 ; which involve well-defined issues, and in which we have opposed to us a formidable combination of several entire tribes, including the largest, the most warlike, and most influential.

These earlier wars, however, had one very important effect. They entirely destroyed the prestige which the Queen's troops had previously enjoyed in the eyes of the natives. Our operations were conducted with so little military skill ; our disasters were so serious and so many ; the losses of the natives were so small, and they outwitted and out-generalled us on so many occasions, that though for the reasons above

stated fighting ceased, yet a feeling of supreme contempt for the soldiers became permanently and generally impressed on the native mind. The only superiority on our part which they would admit after these wars, was the possession of greater resources in the shape of arms and ammunition, a conclusion which stimulated them to the acquisition at any cost of means which alone they believed to be wanting to give them an absolute superiority in case of future hostilities. Governor Grey very wisely threw all the difficulties he could in the way of their acquiring "munitions of war;" and by imposing restrictions on their sale he succeeded in reducing it to pretty nearly the limits of a smuggling trade. Governor Browne unfortunately relaxed the restrictions imposed by his predecessor, and within the three following years the natives purchased and stored up not less than 50,000*l.* worth of arms and ammunition,* which, with what they had previously accumulated, sufficed to supply, probably, every adult native in the islands with a

* Government returns in 1861.

serviceable fire-arm, and the means of using it for several years of active warfare. It was no doubt the possession of such resources, combined with the estimate formed of the military prowess of our troops, which emboldened the natives, when they thought the time had arrived, to defy the power of the British nation.

After the termination of the Cook's Straits wars, the natives for a time settled down to peaceful pursuits, and seemed to be only desirous of emulating the colonists in agricultural industry and commercial enterprise. These efforts were encouraged by the Government with liberal, not to call it profuse support, and for three or four years, what has been called the "flour and sugar policy" prevailed. Mills more numerous than they could use were erected for them at the public expense—millers and engineers paid to work them; ploughs, harrows, threshing-machines, carts, and other agricultural implements were scattered broadcast through the country, particularly among those tribes which have since gone most deeply into the rebellion; and it really appeared as if the Maori race, recognizing the

.

dignity of labour, was at last going to qualify itself for a place among civilized people by a life of industry and the gradual progress of social organization. At all events, it seemed to justify the glowing pictures which Governor Grey, at the period of the termination of his first administration, drew in his despatches to the home Government, parading the advancement of the native race, and their attachment to his rule, and leaving it to be inferred that he had solved the problem which had baffled all other statesmen, of rescuing a savage race from the annihilation usually attendant on its contact with a civilized people. There were, however, not a few persons in the colony who had no faith in the "flour and sugar policy"—at least when unaccompanied by means of regeneration which might strike their roots deeper into human nature. They failed to discover either in the practical action of Governor Grey, or in the numerous despatches which he addressed to the Colonial Office, any indications that he appreciated the real difficulty of the position of the Maori race—their political relations towards the European portion of the community of which

they were to form a part. He left the colony without having either established or suggested any policy or any institutions by which that difficulty might be conquered; and that at a most critical period, when the bestowal of representative institutions rendered it impossible longer to evade a difficulty, the pressure of which was little felt while colonists and natives both remained under the "paternal rule" of the Colonial Office, equally debarred of all political power.

Notwithstanding the hopeful signs of material prosperity which existed at this period, two small clouds had already arisen on the horizon, which were pregnant with the storms which have since burst upon the colony. These were the Land League and the King Movement. They both originated about 1848, during Governor Grey's first administration; but seem not to have attracted any special attention at that period, either from him or any one else. As these movements have both exercised a most important influence on the recent difficulties in the colony, if indeed they did not constitute their sole basis, it is necessary to say a few words in explanation of them.

I. THE LAND LEAGUE.—From the period of the foundation of the colony, there existed a great difference between the feelings with which the colonists were received by different tribes. All were apparently glad to see us in the country. Some, simply for what they could get out of us; others, both for that, and because I really believe they liked us as neighbours and friends. Political reasons weighed with many. The Ngatiwhatuas, for instance, occupied a district which lay between the two greatest and most warlike tribes in the islands, the Ngapuhi and the Waikato. These latter tribes were always at war, and when Waikato invaded Ngapuhi, *via* Ngatiwhatua, they usually gave the latter a backhanded blow in going or coming. So when Ngapuhi invaded Waikato, they, in their turn, “gave them a dig” in passing; and as these invasions were annual, the position of Ngatiwhatua became something worse than that of Belgium used to be among the belligerents of Europe. In short, as they told me on one occasion, “if you English had not come they would have eaten us up between them.” When we did come, Ngatiwhatua pressed on our

acceptance the district where Auckland stands, and by getting us to occupy the intervening tract, they obtained the best possible security against the renewal of the raids through their own country, which had kept it in a continual state of desolation and alarm. Similar motives, no doubt, operated with many other tribes, and there were and still are many tribes who are willing to sell almost any land they have, it being a mere question of price between us. There were other tribes, however, which appeared only to welcome us to the country on account of the good things we brought with us; whose regard for us was purely commercial, and who would have been glad to see us confined to a few towns where they might buy tobacco and blankets, and find a ready market for their fish and potatoes. From the very first they refused to sell land; and in some of the largest and most fertile districts, such as Waikato, not an acre had been sold by them to the date of the beginning of the present war, except a few very small pieces, disposed of to shoemakers, carpenters, and other artificers whose personal services they desired to have at their own doors.

These tribes cultivated a very few acres themselves, while thousands of square miles of fertile land lay unproductive and entirely useless to the human race. As they saw other tribes selling land and colonization progressing, they became alarmed lest the day should arrive when they should be persuaded to sell their own lands, and so admit among themselves the advancing wave of European immigration. The idea of an anti-land-selling league suggested itself, or was suggested to them; and most of those tribes which desired to hold the colonist at arms' length, joined it. So long as they confined themselves to a resolution not to sell their own lands, their right to establish such a league could scarcely be denied; but before long it assumed a more aggressive character. In many instances when tribal lands would have been sold by the vote of the majority, the influence of the league brought to bear upon them by distant tribes encouraged the minority to hold out; and when the league became as it did closely identified with the King Movement, the overawing power of the latter was thrown into the scale to prevent alienation. Many

tribes, however, continued to repudiate the interference of the League and of the King ; and even while the war was at its height, several hundred thousand acres were sold to the Government by the Ngapuhi, the Ngatiwhatua, the Manawatu, the Waitotara, and other tribes. It is evident that these large tribes would regard with little favour the advice of certain persons in England given to the New Zealanders, not to sell their land at all ; and still more the foolish suggestion which those persons made that its sale should be absolutely prohibited by law. The League, however, was a great fact ; a great impediment to the progress of the colony ; and a great obstacle to the harmonious intercourse of the two races. Nevertheless, no attempt was ever made by the Government to interfere with it, except by persuasion and argument.

II. THE KING MOVEMENT.—Notwithstanding the paternal government of the Colonial Office, and the liberal distribution of flour and sugar, the great tribes which held themselves aloof from the colonists, felt that they were not governed ; at all events what government there was among

them was not to their liking. As early as 1848, the idea was entertained among them of appointing a king of their own. Their conceptions on the subject were no doubt exceedingly vague. They had never had among themselves any national head, nor any regular or constitutional form of government. But they had imbibed some notions of our institutions, and they had studied in the Old Testament the history of monarchy among the Israelites. The result, so far as it ever took a definite shape, became a sort of parody of the two. At first a mere blind groping after a better form of self-government than they possessed, meriting the sympathy of all men, it rapidly degenerated into something little else than antagonism towards the Europeans, and an attempt to prescribe the limits of colonization. At the time of the commencement of the present war (1862) it presented the following features:—An elected king, a very young man of no force of character, surrounded by a few ambitious chiefs, who formed a little mock court, and by a body-guard without shoes and with very tight stocks, who kept him from all

vulgar contact, and from even the inspection of Europeans, except on humiliating terms ; entirely powerless to enforce among his subjects the decisions of his magistrates ; an army, if it might be called so, of 5,000 to 10,000 followers scattered over the country, but organized so that large numbers could be concentrated on any one point on short notice ; large accumulated supplies of food, of arms, and ammunition ; a position in the centre of the island from which a descent could be made in a few hours on any of the European settlements ; roads prohibited to be made through two thirds of the island ; the large rivers barred against steamers, so that nine-tenths of the country was closed against the ordinary means of travel and transport ; the Queen's law set at utter defiance ; her magistrates treated with supercilious contempt ; her writs torn to pieces and trampled under foot ; Europeans who had married native women driven out of the king districts, while their wives and children were taken from them, unless they would recognize and pay an annual tribute to the king ; all this accompanied by an exhibition of the

utmost arrogance, and undisguised contempt for the power of the Queen, the Governor, and the Europeans.

Many believe (I do so myself) that in its early stages "kingism" might have been moulded into something useful, and have proved the means of elevating the native race, by the introduction of institutions subordinate to, and in harmony with, the European government of the colony. The opportunity, however, was lost. Governor Browne's responsible advisers induced him to make the attempt, and it was attended for a time with considerable success; but his non-responsible native secretary persuaded him to abandon it, advising him that if he left kingism to itself, it would die a natural death. In making this fatal error, the Governor acted in opposition to the advice of his responsible advisers, and by virtue of the absolute power reserved to him in native affairs by the Imperial Government.* The natural consequence of the *laissez faire* system

* The history of the King movement and the part taken by Governor Browne in reference to it, were thoroughly investigated by the Waikato Committee in 1860. See it in C. P. P., 1860.

soon followed. Kingism rapidly gained strength, and, "left to itself," it soon developed the features I have described, which, it will be admitted, were absolutely irreconcilable with the existence of the Queen's authority and the presence of the constitutional government established in the colony. When to these features it added an open declaration of war, by ordering, in the king's name, the murder of the Queen's subjects, as we shall presently see was the case, there was no possibility of any further tolerance of the existence of an institution subversive of all order, and openly aggressive against the authority of law.

CHAPTER III.

Purchase of Waitara by Governor Browne—Hostilities at Taranaki, 1860-61—Truce arranged by W. Thompson—Governor Browne prepares to invade Waikato—Probable Consequences of Invasion—Governor Browne recalled—Governor Grey appointed—Peaceful Solution anticipated.

IN the month of November, 1859, Governor Browne visited the settlement of New Plymouth. He had an interview with a number of the natives of the district, and announced publicly that if any of them wished to sell land he was prepared to buy, on their showing a good title. A native named Teira (Taylor) rose up immediately and offered to sell a block of 600 acres at Waitara. The principal chief of Teira's tribe, William King, declared he would not allow the land to be sold. The Governor intimated that if Teira proved his title he would complete the purchase; and he left the investigation of the title in the hands of Mr. Parris, an assistant land pur-

chase commissioner. After some months' negotiation, Parris reported the title good; 200*l.* was paid to Teira "on account," and the Governor sent a party of surveyors to mark the boundaries. The surveyors were stopped by William King's party, soldiers were sent by the Governor, and in a few days fighting began.

Hostilities continued till 21st May, 1861. The natives intrenched themselves in strong positions. Our troops followed their example and shut themselves up in the town of New Plymouth. But the natives did not confine themselves to their strongholds; they ravaged, and, with the exception of the town, utterly destroyed the whole of the flourishing little settlement, which extended over some twenty miles in length, by six or eight deep. The whole of the European population were either driven into the town—their houses and homesteads desolated and destroyed—or they left for other settlements. A few unimportant skirmishes, in which we gained little advantage, and the capture of an empty pah or two, were all the military operations on our side for several months. At

length a new general arrived (Pratt), and he undertook the reduction of one of the strongholds of the natives by sap. Before he accomplished it, a truce was made, and the first campaign of the war came to an end; having resulted in nothing except the utter destruction of the settlement of Taranaki.

The truce was effected by William Thompson, a leading Waikato chief, representing the King party and Waikato. Shortly after hostilities commenced, the Waikato tribes, who lived some 200 miles off, and had no personal interest whatever in the land dispute between the Governor and William King, sent down a strong contingent to assist the latter. They had scarcely arrived when they were surprised by our troops and suffered severe loss. Thompson availed himself of the opportunity of going down and proposing a suspension of hostilities. He was successful: a truce was arranged between him and Governor Browne; the Waikato contingent returned home, and the Taranaki resident natives abstained, for the present, from any further active hostilities.

The colony was taken entirely by surprise by

the war. Unbroken peace had prevailed, without either wars or rumours of wars, since the termination of those in Cook's Straits, in 1846. When this new war commenced there were not ten persons outside of the Native office who knew that the colony was on the eve of a conflict. It was during a two years' parliamentary recess ; the administration of native affairs was in the hands of the Governor and his non-responsible native secretary. Withdrawn from the direct control of the colonists, it had come to be regarded as a mystery, only to be comprehended by a few experts ; and, as a general rule, no colonist ever knew what was going on in reference to the political affairs of the natives, or their relations to the European Government. The campaign commenced during the recess, and it was not till after the war had been going on for some time that the Assembly was summoned, and information laid before it as to the causes of the outbreak. There was a great difference of opinion among the members. A majority of those of the Northern Island, who lived among the natives, and knew something of their customs and land laws, thought

the Governor wrong, and that William King was justified in opposing (though, of course, not by arms) Teira's attempted sale. A majority of Middle Island members who knew nothing about the natives, actuated mainly by feelings of loyalty and of personal regard for the Governor, supported him. Of the whole House of representatives he had a considerable majority with him; of the Legislative Council a still larger proportion. His ministers conceived themselves to be so strong that they, very foolishly, opposed and defeated a motion for inquiry into the causes of the war. Had it been granted, it is very probable that a way would have been discovered to adjust the difficulty, and get the colony out of the critical position into which the act of the Governor had precipitated it.

Immediately after the truce was made, in May, 1861, the Governor called on the natives by proclamation, to make submission and take the oath of allegiance. Very few did; and as the year wore on he made his intention known of invading Waikato, to compel submission and punish those tribes which had joined in the

Taranaki disturbances. The Assembly met again in June, 1861. It was now winter, but by September (the New Zealand spring) it was understood operations would commence. General Cameron had arrived and had expressed his anxiety to find some employment for his soldiers. To the old colonists of the Northern Island the prospect was most gloomy, particularly to those in its southern portion. We were well aware of the preparations which the natives had made for war; we knew that we ourselves were entirely unprepared, almost without arms, untrained, unorganized, and scattered over large tracts, with our families and properties exposed to attack on every side. The Wellington members sought an interview with the Governor, and asked him if it was true that he intended to invade Waikato. He said it was, and that he had no doubt that the first shot fired there would be the signal for a general rising all over the island. We called his attention to our unprepared and unprotected state. He said we must build redoubts and defend ourselves, as the colonists at Taranaki had done. As that settlement had

been swept as bare as the floor, we thought this a poor prospect, and told him so. He replied that "War is not made with rose-water." * After this we said no more, though we thought a good deal ; for it appeared to us that the colonization of twenty years was about to be destroyed, and that ruin was preparing for the colonists of the Northern Island. And had the intended invasion of Waikato been attempted with the small military force under General Cameron's command, and with the colony so unprepared as it was at that date, nothing but the most fearful disasters could have ensued. If, with nearly 15,000 men, and two years' preparation, he was barely able to drive back the invading Waikatos from Auckland in 1863, what would have been our position if the invasion of their country had been attempted by us with a force of barely 3,000 men, and the colony altogether unprepared ? We may well be thankful that we were spared the calamities that must have inevitably followed.

Before, however, the season was sufficiently

* C. P. P. 1861.

advanced to admit of military operations, two important changes took place. The war Ministry was defeated in the Assembly, and one which its opponents termed "the Peace-at-any-price Ministry" took its place. The majority which had supported the Governor in what he had done had evidently not confidence in what he was about to do. As, however, he would, in invading Waikato, have acted on his own responsibility as an imperial officer, the change of Ministry would probably have had little effect but for the other event referred to. This was his own removal from the Government. The Home Government found the position of the colony becoming serious. It determined to entrust the reins to other hands, and by a despatch full of complimentary language, expressing approval of what he had done, and continued confidence in him, the Governor was informed that he was superseded by Sir George Grey, formerly Governor of New Zealand, and then of the Cape of Good Hope. The colony had now breathing-time, and the hope revived that we might yet escape the horrors of an insurrection of three-fourths of the native race. Sir

George Grey arrived in September, and the spring opened upon us without the renewal of hostilities. We ventured to believe that the hatchet was buried.

CHAPTER IV.

Important Events overlooked—Thompson and King Natives hold aloof—Governor Grey visits Lower Waikato—His Reception—Offer made to refer Waitara Question to Arbitration refused—Further Attempts at Pacific Solution—Governor goes to Taranaki—Determines to give up Waitara—Takes Possession of Tataraimaka—Natives murder Escort, 4th May—Governor gives up Waitara—Distinction between Governor Browne's War of 1860, and that which now commenced.

THERE is in England a class of persons who live, or whose cause lives, by "sensation." Their minds appear to get into a "hustings" state; they exaggerate and high-colour whatever supports their views, while they ignore or misrepresent any amount of facts which make the other way. In discussing the New Zealand question, which unfortunately they are very fond of doing, these persons generally overlook the events of the year and a half which elapsed between the arrival

of Governor Grey and the renewal of hostilities at Taranaki in May, 1863. They assert that the war which then commenced was identical in its merits, or, as they express it, “as iniquitous” as that under Governor Browne; and putting out of sight altogether a course of deliberate action, extending over eighteen months, which had for its object the pacific adjustment of the Waitara dispute, they assert that “we did not endeavour to make any terms with the natives, but the one thing we called upon them to do, was to lay down their arms and cease to be rebels.” * The object of the present chapter will be to endeavour to show by a simple record of facts, how entirely untrue and unfair is the view taken by these persons.

When the truce referred to in the last chapter was made, William Thompson, who represented the Maories, said:—“Let the law have the care of the Waitara; let a good man from the Queen investigate the case—that is, some person sent by the Duke of Newcastle, to suppress the troubles

* Lord Alfred Churchill, Ab. Pro. Soc. Report, 1865, p. 20.

in this land." William King had previously put Waitara into Thompson's hands, appointing him in the most solemn manner, his plenipotentiary to settle the pending dispute about it with the Governor. When Governor Grey arrived, we naturally looked to Thompson to make advances. He made none ; but with the other leaders of the King party, held himself aloof. Tamati Nopera, an uncle of the king, a chief of very high rank and great influence, who was living near Auckland, was induced to visit Thompson and the other King leaders, to endeavour to persuade them to make overtures to the Governor, or at all events to come to Auckland to see him. When Nopera returned I was present at his interview with the Governor. It was too evident that his visit to Waikato had done him no good. He was reticent, and formal to the last degree, and did nothing but fence with the Governor about words. The interview was a very protracted one, and the Governor was obliged at last to terminate it abruptly. Shortly after this the Governor visited by invitation a friendly chief in Lower Waikato. There was a very large gathering of friendly natives, but no chief of the

King party of any note made his appearance. Two inferior men of that party, who professed to be delegates but had no credentials, wrangled with the Governor for some hours at public gatherings on the merits of Kingism. It had been hoped that the leading men of the party would have availed themselves of this opportunity of meeting the Governor in their own district, where he had come unattended by any but a few civilians. He waited some days, and then returned to Auckland a good deal chagrined at the result.

This conduct of the Waikatos was altogether irreconcilable with the idea that they wished for peace. Sir George Grey had during his previous administration been on the most friendly terms with them; he had been most liberal towards them in the distribution of ploughs, mills and other things; he had been personally acquainted with most of the leading chiefs; and yet when he came in the character of "the good man sent out by the Duke of Newcastle to investigate Waitara, and suppress the troubles in the land," they absolutely ignored his presence in the country and abstained from all communication

with him. This was not the course which men of candour, honestly desiring peace, would have pursued.

I was so deeply impressed with the conviction that before any good could be done "Waitara" must be disposed of, that before the Governor returned to Auckland from Waikato, I proposed to him that I should go to the upper part of the district, see Thompson and the leading chiefs of the King party face to face, and propose to them, in the Governor's name, to refer the Waitara question to arbitration before a tribunal of two Europeans and four Maories, three to be appointed by the natives, and three by the Governor. His Excellency assented, and I went. Thompson was absent from the district; but I found nearly the whole of the other leading chiefs of the King party assembled together at Hangitikei on the Waipa river. At my request they met me in a full public assembly, and I then formally proposed to refer Waitara to arbitration, in the manner already mentioned. The reply was that Waitara had been placed in the hands of Thompson, and whatever he might decide would be accepted by

the rest.* I waited in Waikato several days for Thompson, and sent several messengers to places where he was said to be. At last I was obliged to return to Auckland, without seeing him ; but I left a letter for him, informing him of the offer I had made to the other chiefs. At the end of a fortnight I received a reply dated 21st of January 1862 from him. It was a disingenuous and evasive document, and distinctly stated that " he would not now agree to Waitara being investigated." Coupled with his conduct towards the Governor, I could only regard this letter as proof that Thompson was playing us false, and that he was not really desirous of removing the great stumbling block in the way of re-establishing friendly relations between his people and the Government.†

However, we were determined to persevere. The influential tribes at Hawkes Bay had sympathized strongly with Waikato and William King on the Waitara question ; but they had abstained

* See *Journal of Events*, C. P. P. 1863, E. No. 13.

† See Thompson's Letter and subsequent correspondence, C. P. P. 1863, E. No. 13, p. 14, &c.

from mixing themselves up in the quarrel between them and the Government. On being told by me that Thompson had declined to refer Waitara to arbitration, they expressed great surprise and disappointment, and wrote to Thompson to know if it was true. They were told distinctly in reply "that the Waikatos disapproved of the proposal to investigate Waitara;" and they were snubbed for their interference. They, however, did not give the matter up. A great meeting of natives was to be held in Waikato in Oct. 1862, to discuss the prospects of Kingism, and thither a strong deputation of the Hawkes Bay natives went. The Bishop of New Zealand also attended it. He preached a sermon, and made a speech urging the Waikatos most earnestly to accept the proffered arbitration. The Hawkes Bay deputation honestly pressed the subject; but neither bishop nor deputation could prevail; and the matter was got rid of very summarily, much as it might have been in our Parliament, by moving the previous question.*

* Report of Peria meeting, C. P. P. 1863, E. No. 12.

In the following January, the Governor, accompanied by a single interpreter, and unannounced, visited Ngaruawahia, the usual residence of the king. The king was absent ; but the Governor had a long interview with Thompson, the general tenor of whose conversation was a determination to support the King movement, and to resist the introduction of steamers on the Waikato river ; while, on the other hand, he appears to have intimated that Waikato would not interfere to prevent the Governor from resuming possession of the Tataraimaka district and other lands from which the Taranaki settlers had been driven, and of which the natives still held armed occupation.* Nothing very encouraging, however, resulted from this interview ; and the Governor was obliged by illness to return to Auckland without seeing any of the other leading men of the King party. He seems from this time to have made up his mind that it was hopeless to endeavour any longer to induce the Waikatos to adjust the Waitara question by amicable means. He appears, however, to have determined to wash his hands of it

* *Southern Cross*, Supplement, Jan. 1863.

by any means and at all risks, and he shortly afterwards went to New Plymouth to carry out his plans upon the spot. In doing so I think, as a matter of policy, he was quite right, and had he done it in the right way, none, except those whose partisanship for Governor Browne might have warped their judgment, could possibly have objected. But there was a complication in the matter, and it baffled him. At the very last moment he took a wrong course, and the fruits of all the patient forbearance, all the diplomatic skill, all the anxious care to avoid a renewal of hostilities, which had been exercised for eighteen months, were thrown away in a day. The complication referred to was this:—

About fifteen miles south of the town of New Plymouth lies the district of Tataraimaka. This district had been purchased during Sir George Grey's previous administration, in 1848 or 1849. There had never been a shadow of a doubt as to the validity of the purchase; and it had been occupied by European settlers for ten years, holding under Crown grants. During the Taranaki war of 1860-1 the settlers were driven from this

district by the insurgent natives, and their homesteads ravaged and destroyed. The natives had ever since retained armed possession of it. It was impossible that this could be permitted to continue; and when the Governor went to Taranaki in April 1863, he had, according to the plans he had decided on, to do two things—to give up Waitara and to retake Tataraimaka. By one of those unfortunate errors which are apt to befall those who are too much given to “diplomacy,” he, for some unexplained reason, reversed the process: without even giving a hint of his intention to surrender Waitara, he sent soldiers to occupy Tataraimaka. The resident natives at first made no opposition, but they instantly sent to Waikato for orders. The orders, signed by the fighting general of the King party and other leading chiefs, were, “Begin your shooting.” They were promptly obeyed. On the 4th May 1863 an ambuscade of natives attacked a small escort party convoying some carts between Taranaki and Tataraimaka, and barbarously murdered Lieutenant Tragett, Dr. Hope, and eight rank and file of the Queen’s troops. The Governor

then committed, if possible, a greater error than his first. With the utmost precipitation he announced that Waitara was abandoned, and that the purchase from Teira would not be completed. This step, immediately following the murder of the escort, was regarded by the natives, hostile and friendly alike, from one end of the islands to the other, as the result of fear, and an indication of unmistakeable weakness on our part. It greatly encouraged our enemies, and did more to shake the attachment of our friends than any other event which had ever happened.

I think the facts I have recorded establish beyond all question a broad distinction between the war of 1860 and that of 1863. If Governor Browne was morally wrong in provoking the former, it must be admitted that during the first eighteen months of Governor Grey's administration, no means were left untried to induce the natives to adopt a course by which the cause of contention might be amicably got rid of. The sole responsibility of the renewal of the war in 1863 rests on Thompson and the other members of the Waikato tribes, who refused our repeated

and most liberal offers, to refer the matter in dispute to arbitration, and who, when the Governor retook Tataraimaka, though they themselves had no personal interest in Taranaki, ordered the resident natives to commence the work of blood. Certainly those who say that "no attempt was made to offer terms to the natives, but that we called upon them only to lay down their arms and cease to be rebels," very grossly misrepresent the facts. Governor Grey never called on them to do anything of the sort during the first year and a half of his administration; he made no aggressive movement, unless by friendly argument, against Kingism; and he punished no one for participation in the insurrection of 1860. If ever the olive branch was held out in sincerity it was during that period. Had it been accepted as sincerely as it was offered, all questions of difficulty between the Government and the natives might have been amicably adjusted, all the bloodshed which has ensued might have been spared, and the two races might have continued to occupy in harmony and peace the fine country which has ample room for both.

CHAPTER V.

Alarming State of Affairs in Waikato—Suppression by Force of Government Printing Establishment—Obstruction of Buildings at Kohekohe—Expulsion of Resident Magistrate—Attempts made by Waikatos to rouse Rebellion in the South—Thompson's Complicity—Commencement of Waikato Campaign—The first step taken by the Rebels—Attack on Escort, and Fight at Koheroa—Defeat of Rebels—Long Delay.

WHILE the Governor was engaged at Taranaki, as related in the last chapter, events had been occurring in Waikato, indicating that, even if the outbreak at the former place had not occurred, the temper of the King party had become such, that it would be impossible for the Governor long to avoid coming into hostile collision with it.

Shortly after the Governor's arrival in the colony, in 1861, William Thompson had complained of ardent spirits being smuggled into Waikato by a French trader, and called on the Government to assist him in suppressing the

practice. Advantage was taken of the opportunity afforded by this request, and a magistrate (Mr. Gorst), was sent into the heart of the Waikato country, where he was established on a small block of land which had been sold by the natives to a carpenter, and was held by him under a grant from the Crown. Mr. Gorst was not allowed by the surrounding Kingites to exercise his functions as a magistrate among them ; but he was useful to the Government in keeping it informed of what was going on in Waikato, and getting an insight into the character of the King movement. About the close of 1862 Mr. Gorst proposed to establish a school in the district, for the education of young men who might be gradually weaned from the influences of the King party ; and the Mission station of Awamutu, with an estate of several hundred acres of land, and extensive buildings, was placed at the disposal of the Government for the purpose. Additional buildings were erected, and an ample staff of teachers suitable for a large industrial school were provided at the cost of the Colonial Government, Mr. Gorst being placed at the head

of the establishment. Several pupils were induced to enter, and though things had gone much too far in Waikato to make it likely that it would exercise any perceptible influence on Kingism, yet no doubt the intention was good, and no harm, political or otherwise, was likely to arise from the establishment of such an institution, if discretion were exercised in its management. Unfortunately discretion was not exercised. The King natives had for some time past been in the habit of issuing an occasional sheet of newspaper on a very small scale, in support of the principles of Kingism. It was printed at a press which had been sent to them as a present by the Emperor of Austria, and was called the *Hokioi*—the name of a fabulous bird of ominous portent. This journal was a very poor affair, and might safely have been left to itself. Some one, however, unfortunately suggested the idea of an opposition paper for the purpose of writing down Kingism. A printing press was obtained, and under the editorship of Mr. Gorst, a journal in the Maori language was issued periodically from the industrial school. In contempt of the *Hokioi* appa-

rently, it was styled the *Pihoihoi*, the name of a little ground lark common in the country, and which might represent to Maori ideas what "the chirping sparrow" would to us. Great was the bickering between the birds; and it is probable that that which chirped under Mr. Gorst's auspices had the best of the argument. At all events the natives seem to have thought that it was more than a match for their champion, so they determined to abate it. A strong party of them marched down to the printing office armed, took possession of the press, types, and material; and in spite of all the resistance, short of bloodshed, which was offered by an extremely energetic Maori pressman, carried them away. A member of the House of Representatives palliating this transaction, said that if any one had established a violent anti-Catholic paper in the town of Tralee, that not only would the press have been seized, but the proprietor also summarily disposed of. It might be so; but the perpetrators of such an act would have been very likely to have to answer for their conduct at the next criminal assize. And though no one can

deny that the attempt to establish a political agency under cover of an industrial school was neither judicious nor straightforward, yet it certainly did not justify the resort to violence which followed. This happened in 1863. A more serious affair, however, happened very shortly afterwards.*

The Governor wishing to strengthen the frontier between the King party and Auckland, and possibly with ulterior views for the maintenance of the Queen's authority, had determined to erect a court-house and police barracks in lower Waikato, on land belonging to a loyal chief—a native magistrate—who gave his full consent; if, indeed, it was not originally requested by him, which, if my recollection does not mislead me, it was. From the very first, the King natives up the river said it should not be done. At last the timbers were ready, sent to the place, and the erection commenced. The King natives came in force, and on the 9th of March 1863, threw the whole concern into the

* All the papers relating to this affair are collected in C. P. P. 1863, E. No. 1.

river. The friendly natives resisted to the utmost short of the loss of life, but they were overpowered.*

Immediately after this transaction, the King natives expelled Mr. Gorst from the district. He and his assistants had with much courage stuck to their post to the very last, and it was only after the natives had threatened to put them into a canoe and launch them down the river—when in fact their remaining was no longer consistent with personal safety—that they abandoned it. This happened at the end of April 1863.†

These events all occurred before the outbreak at Taranaki. No sooner had that event occurred, and the King natives had committed themselves to hostilities by the part they took in directing the murders of the 4th May, than they began to make preparations for an immediate aggressive movement upon Auckland. Evidence of this poured in from all sides. A great number of letters were addressed to the Governor, to missionaries and others, by friendly natives in

* C. P. P. 1863, E. No. 3.

† C. P. P., E. No. 3, § 1.

Waikato and elsewhere, urging them in the most earnest manner to be on their guard against the contemplated attack on that city and the surrounding settled country. A mission, headed by an old chief seventy years of age, was sent by the King party to Cook's Straits, a distance of 200 miles, to rouse the natives there, and they were urged "to drive the Europeans into the sea, so that they might disappear from the island." These Southern natives were also informed, by a circular letter signed by leading chiefs of the war party in Waikato, and of which the Government obtained a copy, that it was intended *immediately* to attack Auckland and other places. They were exhorted to "sweep out their yard, and we will sweep ours," meaning, "Do you drive out the Europeans in your districts, and we will do the same;" and the letter concluded with a well-known war song of the olden time, the last line of which is, "Grasp firm your weapons, strike! fire!" It was distinctly stated also that William Thompson, the leading spirit and controlling mind of the King party, had "consented to the attack on Auckland;" and letters which he wrote imme-

diately after the commencement of hostilities confirm the statement. "I have consented," he writes on the 26th July, "to attack the whole of the town. I shall spare neither unarmed people nor property. If they prove the strongest, well and good. If the Maories prove the strongest, this is how it will be: the unarmed people will not be left." *

The Governor had no longer any doubt that the tribes of Waikato had organized plans for "the wholesale destruction of the European settlements." He had positive proof that they had authorized the murders at Taranaki, and that they were on the point of attacking the immediate neighbourhood of Auckland and committing similar murders there. He knew that they had been arming and drilling for years past. He determined at once to advance into their country, to bring to account the tribes which had provoked the outbreak at Taranaki, and to suppress if possible the threatened insurrection.

* A portion of the letters, &c. referred to, will be found in C. P. P. 1863, E. No. 3, and E. No. 3 A. Thompson's letter, E. No. 3 A., p. 7.

General Cameron was still at New Plymouth endeavouring to punish the actual perpetrators of the murders there—and he had fought one successful engagement with them at Kaitikara. He was now recalled to Auckland, with all the force that could be spared beyond what was necessary to form a garrison for the protection of the town of New Plymouth. By the beginning of July he had concentrated a strong force on the boundary between the settled European districts and the unsold Maori lands. The proper right bank of the Waikato river and the Maungatawhiri creek which falls into that river just where it makes a rectangular bend, forty miles from Auckland and about the same distance from the sea, formed the frontier line between the Imperial troops on the one side, and the insurgent natives on the other. The King tribes had always said that they should look upon our crossing this frontier as a declaration of war. We were now prepared to take that step, but not with any such intention as “declaring war.” War had already been declared by the Waikatos, when they ordered the murders of the 4th of May; *that*, according to

Maori ideas, was a declaration of war ; and the Governor crossed the Maungatawhiri creek to punish them for that act, and to arrest the invasion of the province of Auckland, of the immediate imminence of which he had the irresistible proofs above referred to.

On the 12th July General Cameron crossed the Maungatawhiri creek with a detachment of 380 men of the 12th and 14th Regiments, and placed them in a redoubt on the Koheroa ranges, overlooking, and at a distance of about 500 yards from, the Waikato river. It appears that the very day before this step was taken, the Waikatos had despatched from Ngaruawahia, the head-quarters of the rebels, in the upper river, the force intended to invade Auckland. It was divided into two columns. One of them proceeded by a circuitous route up the Maramarua creek, descending secretly through the heavily timbered Wairoa ranges, so as to outflank and get completely into General Cameron's rear.* The other column

* Governor Grey to Secretary of State, Dec. 5th, 1863. P. P. of June, 1864, p. 7; and Same to Same, 6th Jan. 1864. P. P. 23rd May, 1864.

WAIKATO CAMPAIGN.



advanced straight down the river, intending apparently to attack the outposts on the north side of the Maungatautari creek, and at the pah on the bend of the Waikato river. Both columns seem to have arranged to commence their operations simultaneously. On the 17th of July, the column which had got into the rear of our forces, attacked an escort marching from the Queen's Redoubt to Drury, under command of Capt. Ring of H.M. Royal Irish. A smart engagement ensued; but the escort was overpowered by numbers and had to retire to the shelter of a settler's house in the neighbourhood, with a loss of four killed and ten wounded. The loss of the natives was not known.

In the meantime, on the same morning, at 11 A.M., Colonel Austin, commanding the advance-post which had been stationed at Koheroa, observed a large body of natives collected on the ranges in his front. This was undoubtedly the other invading column before mentioned. He immediately got his men under arms, and advanced against the enemy; his force being increased to 500 men by detachments of the

12th and 70th Regiments which had just arrived from the camp on the other side of the creek. General Cameron, who was at the moment on his way to Koheroa, hurried forward, and put himself at the head of the force. After proceeding in skirmishing order for about two miles, the rebels opened fire ; but as the troops advanced, they retired along the narrow crest of the ridge towards the Maramarua creek in their rear, making a stand on a very favourable position which the ground presented. As our troops advanced, they fell back on several lines of rifle pits, which, from the nature of the ground, could not be turned, which they defended with great obstinacy, and from which they were only dislodged by the bayonet. From one of these positions they poured so heavy a volley on the advancing detachment of the 14th Regiment, which had never before been under fire, that the troops wavered ; and it was only by General Cameron rushing twenty yards to the front and cheering them on, that they were steadied to their work. The rebel force was pursued from one position to another, a distance of about five miles, until

they were driven in great confusion across the mouth of the Maramarua creek, where some of them escaped up the Waikato river in canoes, and others along its right bank, after swimming the creek. As no means of crossing this creek were at hand, the pursuit was here necessarily abandoned. The loss on our side was, one killed, and eleven wounded; one of whom, Lieutenant-Colonel Austin, of the 14th Regiment, afterwards died of his wounds. The loss of the natives was not accurately ascertained, but was variously reported at from 17 to 100.*

The great body of the rebels at this time were busy entrenching themselves behind earthworks and lines of rifle-pits at Meri-Meri—a strong position on the right bank of the Waikato river, about three miles from the Wangamirino creek, which now formed General Cameron's advanced post. There was, it is believed, a larger body of the rebels collected at Meri-Meri than ever again

* C. P. P. 1863, E. No. 5, p. 7. The official returns are generally under the true numbers, being made up immediately after the actions. Many, often very many, were found for days afterwards, doubling and even trebling the original return.

assembled at any one time or place ; in short, the whole force which they could bring together in Waikato proper amounting probably to not less than 1,000 fighting men, besides many women—who always assist more or less in Maori warfare making cartridges, loading guns for the combatants, cooking, and otherwise aiding in the active operations of the campaign.

After the successful skirmish with which the Waikato campaign had been initiated at Koheroa, it was earnestly hoped that no time would be lost in following up the advantage gained. Those who know savages, and particularly those who know the Maories, will agree that the one thing of essential importance in fighting with them, is always to follow up an advantage with rapidity ; never to give them breathing time, to harass them from place to place, to impede their lines of communication, to destroy their stores of provisions, and compel them thus to break up and scatter for food and safety. Such a strategy vigorously followed up, ought, in such a country as Waikato is, very briefly to have placed the Maories in a position which would in all probability have led

them to submit. What we had to convince them of was, that we were better soldiers, personally, than they were ; that our force was irresistible, and that, with our superior training and armament, they had no chance of resistance. Short, sharp, and decisive operations were what were wanted, in order to convey to the minds of the natives, not only those engaged in the conflict but to those at a distance who sympathized with them, the moral conviction that we were their masters. We therefore looked with intense anxiety to see what would be the next move made by the General against the enemy, whose whole force was encamped in a position the fortification of which was still quite incomplete, at a distance of only three miles from his advanced post. For weeks, however, we looked in vain. The skirmish at Koheroa was on the 17th July. It was not till the 30th October, a period of fifteen weeks, that a forward movement was made. I shall take advantage of this pause in the operations, to give a brief account of the country in which the Waikato campaign was conducted, and of the immediate cause of

this most serious, and, as it seemed to us, almost fatal delay.*

* To avoid breaking the thread of my narrative, I have omitted a fact that occurred a few days before the commencement of hostilities. About 300 to 400 Maories, belonging to, or closely related to the Waikatos, lived in villages very close to Auckland. They were known to be deeply disaffected. Mr. Gorst, the resident magistrate of Waikato, has designated two of their leading chiefs as "salaried firebrands," and there is no reason to doubt that their followers were sticks of the same faggot. Governor Grey (acting apparently on a hint given by the Rev. Mr. Ashwell, a missionary in Waikato) gave them the choice of taking the oath of allegiance and giving up their arms, or going off to Waikato. They preferred the latter: but the matter was clumsily managed, and they were allowed to take their arms with them. It is believed that they joined the marauding party in the Hunua ranges. Governor Grey has been vehemently assailed for this, as an act of great cruelty; but if he really believed that a plot had been matured for an attack on Auckland by the immediate relatives of those people, I cannot see that he could have prudently acted otherwise than he did.

CHAPTER VI.

Description of Waikato Country—Causes of long Delay before
Meri-Meri — Defective Transport — Neglect of River
Transport.

THE geographical relation of Waikato to Auckland, the seat of Government at the commencement of the war, will be comprehended by a glance at the map. The Waikato district may be said to commence at the point where the river takes its rectangular bend to the sea, and to embrace all the country on or about the river, and its two affluents, the Horutiu and Waipa, for 100 miles south from that point. Starting from Auckland, there is a wide metalled road for forty miles to the river ; the first twenty-five running between fences and through cultivated farms ; twelve of the remaining fifteen through a dense forest, through broken country, over hills and gullies of an eleva-

tion of from 300 to 400 feet high. The river once reached, becomes the natural highway, being navigable for light-draught steamers and boats to almost the southern extremity of the district; and the land being practically level along the proper right bank, there is also, with few and trifling impediments, chiefly creeks, a good summer road all the way, either at the river side or at a little distance from it.

The great Waikato plain between the two affluents, Horutiu and Waipa, is practically level, open, and without "bush." I remember no gradient too steep to gallop a horse upon, and there are only a few clumps of forest here and there. It is pretty nearly an equilateral triangle with sides of from forty to fifty miles each in length. In the lower and central portion there are large and intricate swamps; but they are all penetrated by good horse and dray tracks, well known to the friendly natives and the few European settlers who resided in the district. On my return to England, I visited the interior of Ceylon, and crossed the great Kaduganava pass, over a mountain some 1,500 feet high, between

Colombo and Kandy, now penetrated by a noble road, but formerly only traversed by the rude tracks of the mountaineers. A few weeks later, I surmounted, by a wonderful railroad, the celebrated Bhore Ghât pass, between Bombay and Poonah, where the locomotive now ascends a height of over 1,800 feet in little more than sixteen miles ; but where formerly there was no other road than a mere track. These two great passes present almost every conceivable impediment, from the perpendicular wall of rock to the entanglements of the densest jungle in the world. During the Mahratta and Kandyan wars, small British divisions repeatedly forced their way through them, in the face of overwhelming bodies of well-armed and well-disciplined enemies. Now compared with these passes, and the country on either side, I do not hesitate to say that the access to Waikato, and the great plain when reached, do not present a single difficulty which ought to have stopped a force like ours for a moment ; they are, in fact, by comparison, as level as a bowling-green and as smooth as a drawing-room floor.

It was, however, not the physical impediments

of the country which kept General Cameron four months before Meri-Meri. It was rather the physical requirements of his men. It is a commissariat maxim, "that great armies march on their bellies;" and whoever has seen a commissariat transport train, with its long line of waggons, its casks of bread, its barrels of beef and pork, its hogsheads of rum, its bags of sugar, and boxes of tea, will admit the truth of the maxim. The British soldier is well cared for both at home and abroad, and right it is he should be. It may, however, be carried a little too far. One of the generals who commanded in New Zealand is said, on sending out a detachment to fight one afternoon, to have given orders to the commanding officer "to be sure and have his men back to tea, for the evenings were getting cool." No doubt it was partly owing to this excessive care of soldiers the manufacture of each of whom has cost the nation 100*l.*, that it was declared "useless" to take them into the bush. The rule seems to have been, "where the rations can't be taken, the men can't be taken." The colonial forces and the friendly natives, as we shall see by and

by, when they asked, at the end of a long day in the bush, where their suppers were, were pointed to the enemy's pah, and told that they would find them there—and there, accordingly, they did find them.

It was the necessity then of piling up an ample supply of provisions and military stores "at the front" that detained General Cameron so long. Some 1,500 horses toiled incessantly at the task of hauling waggon-loads of stores from Auckland along the forty miles of road to the river, running the gauntlet through the flanking column of marauding natives who had got to the rear of the General's main force, and being continually assailed by ambuscade parties as the transport corps dragged its slow length along. Yet all this might have been avoided by a little foresight. The natural key of the Waikato country was the Waikato river, and there was no difficulty in sending supplies round by sea from Manakau, the western harbour of Auckland, and so up that river, thus avoiding the tedious and exposed land transport. The reason the river was neglected was, that no steamers and barges

suitable for its navigation had been provided. One would have imagined that any one watching the course of events in Waikato for two years previously would have arrived at the conclusion that war in that district was almost inevitable. To any one arriving at that conclusion, the necessity of a steam flotilla was obvious. Yet, when the army had to be advanced into it, no provision of the sort had been made. Nor did the representatives of the Imperial Government ever provide the means of sea and river transport, except one sea steamer purchased in December 1864, and one small tug. The Colonial Government built and bought no less than eight steamers, each of which, as fast as provided, was demanded by officers of the Imperial Government, and placed with great readiness at their disposal; but too late to avoid the serious delay referred to. Had the Governor or General provided beforehand the necessary and obvious means of transport for the Queen's troops, the Waikato campaign might have been over in less time than General Cameron took to advance upon Meri-Meri.

CHAPTER VII.

Meri-Meri evacuated—Rangiriri captured—Natives retreat up River—Ngaruawahia occupied—Negotiations for Peace—Troops advance up Waipa River—Pikopiko and Paterangi—Rebel Position outflanked—Awamutu, Rangioawhia, and Kihikihi taken—Orakau captured—Maungatautari evacuated—Termination of Campaign in Waikato.

By the end of October, the Colonial Government having in the meantime placed two iron-screened steamers, the *Pioneer* and *Avon*, at the disposal of General Cameron, his preparations for an advance were completed, and on the 30th of that month (just fifteen weeks after the engagement at Koheroa) he made in the former of these vessels a reconnaissance of the Maori position at Meri-Meri. Finding it very strong in front, he wisely determined to outflank and attack it in the rear; where, according to Maori custom, it was likely to be, and was, very weak. On the

night of the 31st he sent up a force of 612 men to a point about six miles above Meri-Meri, where they landed without difficulty, and took up a commanding position about 400 yards from the river. He then returned down the river to bring up an additional force, with which to attack the rear, or rather right flank of the Maori entrenchment. The Maories, however, were not asleep all this time. They had no intention of fighting; and they perfectly understood what was meant by General Cameron's movements. On the afternoon of the 1st of November they were observed by the officer in command of the advanced post, to be abandoning their entrenchments, and escaping in their canoes up the Maramarua and Wangamarino creeks at their rear; which, in consequence of heavy rains and the flooded state of the country, afforded more than usual facilities for the manoeuvre. Our troops appear to have been able to do nothing except look on from a distance. By the afternoon the Maori camp was evacuated; and during this evening and the next day, a force of 500 of our troops took possession of the abandoned works. They proved

to be extremely strong on their river front, rifle-pitted, and trenched over a space of 100 acres, and much protected on that side by the character of the country. But it would appear that at all times they could have been easily turned on their right flank and rear, and that an attack made from those quarters, before the flooded state of the country increased the opportunity of escape, must have ensured an easy and most important victory. With the command of the Wangamarino and Maramarua which we had on one side, and the main river on another, it only remained to throw a force across the rear and right flank, to shut them completely in. This last step was taken, as we have seen; but no provision had been made to stop the obvious line of escape up the creeks, of which of course they took advantage, and carrying off bag and baggage, left us in possession of the empty honours of their rifle-pits.* It was a great disappointment to everybody. It was believed that the flower of the Maori army was collected

* C. P. P. 1863, E. No. 5 A., p. 2.

at Meri-Meri, and after the long period of preparation it was thought that no precaution could have been omitted which might be necessary to bring the rebels to a general engagement, which might have decided the fate of the campaign and even put an end to the revolt. On too many occasions in previous wars, the Maories had given us the slip in a similar manner, and our troops on entering an evacuated pah had found nothing but perhaps a short pipe and an old pair of breeches. We began to be afraid that our triumphs in Waikato were destined to be of the same inglorious and ineffectual character, and as little likely to bring the campaign to an end. However, it was not long till better fortune dawned on our arms, and one of the principal events of the war occurred in the defeat of a large body of rebels at Rangiriri.

Rangiriri was a native village situated on the right bank of the Waikato, about twelve miles above Meri-Meri. It was equally accessible from the latter place by land and by water. For a few days after the natives evacuated Meri-Meri, it was supposed they had scattered and retreated far

up the river, which I believe was true of the Ngatimaniopotu contingent. Information however soon reached General Cameron that a strong party of them were entrenching themselves at Rangiriri, and on the 20th November he advanced by land against that place, with a force of 771 men, and two Armstrong guns; sending at the same time by the river the two steamers, with an additional force of 300 soldiers, and about 200 of the Naval Brigade; in all, nearly 1,300 men, accompanied by four gunboats on the river. The Maori force is reported to have been between 400 and 500. Their position was a strong one, if they had been numerous enough to defend it and beat off our troops; but if otherwise it was a complete trap, deficient in the usual appliance of a safe back-door, for which their entrenched positions are usually so remarkable. It consisted of a main line of entrenchments across the narrow isthmus which divides the Waikato river from the Waikareai lake. This line had a double ditch and parapet, and was strengthened in the centre by a square redoubt of very formidable construction, of which the ditches are

stated to have been nine feet deep and the parapet (I presume from the bottom of the ditch,) twenty-one feet high. Behind the left centre of the main line and at right angles to it, there was an entrenched line of rifle-pits parallel to the Waikato river, and obstructing the advance of troops in that direction. Altogether, though formidable in appearance, the works were of far larger extent than the small Maori force in possession could defend, if attacked in front and rear at one time. General Cameron with the 770 men whom he had brought by land, and his Armstrong guns, prepared to attack the post in front, while the 500 men in the steamers were to be landed on the rear, to attack it on that side and cut off the retreat in that direction or by the lake on the right flank. The two forces arrived at Rangiriri at the same time—3 p.m.—but owing to some difficulty in getting the steamers to the landing-place, an hour and a half elapsed, during which shot and shell were poured into the entrenchments, at a range of 600 yards, by the Armstrong guns. Not much effect was produced by them, and at 4½ p.m. the assault was ordered to be led by the 65th

Regiment. With great gallantry they carried the rifle-pits and the weaker portion of the main line, driving the rebels into the strong central redoubt above described, which was defended with desperate resolution. The 65th having failed in the attempt to carry it, three separate assaults were made upon it: one by thirty-six men of the Royal Artillery, led by Captain Mercer, and two by ninety of the Naval Brigade, led by Commander Mayne of H.M.S. Eclipse. But all attempts to carry the work by storm were unavailing, while the assaulting parties were literally mowed down by the heavy fire which was poured upon them. At last it being nearly dark, the attempt to storm the work was discontinued; the troops were disposed around it for the night, so as to preclude escape, and a trench was commenced with the view of sapping and blowing up the parapet. In the meantime the soldiers and part of the Marine Brigade, which had landed from the steamers about the time when the assault in front began, had got round to the rear, and discovered that a large number of the natives were escaping by the lake and swamp on their right flank; from a

commanding position they poured in a heavy fire on the fugitives, inflicting a very severe loss, and stopping any further attempt at escape in that direction. It is stated that before the arrival of the 40th both the King Matutaere and William Thompson had succeeded in escaping by this route. I could never ascertain for a certainty that either of them was actually there, though on the testimony of five independent narrators, I am inclined to think that the king was; and one of the rebel prisoners pointed out to me on paper the track by which he said Thompson had got away. The rebels probably would not like to admit that their great men had been the first to get from under fire, which may account for the conflicting statements which have been made on the point.*

During the night the natives kept up a desultory fire, and expressed their defiance by the most hideous yells. They knew very well, however, that they were trapped; and at early daylight one of their chiefs appeared on the parapet with a white flag, asking for an inter-

* C. P. P. 1863, E. No. 5 A., p. 3.

preter. The General was sent for, and they surrendered unconditionally : 183 men, 2 women, and 175 stand of arms fell into our hands.

The casualties on our side were extremely numerous : 2 officers killed, and 13 wounded, of whom 3—Colonel Austin of the 14th, Captain Mercer of the Royal Artillery, and Captain Phelps—afterwards died of their wounds. Privates, 35 men killed, and 85 wounded. Total casualties, 135. The loss on the Maori side is never accurately ascertained. They generally contrive to carry off many of their dead, and when they have the opportunity they will bury them during the action, as they did on this occasion. About fifty was, I believe, the total number of bodies found in the trenches and swamp, though probably a few more were killed in the latter and the lake.

Both Maories and troops exhibited very great courage. Nothing could surpass the conduct of our troops, who, at the word of command, literally threw themselves against the impregnable earthworks, to meet almost certain death. The victory, though dearly bought, was a most im-

portant one to us. The 183 prisoners represented a very large portion of the immediate followers and near connexions of the King and William Thompson ; and among their wounded was a chief of very great military reputation, Pene Wharepu, who died of his wounds a few days after the fight. What became of the prisoners I shall relate hereafter.

The colonists, though of course entirely ignorant of military technicalities, could not help criticizing the tactics of the General. It did seem to us a strange thing to attempt to storm, with no other weapons than revolver pistols, an earth-work such as the central redoubt, before which so many of our brave soldiers and sailors fell. There were no platforms or scaling-ladders to bridge the ditches, 9 feet wide, or scale the parapet 21 feet high. To get over them in any other way than by ladders and platforms involved a capacity to jump about six clear yards at an upward angle of 45 degrees from the take-off : a feat which probably no acrobat could perform, and certainly no soldier or sailor in the usual military costume, with a six-shooter in his hand,

and several rounds of ammunition at his waist, especially in the face of a large armed force completely protected by the parapet. On the other hand it appeared to us that if the redoubt had been quietly surrounded as soon as the enemy was driven into it from the outer entrenchments (which was done with little or no loss on our side), and a sap had been pushed on during the night, the Maories must have surrendered in the morning, or have fallen almost helplessly before our bayonets ; while all the valuable lives which were sacrificed in the vain attempt to carry by assault earthworks of great strength, without a breach and without ladders, would have been spared. The assault on Rangiriri was just one of those military achievements, the reasons for which it puzzles a civilian to understand.

The rebels now retired, leaving the river and the formidable gorge of Taupiri undefended. After waiting a few days for supplies, General Cameron again pushed on, and on the 8th December he took possession of Ngaruawahia, unopposed. This place, which stands at the junction of the Horutiu and Waipa rivers, had

been the head-quarters of Kingism, where old Potatau's bones were laid, and where his son Matutaere held his court in a palace consisting of a large hut constructed of reeds and grass in the usual Maori fashion. Here also stood the gigantic flagstaff, from which, in its more prosperous days, floated the emblem of the King party. Potatau's bones had been carried away before the arrival of our troops, but his tomb, the palace, and the flagstaff, were left standing.

The time had now arrived when there seemed to be an opening for negotiations for peace. Pene Wharepu, a leading chief of the King party, who was mortally wounded at Rangiriri, had before his death written to the Governor expressing a desire for negotiation. The Governor had replied that "the General must go to Ngaruawahia; then I will talk with you."* On that event occurring, the colonial ministry urged the Governor to visit Ngaruawahia, accompanied by two of themselves, in order that, if the rebels really were desirous of coming to terms, the opportunity

* Papers relating to intended visit to Ngaruawahia. C. P. P. 1864, E. No. 2, p. 1, &c., and p. 88.

might be afforded them. As is too often the case with Governor Grey, he could not make up his mind. At first he acquiesced in the advice of his ministers, and a document was prepared and assented to by him, stating the terms on which submission would be accepted, which it was intended to issue at Ngaruawahia, and which bore date at that place. Then he changed his mind, and would not go; then, after much pressing, he changed it again, and would go. Then the day was fixed; carriages were ordered for the following morning; horses, provisions, and personal baggage sent on. At half-past nine the evening before the start was to be made, the Governor changed his plans again, and finally decided not to go. Instead of a personal visit, a letter was written to the natives by the Governor, telling them that if they wished to know the course that would be pursued towards them for the future in case they submitted, he was prepared to receive at Auckland any deputation of chiefs they might please to send. No reply was ever given by them to this letter, which is known to have reached them. William Thompson, some

months afterwards (August 9th, 1864), writing to the Roman Catholic bishop,* positively asserts that if the Governor had gone to Ngaruawahia, peace would have been made, and that he was exceedingly disappointed at its not being done. But if that is the case, why was the Governor's letter not even replied to? It is most unfortunate for Thompson's reputation as "the Peacemaker" that on many occasions, when a frank word spoken by him would, according to the testimony of his own people, have settled all our differences, that word was not spoken. It is very well for him to tell us in August 1864, that peace could have been made in December 1863. Why did he not tell us so at the time? I am sorry to say that there is distinct evidence that during the period when Thompson declares that he had retired from the war, and was remaining quiet in the hope that peace would be made, he was stimulating the east coast tribes by fabulous reports of Maori victories, at which he professed to have been present, to come and join the war in

* C. P. P. 1864, E. No. 2, p. 88.

Waikato.* However, there is no doubt it was an unfortunate thing that the Governor did not go to Ngaruawahia; and it afforded a colourable pretext for the rebels charging him, as they do, with a breach of faith, and with the responsibility of all subsequent hostilities.

From the 8th of December to the 27th of January, General Cameron was detained at Ngaruawahia waiting for supplies. In the meantime, the rebels had taken up a strong position at Pikopiko and Paterangi, about forty miles up the Waipa river. Some twelve miles inland of this, nearly at right angles to the river, lay the Awamutu mission station, where Mr. Gorst's unsuccessful experiments had been carried on; a little further on was Kihikihi, the "country seat" of Rewi, the great fighting general of the rebel party; and two miles further, Rangioawhia, where were the principal cultivations of Waikato, and where nearly the whole supplies of food of the rebel party were either stored

* Governor Grey to Secretary of State, Mar. 7, 1864. P. P. June 1864, p. 42.

or ripening in the ground. It was of vital importance to them to prevent these places falling into our hands. There were two routes by which they could be got at. One by water for about forty miles up the larger and deeper branch of the river, the Horutiu, to Pukurimu, and thence across a nearly level and open country, by a good Maori track of a dozen miles, defended by only one feeble pah (Ohupu). The other route was up the Waipa (as far as Paterangi), a narrow and comparatively shallow stream, full of snags and dangerous sand-banks, up which the principal steamer of the river flotilla could not go. The road inland from Paterangi, about twelve miles, was defended by four or five pahs of great strength. The natives had, with much acuteness, calculated upon our following them up in front, instead of doing what no doubt they would have done themselves, slip quickly up the Horutiu, and across the level country behind, reaching Rangioawhia in a few hours after the capture of Ngaruawahia. Such promptitude would, perhaps, have been contrary to the regular rules of war, and General Cameron preferred to follow the

rebels at his leisure, and by the more difficult line of advance to which they so cunningly invited him. Arrived before Pikopiko and Paterangi, he found these places so strongly fortified, that to carry them by assault would, he conceived, have entailed terrible loss on our side. An accidental skirmish, at Waiarei, in which the rebels suffered very severely, originating in an attack upon a party of soldiers bathing in the Mangopiko creek, enabled him to throw forward a force to an advanced point on one flank of the defences of Paterangi, and directly on an old inland road towards Rangwahia. Obtaining the services of a former Waikato settler (Edwards) who knew every inch of the ground, he marched out of camp on a dark night (the 20th of February), with a force of 1,000 men, and shortly after daylight he astonished the Maories at Awamutu, by rousing them out of their beds. The movement was skilfully and adroitly effected; and though there is little doubt that it might have been done weeks before, and with infinitely greater ease, if the Horutiu branch of the river had been made the base of operations instead of the

Waipa, yet when done it was a complete success. From Awamutu General Cameron pushed on to Rangioawhia, where he surprised a considerable body of rebels, and a running fight, carried on among the huts of the village, ensued, ending in the defeat of the natives, with considerable loss. On our side, however, Colonel Nixon, of the Colonial Defence Corps, and one or two other valuable officers of the same service, were mortally wounded. The General then withdrew his force for the night to the more comfortable quarters at the mission station (Awamutu); but early next morning a force of rebels, estimated at 400, who had evacuated Paterangi, were found to be entrenching themselves near Rangioawhia. They were immediately attacked by a detachment of the 50th Regiment, who gallantly charged them with the bayonet as they lay under the cover of an old bank fence. They delivered one volley as the soldiers came on, and then bolted, with so much precipitation that many of them left their cartouche-boxes and ammunition behind. They were followed by the mounted defence force, and scattered pell-mell into the swamp

and bush where they could not be followed.* The rebels suffered severely in these engagements, while our losses, with the exception of the officers mentioned, were trivial. The result proved how much better policy it was to draw them out where they could be engaged in the open, than to accept their challenge to try our bull-dog courage against their strong entrenchments. There were very few occasions on which we assailed their posts, and suffered so severely, when a few hours' patience would not have compelled them either to surrender, or to come out and engage us outside, as they did at Orakau. On scarcely any occasion had they more than a few hours' food inside their fortified positions; on more than one they had scarcely any food and absolutely no water; and had our troops simply surrounded them, availed themselves of the good offices of hunger and thirst, to which a few hours must have subjected our enemy, employing the spade in the meantime

* For General Cameron's despatches, see C. P. P. 1864, E. No. 3, p. 29.

to ensure quicker access, if necessary, civilians cannot help thinking that the result would have been more satisfactory. Indeed, a partial resort to those tactics on the next occasion on which our troops became engaged, led to one of the most complete successes which we achieved during the war. I shall proceed to give an account of it.

Immediately after the events at Rangioawhia and the neighbourhood, a large party of the scattered rebels collected together at Maungatautari, a stronghold on the Horutiu, about fifteen miles to the north-east of Awamutu. It was a place to which great traditions of Maori wars attached, and was supposed to be almost impregnable. It was now said that William Thompson, and all the women and children of his tribe, and a large miscellaneous force of rebels, were there collected, prepared to make a final stand at this, the only remaining place of strength in the district of Waikato Proper. The General made up his mind to reduce it, and the superior advantages of the Horutiu having by this been made apparent to the military and naval authorities, immense sup-

plies were sent up that river to Pukerimu, where the head-quarters camp was formed. Before, however, active operations could be taken against the pah, an unexpected event occurred in another direction.

Brigadier-General Carey (late 18th Royal Irish) had been left with a considerable force in charge of Awamutu, Rangioawhia, and the surrounding district. On the 30th March he was informed that the natives were entrenching themselves at Orakau, about three miles from his quarters. After reconnoitring their position he returned, and collecting a force of about 1,000 men, with three guns, he made a night march, appearing before the pah at early daylight, and having so arranged the arrival of his detachments from different posts, that from the first they surrounded the enemy's position and rendered escape impossible. The pah proved to be a place of great strength, with the usual ditches and parapets of more than usual depth and height, surrounded on the outside by a strong post and rail fence, and outlying connected rifle-pits. At first, General Carey fell into the same mistake as cost so

many lives at Rangiriri, in attempting to storm the works and take them by a rush. But after two assaults by the Royal Irish and Forest Rangers (Colonial), led by Capt. Ring of the 18th and Capt. Fisher of the 40th, the former of whom fell mortally and the latter severely wounded, and a third led by Capt. Baker of the 18th, he wisely desisted, and determined to adopt the slower but more certain method of approaching the defences by sap; which, it may be thought, it would have been quite as prudent to have done at the commencement. The number of natives inside is supposed to have been about 300; most of them desperadoes from the wild tribes of the Urewera on the east coast, and the central interior district of Taupo. They were commanded by Rewi, the great fighting general of the King party; though that was not known till after the engagement. During the afternoon a reinforcement of 150 to 200 rebels appeared in sight, evidently intending to relieve the place. They advanced to the edge of a bush about 900 yards in the rear of our outposts, but there they stopped and commenced firing harmless volleys, at the same time

endeavouring to encourage their friends in the pah by dancing the war-dance and yelling. In the meantime reinforcements kept arriving on our side from Maungatautari and elsewhere, which brought up our number to over 2,000 men, who were so disposed that the escape of the beleaguered Maoris seemed to be absolutely impossible. All that day and the following night heavy firing was kept up on both sides; not less than 40,000 rounds of cartridges were served out to our troops. By the morning of the 2nd of April the sap was pushed close up to the works, and hand-grenades were thrown into the entrenchments. The Armstrong guns were brought into play, silencing the fire of the enemy to a great extent. General Cameron now arrived on the ground from Maungatautari, but did not interfere with the direction of operations. As it was known, however, that there were many women and children inside, he sent an interpreter, Mr. Mainwaring (now resident magistrate at Waikato) to tell them that if they would surrender their lives would be spared. Their reply was, "This is the word of the Maori: we will fight for ever,

and ever, and ever." (Ka whawhai tonu; Akè, Akè, Akè.) They were then urged to send out the women and children. They answered, "The women will fight as well as we;" and then the firing recommenced. Does ancient or modern history, or our own "rough island story," record anything more heroic?

Our troops were now getting desperate, so near to a hand-to-hand encounter, and only a parapet between. A private, whose name I unfortunately have not discovered, threw his cap over a partially breached place, and rushed after it. About twenty others, chiefly colonial troops, led by Captain Hertford, of the Colonial Defence Force, followed, got over the fence and into the trench beyond. The Maories, packed into a corner, delivered a withering volley and ran for the inner works. Captain Hertford fell, shot through the head, and of the whole party of twenty, ten were down. Shortly afterwards some men of the 65th and militia made a similar attempt on the opposite side, but with no better success. It was now four o'clock of the third day, during which the Maories had had no food

but a few raw potatoes, and not a drop of water ; while the shower of grape, hand-grenades, and rifle-balls poured with more and more effect into their entrenchments. Suddenly, on that side of the works which was supposed to be closely invested by a double line of the 40th Regiment under Colonel Leslie, the whole Maori force was seen to be escaping. A friend of mine, who was present, described it to me. "They were," said he, "in a solid column, the women, the children, and the great chiefs in the centre; and they marched out as cool and as steady as if they had been going to church." The first line of the 40th was disposed under a slight bank, which had sheltered it from the fire of the pah. Before they knew that the Maories were out, the latter, it is said, had actually jumped over their heads, and then passing on, walked through the second line. By this time the General and his staff had discovered what was going on; the troops in the rear and in the trenches were got together, and with tremendous yells started in pursuit, firing at the retreating Maories as they now quickened their pace, and broke away for a neighbouring

swamp and scrub. Here they might all have escaped in a body, but for a small corps of colonial cavalry and another of mounted artillery (regulars) and the Colonial Forest Rangers, under Captains Jackson and Von Tempsky. These forces got ahead, and met them again just as they emerged from the swamp and scrub, and did great execution. Upwards of 100 bodies were picked up on the field, 18 or 20 were stated by the survivors to have been buried in the entrenchments, 26 wounded prisoners, and 7 unwounded, were taken, and traces were found next day of a number of more dead having been dragged away during the night. The natives themselves afterwards acknowledged to a loss of 200. Our casualties amounted to 16 killed and 52 wounded.

Rewi escaped unscathed. He got away with a small party of seven or eight. After running some distance, it is said he loaded his gun and sat down, saying, "it was no use; let them take him."* His friends, however, persuaded him to go on; he got up, and ultimately reached Han-

* Despatches, C. P. P. 1864, E. No. 3, p. 52, &c.

gatikei, a stronghold of his tribe on the Waipa, about 40 miles from Orakau.

There was much comment on the escape of the Maories through the lines of the 40th. General Carey excuses them in his official despatch on the ground that the regiment "had been thrown back under cover to enable the guns to open." This would scarcely seem enough to account for it. A soldier, writing to one of the Auckland papers some months afterwards, says "they had been sent away to a distance to make gabions." This is not consistent with the other account. The regular correspondent of the *Southern Cross* (Auckland) says, "The retreat appears to have been first noticed from the small breastwork thrown up as a protection for the gunners, &c. The cry was quickly heard that the rebels were retreating, and a scene baffling description ensued. General Cameron, Brigadier-General Carey, and aides, and the gallant colonels of the Staff, were rushing about to warn and gather the men from the sap, &c. This occupied some minutes, and all this time not a 40th man appears to have seen them. The Maories must have

jumped over the heads of the soldiers lining the road, cut out of the steep embankment, and so passed into the swamp and the Ti-tree, first wounding, it is said, two or three of the 40th, as a remembrance of their passing. No attempt was made to pursue them, until the Forest Rangers, &c." This exactly corresponds with what was told me by the friend before referred to, who was on the field. One thing is certain, that, whoever may have been to blame, it was *through* the double line of the 40th, *or* over their heads, *or* behind their backs, that the Maories escaped; and that, had this not unfortunately happened, Rewi, the most influential chief in the war party, must have fallen into our hands, dead or alive.

General Cameron now returned to Pukurimu to prepare for his intended attack on Maungatautari. On the morning of the 5th of April he proceeded with a force of 300 men, to reconnoitre the position from the opposite bank of the river. To his surprise he found it evacuated. A few remnants of old clothing, a kit of mouldy corn, and an old musket, was all that remained to reward the party of six men who crossed the

river, and clambered up into the works. It was, however, a place of great strength, both from position and by artificial works. What, however, was not at all unusual in old Maori wars, and was the case at Orakau, not a drop of water existed within the works. In the old times the Maories, when besieged, trusted to their braves getting out at nights and bringing water through the lines of the enemy. But closely invested, these waterless entrenchments were mere traps; and had we contented ourselves with surrounding them, and abstained from throwing away ammunition and lives in vain attempts to storm them, the Maories must, in every such case, have walked out into our lines at the end of forty or fifty hours. Even if, at the end of that time, the natives had succeeded in breaking through our lines, as at Orakau, a small cavalry force in reserve would always have enabled us, as it did on that occasion, to cut off their retreat and inflict crushing loss upon them.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Tauranga Campaign undertaken at request of General Cameron—Reasons for—Condition of Natives there—Unfortunate Repulse of our Troops at the Gate Pah—Successful affair at Te Ranga—Submission of Tauranga Natives.

WITH the evacuation of Maungatautari may be said to have ended the campaign in Waikato Proper. As the General had advanced he had left military posts behind him at intervals, so that the whole district from Auckland was now effectually held by our forces. Several of these posts were occupied by the Volunteer Settlers, who had been enlisted on terms which entitled them to grants of land, and who were now placed in partial possession of these allotments.

In recording the events of the Waikato campaign, I have so far confined myself entirely to a relation of the principal sieges (if they may be so

called) and engagements on the main line of operations. It would have been impossible, within any reasonable limits, to record all the skirmishes, the attacks on escorts or redoubts, the demolitions of homesteads, isolated murders of old men, women, and children, which occurred, chiefly in the rear of our forces, and to within 17 miles of the town of Auckland, during the first four months of hostilities. Some of the skirmishes were very gallant affairs, and well deserve to be recorded in detail, if it could have been done. But to have done so would only have distracted the attention of the reader from that main line of operations by which the rebels were driven back from their attempted invasion, and the country occupied.

I shall therefore now proceed to narrate the events of what has been called the "Tauranga campaign." The district of Tauranga lies in the Bay of Plenty, on the east coast, and may seem at first sight to have little connection with Waikato. The operations there were, however, only a part of the Waikato campaign, and as closely connected with it as the operations in the

Lower Waikato were with those in the Upper. The actual distance of Tauranga harbour from Pukurimu in Waikato, where we left General Cameron encamped, does not exceed 40 miles as the crow flies. The intervening country is somewhat broken, but not mountainous, and but for a considerable forest on the crest of the dividing ridge, detachments might easily have been sent across from Waikato. William Thompson and his people had large possessions at Tauranga, and often lived on and cultivated them. Many of the Tauranga people were similarly interested in Waikato, and went backwards and forwards between the two. During the fighting in Waikato, it appears from the statistical return of the local commissioner,* that more than two-thirds of the adult males on the west shore of the Tauranga harbour had been engaged in active hostilities with the Queen's troops in the former district. They were also known to be growing large crops which were destined to feed the rebel army, and which were the only considerable supply which

* C. P. P. 1864, E. No. 2, pp. 13, 14.

it had to look to after the capture of Rangioawhia. General Cameron was aware that the rebel force was greatly increased by these Tauranga natives, and by contingents from other tribes lower down the east coast, such as the savage Uriwera, the Ngatiporo, and others. On the 13th of January, just before proceeding to invest Paterangi, he wrote to the Governor, urgently pressing the despatch of an expedition to Tauranga, and along the east coast, in order to create a diversion, and draw off a large part of the force opposed to him. The Governor consulted his ministers. They advised * that, for the strategical reasons urged by General Cameron, and in deference to his opinion, the expedition to Tauranga should be sent, but that no operations should be attempted further down the coast, as being likely to involve us with tribes which were believed to be friendly. The Governor, who (like the Maories when they build a pah) always likes, when responsibility is to be incurred, to leave a back-door for escape, assented, but said he did it "reluctantly." How-

* C. P. P. 1864, E. No. 2, p. 7.

ever reluctantly or not, he issued his orders (without which, of course, not a soldier could have been moved), and a force of 500 men, under Lieut.-Colonel Carey of the 18th Royal Irish, went from Auckland by sea. On Colonel Carey's promotion as Brigadier-General, the command of the post devolved on Lieut.-Colonel Greer, of the 68th Regiment.

For some weeks nothing material occurred. The troops were stationed on a block of land at Te Papa, belonging to the Church Missionary Society, and the few natives who had not gone to Waikato, from that side of the harbour, affected to be friendly. The temper of some of the tribes down the east coast was, however, said to be unfavourable, and the Ngatiporo and Ngatiawa were said to be preparing a force of 2,000 men to assist in any hostilities that might occur. They were kept in check by the friendly Arawa, at Maketu, about 16 miles from Tauranga, and at Matata about the same distance further south; strengthened at both places by small detachments of our troops. After the fall of Orakau, and evacuation of Maungatautari, at the

end of March, the Tauranga natives, accompanied by parties of Waikato, returned home, and began to threaten Colonel Greer's position at Te Papa. He asked General Cameron for reinforcements, which were sent, and the General himself moved his head-quarters to Tauranga.

On the 27th of April he reconnoitred the position of the rebels, where they had entrenched themselves at a distance of about three miles from Te Papa. Their defences were of the usual earth-work type, constructed on a neck of land which fell off into a swamp on either side. On the highest point of this neck, about fifty feet by a very gradual rise from the approach in front and rear, the Maories had constructed an oblong redoubt, about seventy yards wide by thirty deep, well palisaded and surrounded by a post and rail fence. The intervals between the side faces of the redoubt and the swamps were defended by lines of rifle-pits. The rifle-pits of the main redoubt were in three zigzag tiers, roofed with wattles and thatched with fern, and the eaves of the roofs so raised as to enable the garrison to fire out on their assailants. In some cases the

roofs were covered with earth. So long therefore as the assailants were before the works the defenders had everything in their favour; but when once the assailants should get inside, *they* had the advantage, because standing on the parapets and roofs of the inner trenches, the defenders could not show themselves without being exposed to the fire and bayonets of those above them. In fact the pah was a trap, in which, with ordinary precaution and courage, the rebels might have been taken to a man.

The number of natives in the works is believed not to have exceeded 300. The survivors asserted that their force was not more than 150. They were entirely without artillery, and there was no water in the pah. Our force consisted of 16 field officers, 20 captains, 35 subalterns, 8 staff, 94 sergeants, 42 drummers, and 1,480 rank and file. In fact the officers alone of our force amounted to nearly four-fifths of the entire strength of the enemy, while our total force (1,695) was at least five times as large as theirs. Besides these we had a battery of artillery, consisting of one 110-pr. Armstrong

gun, two 40-pr. Armstrongs, two 6-pr. Armstrongs, two 24-pr. howitzers, two 8-inch mortars and 6 cohorn mortars. Perhaps to this '*embarras de richesses*' may be attributed the disastrous result which followed.

By able dispositions the pah was completely surrounded after dark on the evening of the 27th, the General remaining with his troops on the ground all night. The 68th Regiment had been cleverly manœuvred past the pah, and prevented escape from the rear. Detachments of the 43rd and 70th, and 371 men of the naval brigade, were placed in front. The Artillery was planted in four batteries at distances varying from 800 to 100 yards from the works. At 6.30 A.M. on the morning of the 28th February the natives fired a volley at our skirmishers, and fire opened simultaneously from our four batteries. For the first two hours our fire was directed mainly at a flag-staff which was supposed to be in the redoubt, but which the natives, with their usual cunning, and trusting no doubt to our usual deficiency of that quality, had placed outside the pah 100 yards in the rear. This ruse, however, seems to have been

at last discovered, and a fire of shot and shell was poured into the redoubt, which, as I heard it said by one who was present, would "have smothered Sebastopol." Much of the fire, however, from the Armstrongs was extremely wild, and the huge 110-pr. and 40-pr. shells went booming and whizzing over the works for a distance of from 1,000 to 2,000 yards. When riding some months afterwards I saw many of them lying about unexploded.

During all this time, except twice at long intervals, the natives never fired a shot. Now and again a man would be seen shovelling up earth to repair a breach, and once a man hung up a blanket across the inner palisading where damaged by our fire. Imagine the position of the Maories lying still in their grass-roofed and wattled burrows excavated in the banks of their rifle-pits, listening hour after hour to the roar of the big guns and the hurtling sound of the projectiles, feeling the terrible concussions of the shells as they struck close by or just over them, or scattered in fragments and carrying death among them, with the certain conviction that

before night they would be assailed by the bayonets of an overwhelming force of trained soldiers. It must have required something more than a dogged disregard of death in untutored men, to enable them patiently to await their apparently inevitable end, amidst such a terrible scene.

By 4 P.M., one of the angles had been completely breached, and the assault was ordered. The assaulting party consisted of 150 seamen and marines, and an equal number of the 43rd Regiment. 170 men of the 70th were extended to keep down the enemy's fire, and to follow the assaulting column into the breach. The remainder of the seamen and marines, and of the 43rd Regiment (300 together), followed as a reserve. The assaulting column, protected by the nature of the ground, gained the breach with little loss, and effected an entrance into the main body of the works, charging with a cheer which was answered by their comrades over the field: the 68th in rear at the same moment drawing in close to the works, to cut off the escape in that direction. Up till this everything went well, and it was believed by

those outside that the pah was taken. The natives actually attempted to escape from the rear ; but seeing the 68th pressing on, turned back, and suddenly reappeared in front of the assaulting column. At this moment, from some cause which General Cameron says " he is at a loss to explain," a sudden panic seized our men, and, turning round, they rushed pell-mell out of the breach, in headlong and terrified flight, crying out, " There's thousands of them, there's thousands of them ! " At this moment, Captain Hamilton, of H.M.S. *Esk*, rushed up with the reserve of the naval brigade ; but it was too late, and he fell with a bullet through his brain as he mounted the breach. What came of Major Ryan's seventy-five and the rest of the reserve of the naval brigade, and 43rd, is not stated in any of the reports of the affair ; but they seem, at all events, to have been unable to check the flight of the retreating column, if they attempted it, and not to have taken their place in the breach. The rebels concentrated their fire on the flying column, and committed fearful execution. After a time, our force was rallied, but General Cameron thought

it unadvisable to renew the assault, and directed a line of entrenchment to be thrown up within 100 yards of the work, so as to be able to maintain an advanced position, intending to resume operations on the following morning. The night proved pitchy dark; and for a time the rebels howled and shouted fearfully, as they usually do on such occasions. Suddenly this demonstration ceased, and by-and-by firing was heard from the rear, indicating an escape through the lines of the 68th. An officer crept up about midnight, and found the pah evacuated. It was not taken possession of till daylight, when several of our wounded were found still alive. They had not been stripped nor plundered (with the exception of a watch and one or two trinkets). Our loss on this lamentable occasion amounted to 27 killed and 66 wounded, several of whom afterwards died of their wounds. Only 10 Maories were found dead in the pah, but it was said that they had carried several of their dead away, and that a great part of their wounded escaped.* Their total

* Despatches, C. P. P. 1864, E. 3, p. 60. *Southern Cross* Supplement for May, and private information of spectators.

loss was afterwards estimated at between 30 and 40, among whom were some chiefs of importance.

The criticism of the colonists on this affair was that from the position of the pah, the facility and completeness with which it was surrounded by an overwhelming force, and the all-important fact that it contained no water, the rebels might easily have been forced into surrender, or compelled to fight outside. We ventured to imagine also that it could scarcely be consistent with the rules of military science to compose the assaulting column of two such discrepant branches of the service as an infantry regiment and a naval brigade, particularly when we had an ample force of one branch in the field. Rumour does allege that the final disaster was owing to a want of discipline on the part of one of the forces employed, and some stiff correspondence is said to have passed between officers of the two services on the subject, which, of course, however, has not been allowed to become an official record. This criticism received support by an event which happened shortly afterwards when the 43rd Regiment retrieved its character in the attack on Te

Ranga, an entrenchment in course of construction about three miles inland of the Gate pah. This occurred on the 21st June. Lieutenant-Colonel Greer, who had been left in command at Tauranga, hearing early in the morning that the rebels were entrenching themselves at Te Ranga, in a position almost exactly similar to that which they had occupied at the Gate pah, resolved on dislodging them before they had completed their works. He took with him a detachment of the 43rd and 68th regulars and 1st Waikato Regiment, and a small corps of colonial cavalry; and after a few enfilading rounds from a big gun, he ordered an assault, which was most gallantly effected with the bayonet, the 43rd leading, closely followed by the other detachments. The natives were caught in the trenches, and a hand-to-hand fight ensued; while those of the rebels who fled were followed and cut up by the cavalry. The engagement only lasted a few minutes. 109 dead bodies of the enemy were picked up and buried on the spot; 19 wounded rebels (of whom 12 died of their wounds), and 11 unhurt, were taken

.

prisoners. Our loss was only 8 killed and 39 wounded.*

During the period the events of which I have been relating, our native allies the Arawas at Maketu had not been idle. They had as early as March and April engaged in a series of hard-fought skirmishes in the interior towards Taupo, in the attempt to stop the Ngatiporo and Uriwera from going through their country, to join the Waikato rebels. Towards the end of the latter month a large force of rebels of the east coast came up to attack them in their positions at Maketu and Matata, but were driven back and defeated on several occasions by our native allies, sometimes with the aid of detachments of regular or colonial troops, or steamers which shelled the enemy from the coast, at other times single-handed. The Arawas inflicted heavy loss on the enemy, and suffered very little themselves; the heaviest casualty which occurred being the death of Tohi, a very gallant and loyal old chief, who was killed while leading his party in one of the most successful actions which occurred. It is

* Despatches, C. P. P. 1864, E. 3, p. 76.

impossible, however, to follow these collateral events in detail. The leading events of the Tauranga campaign were the affairs at the Gate pah and Te Ranga. The losses of the natives in these were so heavy that, as they expressed it themselves, their whole tribe was annihilated. Nearly all their braves and leading men were killed, and when afterwards the survivors surrendered and made submission, they were truly a miserable remnant on whom it was impossible to look without feelings of the deepest commiseration and pity.

Heavy as our losses were, the Tauranga campaign was a complete success, in a strategical point of view. Tauranga was in fact the harbour of Waikato, and the only harbour it had. It was through it that the rebels in the latter district received supplies, and it was the easiest route by which east coast contingents could reach Upper Waikato. Thompson was well aware of this, and used every exertion he could to keep this important post open for himself. He is said to have acknowledged that its occupation by us was the greatest disaster which had befallen the rebels.

But for the complete defeat of the rebel tribes resident on the spot, we could not have held our position there, without our occupying force far larger than could have been spared ; * and con-

* I cannot refrain from noting the account of the Tauranga campaign given in a recent number of the *Church Missionary Record*, December, 1865, p. 389. "The war having exhausted itself in Waikato, now reached the eastern districts. The land of the natives was confiscated at Tauranga. They flew to arms, and sanguinary collisions ensued. The exasperation of the natives being extreme, very many of them cast off their Christianity, and embraced the Hau fanaticism, which promised speedy victory and vengeance on the Europeans. The first disastrous result was the murder of Mr. Volkner at Opotiki." This paragraph contains five statements, every one of which is untrue. 1. The war began on the east coast, while that in Waikato was at its height. 2. No confiscation whatever had either been made or talked of at Tauranga, and none was ever effected there till the campaign was entirely over. 3. The Maories who "rushed to arms" in consequence of this imaginary confiscation, had been already in arms, and fighting with the Queen's troops in Waikato, for many months before hostilities commenced at Tauranga. 4. The Hau Hau fanaticism did not commence its career at Taranaki till the war at Tauranga was nearly over; and when the survivors at the latter place submitted, it had not even reached them. 6. Mr. Volkner was not murdered by Tauranga natives, but by entirely distinct tribes, who had nothing to do with the Tauranga campaign, and who lived sixty or seventy miles off. The event happened nearly a year after the Tauranga affair.

The general effect, I fear the intent, of the paragraph is to create sympathy for the natives as a people forced into rebellion by the confiscation of their lands, and to excite a prejudice against the Colonial Government. It is not creditable to a respectable

sidering the part they had taken in the active hostilities in Waikato, our occupation of their district was as fully justified as any other movement of the war.

society like the Church Missionary Society, to circulate such misstatements, which are given in the narrative portion of their periodical with all the weight of editorial authority.

CHAPTER IX.

Events at Taranaki during Period of Waikato Campaign—Origin of Pai Marire or Hau Hau Fanaticism—First Appearance at Sentry Hill Redoubt—Attack of Rebels on Sentry Hill—Heapaniah the Prophet killed—They attempt to attack Wanganui—Gallant Conduct of Wanganui Friendly Natives—Battle of Moutua between Haus Haus and Wanganui Friends.

THE war in Waikato substantially terminated with the evacuation of Maungatautari and the events at Tauranga. The rebels, however, with the exception of the remnant of the Ngaiterangi at the latter place, made no submission, nor any overtures for peace. They simply retreated to the hills on the borders of Waikato, where it was not considered prudent to follow them with our troops, while our military posts before referred to held all the open country from Auckland to nearly the southern extremity of the great Waikato plains. We will for the present leave them there, and resume

the narrative of events at Taranaki and the adjacent coast to the south-west, including the Wanganui River.

During the continuance of the Waikato campaign, no attempt had been made to carry on active operations on an extended scale at Taranaki, or to retain possession of the Tataraimaka block, the occupation of which had been the signal for the commencement of hostilities in May 1863. Little more had been done than to maintain our own position within the entrenchments of New Plymouth and in a few neighbouring redoubts, and from time to time to scour the open country and drive the rebels into the hills or down the coast to the south, an office which was very efficiently performed chiefly by militia and volunteer corps of bush-rangers. For reasons before assigned, I cannot record all the skirmishes that occurred, though the conduct of our troops, whether regular or colonial, was I believe in every instance meritorious. But I shall take up the narrative at the point where it will enable me to describe the growth and progress of the horrible Pai Marire faith, if such it may be called, which

has since superseded the Christianity, nominal or real, of a large part of the Maori race, and developed itself into one of the most disgusting and terrible superstitions that ever found lodgment in diseased brain or perverted heart.

There is little doubt that this superstition was the work of some designing Maori, who perceived that the events in Waikato were fast weakening the attachment of the southern natives to the King movement, and that some more potent bond of combination was required than a political organization the fortunes of which were not then in the ascendant. The accounts given of its origin by the natives themselves are various and sufficiently absurd. The most connected version, and probably that which accompanied its first promulgation, is given by Mr. J. White, resident magistrate at Wanganui. It is to the following effect :

Kaitaki pah, a very strong position held by the rebels about 10 miles south of New Plymouth, was taken by Colonel Warre and a combined force of regulars and local forces on the 24th of March 1864. The native works were taken possession of,

and occupied by a detachment of the 57th Regiment, under Captain Lloyd. A few days afterwards (4th April), that officer, with a force of 100 men, was scouring the spurs of the adjacent hills to see if there were any cultivations in that direction, with the view of destroying them if found. Having traversed a considerable distance without seeing any traces of natives on the move, his men appear to have got into loose order, when they were suddenly set upon by a body of rebels, who came over a ridge, their front and rear separated, and completely defeated and routed, with a loss of seven killed and nine wounded. Captain Lloyd, who exhibited great gallantry, was among the killed. The rebels drank the blood of those who fell, and cut off their heads, burying for the time the heads and bodies in separate places. A few days afterwards, according to the native account, the angel Gabriel appeared to those who had partaken of the blood, and by the medium of Captain Lloyd's spirit, ordered his head to be exhumed, cured in their own way, and taken throughout the length and breadth of New Zealand; that from henceforth this head should

be the medium of man's communication with Jehovah. These injunctions were carefully obeyed, and immediately the head was taken up it appointed Te Ua to be high priest, and Hephaniah and Rangitauira to be assistants, and communicated to them in the most solemn manner the tenets of this new religion, namely :—The followers shall be called "Pai Marire." The angel Gabriel, with his legions, will protect them from their enemies. The Virgin Mary will constantly be present with them. The religion of England, as taught by the Scriptures, is false. The Scriptures must all be burnt. All days are alike sacred, and no notice must be taken of the Christian Sabbath. Men and women must live together promiscuously, so that their children may be as the sand of the sea-shore for multitude. The priests have superhuman power, and can obtain for their followers complete victories by uttering vigorously the word "Hau." The people who adopt this religion will shortly drive the whole European population out of New Zealand ; this is only prevented now by the head not having completed its circuit of the whole

land. Legions of angels await the bidding of the priests to aid the Maories in exterminating the Europeans. Immediately the Europeans are destroyed and driven away, men will be sent from heaven to teach the Maories all the arts and sciences now known by Europeans. The priests have the power to teach the Maories the English language in one lesson, provided certain stipulations are carefully observed, namely, the people to assemble at a certain time, in a certain position, near a flagstaff of a certain height, bearing a flag of a certain colour.

Very few natives understanding three words of English, it was not difficult for the prophets to persuade them that the angel Gabriel had conferred that gift on themselves. A striking instance of impudent imposition in this particular is given by Mr. White. "An old Maori woman had purchased some articles of clothing in the town of Wanganui, which had been wrapped up in a newspaper; Rangitauira obtained this paper, and to display his miraculous gift, read it aloud in a jargon which the crowd was assured was the English language. When he had finished read-

ing, he obligingly interpreted to them that this was an English newspaper, giving an account of the Waitotara war, in which the number of soldiers killed was 3,800, and the number of friendly natives 400 : of these last, 40 were William King's people ; and that the Queen wished it to be perfectly understood that when the present war was over, all the surviving friendly natives should be used as beasts of burden, or to sweep the streets and cleanse the most filthy localities in European towns."

One of the earliest instances of an attempt to prove their invulnerability by English bullets (which these prophets promised), occurred shortly afterwards at Sentry Hill, a redoubt about six miles north of New Plymouth, occupied by seventy-five men under command of Captain Shortt, of the 57th. The redoubt stands on a rising ground in an open plain. It was a splendid moonlight night, about eight o'clock, when the men in the redoubt saw a Maori coming across the flat, throwing his arms about in a wild manner, and singing what appeared to be a native hymn. He walked boldly up to the parapet, and sat down on

the edge of the ditch. Some of the men wanted to shoot him, but the officers said, "No, no; go out and take him." A party of one serjeant and eight or ten men went out; and as the serjeant approached, the Maori jumped up, threw a stone at him, hitting him on the throat, and bolted. The men were taken by surprise, but before he had run very far they fired a volley at him; on which he sat down on a large stone and went on with his song. Another volley, however, being fired, he took to his heels and disappeared. A few days after this the detachment in the redoubt heard the Maories in the pah at Manutahi chanting their war-songs in the early morning. The noise gradually approached till the party making it crossed the Waiongana river, when it changed its character to the barking of dogs and fierce yells. Presently a force of at least 300 armed Maories was seen at a distance of 800 yards. They advanced along the road slowly, in the military order called "fours," making steadily for the redoubt. Captain Short kept his men down behind the parapet till the Maories arrived within 150 yards, when they halted as if doubtful. The

word was then given, the troops jumped up and poured in a heavy volley on the advancing column, backing it with grape from two cohorns. The Maories stood the fire with great imperturbability, as if they did not expect to be hit; but at last they broke and fled, leaving thirty-four dead and wounded behind them. Our men being under cover, only one was slightly wounded. When the Maories on this occasion advanced towards the redoubt, our troops saw to their surprise, a few yards in advance of the main body, apparently the very same native who had visited them a few nights before, again singing and throwing his arms about. This time, however, he was less fortunate, a rifle ball knocking him over. This was in all probability Hepaniah, one of the three principal prophets of the new superstition, who is known to have fallen on this occasion.*

It might have been expected that the result of the battle of Sentry Hill, so fatal to the pretensions of the new faith, would have given it at all

* Despatches C. P. P. 1864, E. No. 3, p. 72. Papers on Pai Marire, E. No. 8, and private sources.

events a temporary check. It did not do so, however. The surviving prophets asserted that the cause of the disaster was the angel Gabriel having taken offence at something that Hepaniah had done; but that he would still support them in their future career. The prophet Matene (Martin), who had Capt. Lloyd's head in his possession, started with a large party of fanatics down the coast to Waitotara, from whence, at an acute angle, runs the track to the Upper Wanganui river, where a large party of very warlike natives just returned from Waikato, were stationed. He succeeded in persuading many of them to join the new faith, and to attempt an attack on the European town and settlement of Wanganui, at the mouth of the river, about 100 miles lower down. The river, a broad and rapid torrent, rushes for many miles between perpendicular crags, through a country only accessible to Maoriés, or trained and practised bush-rangers. The canoes of a war-party launched on its waters, would reach the outskirts of the settlement in a few hours. The town was but feebly defended by a garrison of 300 men of the 57th

regiment and a few militia, who could have done little beyond protecting their own position, while the remoter hamlets and scattered homesteads over fifty miles in extent would have been exposed to the ravages of the enemy. The danger was most imminent, when it was announced that the portion of the Wanganui tribe which lived within the settlement were determined to prohibit the attack, and if necessary to defend the place with their lives. A party of about 300 of them proceeded about seventy miles up the river in their canoes, till they met the fanatics and war party, who endeavoured to persuade them to let them pass down the river to attack the town; but not only were all their overtures indignantly rejected, but they were told that their passage would be prevented, no matter at what sacrifice of life. Matene then said he would wait two months, if at the expiration of that time the loyal natives would give way. The latter, at length, sick and wearied of these negotiations, on Friday, the 13th May, sent a special messenger to Matene and his fanatics proposing that they should do battle on the following day at a certain hour, on the island

of Moutua. The challenge was at once accepted, it being stipulated that neither party should attempt to surprise the other, or in any way violate the conditions of the duel. The time fixed was the break of day. The island of Moutua, almost midway in the river, may be about 300 yards long and 20 wide, and about 12 or 15 feet above the level of the river; it is thinly covered with manukau scrub and fern, but presents certain irregularities of ground which afford considerable shelter, and except when there is a fresh in the river it is surrounded by a bed of shingle. Before daybreak a party of the loyals, headed by Hemi Napi, were on the island, and posted themselves at the extremity at which their foes were to land. They were shortly followed by the remainder of their force under Mete Kingi. The advance party was formed of three companies, one, consisting of Roman Catholics, and numbering ten men, were led by Kereti; another, consisting of nine men, were commanded by Hemi and Riwai; and the third, numbering fifteen men, was led by Aperaniko and Haimona. The reserve companies were some distance in the

rear. Matene and his fanatics landed out of seven canoes on the shingle spit without opposition about 7 A.M. Their forces were arranged in a similar way to that of the loyal natives. Immediately after they were formed they commenced their incantation, shouting "Hau, hau!"—Up, up! and using gestures not unlike the passes made by mesmerists. They laboured under the strange delusion that while they themselves were invulnerable, their opponents would be forced by their incantations to approach close to them without power to offer any resistance. For two hours were these incantations kept up, the advanced companies being not more than twenty yards from each other. As soon as the first shot was fired by one of the rebels (Hoani Winihere, of Pipiriki), the opposing forces slowly advanced till they were within thirty feet of each other, when a volley was exchanged. Several fell on both sides, and amongst them the chief Kereti, whose loss seems to have dispirited the loyal natives, for they immediately commenced to retreat, slowly at first, but when after another volley or two their two other leaders, Hemi and

Riwai, were killed, they fairly broke and fled. The reserve, instead of coming to their support, also fled, most of them recrossing the river. The battle seemed at this moment completely lost, and probably would not have been retrieved, had it not been for the chief Haimona Hiroti, who, when he reached the end of the island, shouted, "I will go no further," and immediately rallied some twenty men just in time to pour a deadly volley into the rebels, who were close upon them. After this it seems to have been a hand-to-hand fight; but the rebels having lost several of their leaders, and Mete Kingi with the reserve having rejoined Haimona Hiroti, the rebels soon broke and fled, being hotly pursued till they reached the head of the island, when all who survived (with the exception of a few who escaped in a canoe) took to the river, and were most of them shot down. Matene, though he was badly wounded while swimming, succeeded in gaining the bank, but was almost immediately tomahawked by a native policeman, Te Moro, who lost no time in swimming after him. It is scarcely possible to state what the rebel loss was, but

forty dead bodies were found on the island, and several more were seen to sink while attempting to cross the river. Nearly all the survivors were known to be wounded. The friendly natives had twelve killed, and from twenty-five to thirty wounded. Several spears and other weapons of war were taken, and also Pehi's King flag, which was found in a large canoe; and on searching Matene's whare, the conquerors obtained a prize of ninety sovereigns.*

Before these events occurred, information had reached the Colonial Government of the danger which impended over Wanganui. The Governor and General were both at Tauranga, but an express was sent for them, and in a few days I started for Taranaki, with orders from General Cameron to send on a reinforcement of 300 men to Wanganui. I accompanied them down to that place, but before we arrived the danger was over; and I had the satisfaction of meeting the Maori leaders on our side, who had returned down the river. The next day the dead bodies of Hemi

* See very interesting Report by Dr. Featherston, C. P. P. 1864, E. No. 3, p. 80.

Napi and another chief were brought in for burial. The shops of the town were closed, and the Europeans stood uncovered in the street; while the officer commanding the garrison, Colonel Logan, and a strong party of volunteers from her Majesty's troops, all the Government officers, and many old residents, joined the funeral procession. The mark of sympathy was much felt by the friendly natives. A monument has since been raised at Wanganui to the memory of the natives who fell at Moutua, by the provincial government of Wellington, at a cost of 400*l*.

These were the first developments of the *Pai Marire*, or *Hau Hau* fanaticism. As with many other fanatics, the severe reverses with which they met only seemed to add fuel to fire. Their emissaries were sent into every part of the islands, and their creed, which was framed on the convenient principle of embodying something from most other creeds, spread like wildfire; its votaries apparently adding new articles to it to meet the growing furor of their disciples. A large infusion of Judaism, some leading features

of Mormonism, a little mesmerism, a touch of spiritualism, occasional ventriloquism, and a large amount of cannibalism, are the characteristic features which it exhibits. Its rites are bloody, sensual, foul and devilish ; the least reprehensible and most orderly consisting in running round a pole stuck in the ground, howling and uttering gibberish, till catalepsy prostrates the worshippers, who sometimes lie senseless on the ground for hours. Their bitterest hatred, and most refined cruelties, are reserved for the missionaries, who are accused of robbing them of their lands, by tribes which never sold, gave away, or were deprived of an acre. The foul superstition seems to have seized with more or less violence on all the rebel party : a Kingite and a Hau Hau appear to be synonymous.

It is fair, however, to hear both sides. Even this horrid superstition has its apologist. The Bishop of Wellington, in his opening address to the synod of that diocese, on the 26th September last, spoke as follows :—

“ I cannot allow such a remarkable feature to pass unnoticed as the Hau Hau superstition,

which has swept over the land like a pestilence, and carried off in its train the great mass of the people from Waikato to the Wairarapa. But I am bound to say that I should consider it a grave mistake if we were to merge the whole people in one indiscriminate condemnation, as guilty of, or sympathizing with, the worst and most disgusting features of the fanaticism. To use their own language, 'two canoes' started, by the false prophet Te Ua's command, from some place between Taranaki and Wanganui. One canoe was full of wrath, the other one of peaceful propagandism. Some of the crew paddling in the latter were captured near Tauranga, when Hori Tupaea was made prisoner. But the wrathful one went towards Opotiki and Tauranga, and alas! we know too much of its deeds of darkness. Still it would be, I repeat it, a grave mistake to suppose that our neighbours in the Wairarapa, who, almost to a man, have joined the Pai Marire flag, are murderers in heart and will, any more than I can believe William Thompson (Tara-pipipi) and the Waikatos as a body, guilty of the same crimes in will or thought. Doubtless he

and thousands of others have joined the fanatical movement merely as a political engine for upholding their nationality. They have established a Maori National Church, which is to embrace all sects. Their creed and form of worship includes articles taken from the Roman Catholic faith, from Wesleyanism, from our Prayer-book, and especially from Judaism and the Old Testament. This is the religion for those who sail in the peaceful canoe, and for those that belong to the wrathful canoe there are added some of the worst features of the old Maori usage and the days of cannibalism. I have been frequently on board the hulk where there are fifty-six Maori prisoners who had all joined the Hau Hau superstition, but they have nearly all attended divine service most gladly and regularly." *

The bishop appears to have forgotten what one of his predecessors in the Church has told us, that the same fountain cannot send forth sweet water and bitter. His apology amounts to this : that the Hau Hau religion has two mouths, with

* Report of proceedings of Synod, *Wellington Independent newspaper*.

the one it preaches Catholic Christianity, with the other it eats missionaries. I cannot wish him joy of his friends in the peaceful canoe, "who have joined the fanatical movement merely as a political engine." I think they are by very much the worst of the two, in exact proportion as deliberate duplicity is worse than an involuntary delusion.

I shall not at present follow up the history of this superstition. We shall meet with it again at a later period, when it exhibited its most matured character.

The severe reverses which the rebels had lately met with at all points, did much to convince the southern natives of the hopelessness of the cause of the King party. In the province of Wellington there had been large bodies of armed sympathizers, who had been only kept back from open rebellion by the prudence and discretion of one man, Wi Tako, a chief of the Ngatiawas. Sir George Grey had had a very angry interview with this chief in 1862, and had almost driven him out of his presence. Tako kept his temper, and told the Governor that he should be guided by the

course of events in Waikato : " Go you and fight there ; there is the fountain of this evil ; if you can stop it, the small streams like myself will soon dry up." Fortunately Dr. Featherston, the Superintendent of Wellington, had great influence over Tako, and under his advice, and guided by his own good sense, he restrained the impetuosity of about as hostile and impetuous a mob of followers as any in the island. As I travelled down the coast at this date I had the satisfaction of reaping the fruits of the Superintendent's management. Wi Tako met me by appointment ; and we had a long conference, which ended in his making a full submission and signing the declaration of allegiance to the Queen. He complained to me bitterly of the course pursued by the King party, who had perverted a movement, which was intended only to elevate the Maori, into one of mere hostility to the European. " If they would have listened to me," he said, " Kingism would have been a very different thing, and its fortunes very different. But they rejected my advice on every occasion when I offered it." Wi Tako's submission practically put an end to all chance of

hostilities on the south coast between Wanganui and Hawkes Bay. He has since thrown himself energetically into our cause, and has exercised great and most beneficial influence in checking the rebel Haus Haus on the east coast.*

* See full report in C. P. P. 1864, E. No. 2, p. 74.

CHAPTER X.

A lull in the War—Time arrived for Political Action—Policy explained—All Parties agreed—Assent of Duke of Newcastle—Aborigines Protection Society interferes—Mr. Cardwell's Despatch—Governor wavers, and holds back—Difference with his Ministers, about Confiscation—They Resign—He eventually Confiscates for their Successors—Moral Effect of Vacillation on Natives—Mr. Cardwell's Despatch, its Effect to support Minority against Majority—The Result, the Prolongation of the War.

THERE was now a lull. The rebels had nowhere (except at Tauranga) laid down their arms or made any overtures for peace. But for the time at all events they were defeated. Their forces were scattered, they were driven to the hills, they had little or no food remaining, and the winter was at hand. The Colonial Government thought that the time had come when by an exhibition of firmness in taking the material guarantees against a renewal of aggression which the Governor had proposed at the commencement of hostilities, the

rebels would be convinced of our determination, and give up the struggle as hopeless. At all events the practical work of taking those guarantees would be effected, and impose the designed barrier against future incursion. Before explaining how this came not to be done, it is necessary briefly to refer to the policy which had been adopted by the Governor and the Colonial Legislature for the suppression of the rebellion at the period of its commencement.

The policy was this:—1st, to suppress open rebellion by military force; 2nd, to confiscate “large tracts” of the lands of the defeated rebels; 3rd, on part of these lands (particularly on the frontier) to locate a body of military settlers, enlisted at a high rate of pay, and with a grant of fifty acres of land per man. Inside the frontier to put 15,000 ordinary immigrants and their families. The object of this was both to prevent any further aggression on the settled districts, and to give the European race such a preponderance of numbers as might deter any future attempts at disturbance. 4th, to give back to the rebel natives a large portion (500,000 acres was

talked of) of the confiscated lands, which they should hold under Crown titles and as individuals instead of under the pernicious tribal tenure hitherto existing; 5th, to sell another portion of the confiscated lands in order to repay to the colony, and through it to the public creditor, part at least of the enormous cost which the rebellion had entailed upon it; estimated at that time at 3,000,000*l.* sterling, though likely now to exceed even that; and also to aid in the construction of great roads, so essential and so cheap a method of subduing and civilizing turbulent races.

This policy was propounded in the shape of memoranda by the Colonial Ministry addressed to the Governor, and which he forwarded to the Home Government in August 1863.* He strongly urged its confirmation, described it as "based upon that which he adopted in British Kaffraria." "I feel certain," he wrote, "that the chiefs of Waikato having in so unprovoked a manner caused Europeans to be murdered, and having planned a wholesale destruction of some of the

* C. P. P. 1863, A. No. 8.

European settlements, it will be necessary now to take efficient steps for the permanent security of the country, and to inflict upon those chiefs a punishment of such a nature as will deter other tribes from hereafter forming, and attempting to carry out, designs of a similar nature, which must, in their results, be so disastrous to the welfare of the native race as well as to her Majesty's European subjects. *I can devise no other plan by which both of those ends can be obtained than, firstly, by providing for the permanent peace of the country by locating large bodies of European settlers strong enough to defend themselves in those natural positions in this province which will give us the entire command of it, and will convince the badly disposed natives that it is hopeless to attempt either to drive the Europeans from the country, or to place them throughout a great part of its extent under the rule and laws of a king of the native race, elected by the Maori population, who would soon turn his arms against his brother chiefs, and render the Northern Island from end to end one large scene of murderous warfare ; and, secondly, by taking the land on which this*

European population is to be settled from those tribes who have been guilty of the outrages detailed in my various despatches to your Grace. A punishment of this nature will deter other tribes from committing similar acts, when they find that it is not a question of mere fighting which they are to be allowed to do as long as they like, and then when they please to return to their former homes as if nothing had taken place, but that such misconduct is followed by the forfeiture of *large tracts of territory* which they value highly, whilst their own countrymen will generally admit that the punishment is a fair and just one, which the Waikato chiefs have well deserved." * The General Assembly met in October, and by almost unanimous votes of both houses, it adopted the policy above delineated, and authorized the raising of a loan of three millions sterling to carry it out. The Colonial Treasurer was sent home to negotiate it, bearing letters to the Home Government from the Governor, warmly supporting his mission. Im-

* C. P. P. 1863, A. No. 8.

mediately before leaving New Zealand, he had an interview with the Governor, in the course of which the latter said, "that he did not know that there was any difference of opinion between himself and his advisers on the subject of confiscation; if anything," he added, "he went further than they did." "In what direction?" asked the Treasurer. The Governor replied, "You would give them" (the rebels) "some of their lands back; I would not." The Colonial Treasurer then asked, "What would the people do; if they had no lands they would be driven to despair?" "No," rejoined the Governor, "that would not be the case; as other tribes in different parts of the country would give them land enough for their wants."*

The Colonial Government never had any suspicion that after all the Governor had written and said on the subject of confiscation, which was the keystone of the whole policy, any difficulty would arise about carrying it into execution. The Duke of Newcastle had given it the assent of the

* C. P. P. 1864, E. 2, p. 109.

Home Government, only adding some advice about moderation and prudence, for which the colonists were, of course, duly grateful. "I do not disapprove," writes his Grace, "of the principle of the measure. I think that any body of natives who take up arms against her Majesty, on such grounds as those alleged by the Waikatos, may properly be punished by the confiscation of a large part of their common property. I think that the lands thus taken may be properly employed in meeting the expenses of the war, nor do I see any objection to using them as the sites of military settlements." But when the subject was brought before the English Parliament in the ensuing session, Mr. Cardwell, having in the meantime succeeded his Grace, this policy, which was very much misrepresented, was strongly denounced and vehemently condemned, by men whose minds had evidently been schooled by an extremely small minority in the colony. Then the Aborigines Protection Society addressed one of its famous letters to the Governor, which, it has since boasted, induced him to modify his policy.

And finally came an elaborate despatch from Mr. Cardwell,* written under great misapprehension, directing things to be done which were physically impossible, and others to be attempted which were palpably absurd, and which, if attempted to be carried out, could operate in no other way than to upset the plans of the Colonial Government—those very plans which the Governor had claimed as his, and to throw everything that had been already done into inextricable confusion.

The natural result followed. The Governor tried to obey the Colonial Office, and to shape a course which might make things pleasant to the Aborigines Protection Society. The ministry adhered to the policy on which they and the Governor had agreed six months before, and which had induced the Assembly to undertake the tremendous liabilities it had sanctioned. A long contest ensued between the Governor and his ministers. They tried every means in their power to get him to confiscate a sufficient quantity of land to carry out, at least, the

* Dated 26th April, 1864. P. P. 23rd May 1864, p. 47.

substantial part of their plans, and to enable them to keep faith with their military settlers. They proposed, as the least possible amount, 1,600,000 acres out of 8,000,000 belonging to the rebel tribes of Waikato and Taranaki. His ultimatum was, two small blocks in Lower Waikato and at Ngaruawahia, containing about 160,000 acres, just one-tenth of the quantity proposed by his ministers, a large proportion of which was unfit for settlement.* It was hopeless to attempt to effect any compromise, and the ministry, chiefly on this ground, resigned. About three months afterwards, the Governor, on the advice of their successors, confiscated blocks in Waikato and at Taranaki, much larger in area, and including nearly all that the former ministry had advised !

As far as producing any moral effect on the rebels, this came too late. The entire winter had passed away, and we were again in the full height of summer. The rebels had grown crops and taken heart of grace. They had read in the

* See maps and other documents in C. P. P. 1864, E. No. 2 and 2 c.

newspapers the letter of the Aborigines Protection Society, and Mr. Cardwell's despatch; they had heard of the differences between the Governor and his ministers; and they said, "the Queen will not let our land be taken; the Governor is on our side; the good people in England say we are right; let us hold on a little longer, and we shall get back all we have lost." So all the attempts which the Governor had made to induce them to flagellate themselves by voluntary cessions of land as directed by Mr. Cardwell—all his proclamations of amnesty on easy terms—and even his confiscation when it came, were of no avail. The rebels prepared themselves for a fresh struggle, in which we were soon engaged in the country between Taranaki and Wanganui, bordering on Cook's Straits.

Whether it was the result of accident or whether some of a very small minority in the colony had been able to get at and influence Mr. Cardwell's mind, cannot be told. But it is certain that the leading feature of his despatch, voluntary cession instead of confiscation, was a favourite idea of such a small minority; and it was very

remarkable that about a fortnight before his despatch arrived in Auckland, an elaborate article appeared in one of the newspapers there, which, except that it exhibited traces of more local knowledge, might have been written with his own pen. Whether Mr. Cardwell had or had not any communication, direct or indirect, with the small party referred to, the effect of his despatch was really to give effect to the will of the colonial minority, over the will of an almost unanimous majority. Whether it was designed or not, therefore, it was most unconstitutional, and opposed to every principle of representative Government. It was the more unfortunate, because his plan, impracticable from the first, entirely failed when attempted to be carried out; and had no other effect than to break down the accepted policy of the majority (that which the Governor had declared to be the only one he could devise capable of meeting the crisis); to check it just when it had achieved success in its first stage, and to render it impossible to give it further effect after Mr. Cardwell's substitute had proved an abortion.

That the policy of 1863 would have been a success, that it would have been attended with the results which the Governor had predicted, I have myself no doubt, provided it had been vigorously, rigidly, and persistently prosecuted to the five main ends which I have, at the beginning of this chapter, said that it contemplated. That it never got beyond the first stage, was owing to nothing else than the gratuitous interference of the Aborigines Protection Society, and the ill-judged adoption by Mr. Cardwell of an idea altogether inconsistent with it, and opposed to the first principles embodied in it. The actions of that society and of the Minister for the colonies paralysed the Governor, infused fresh hope into the breast of the rebel, and gave new vigour to his arm. That the war became more general and has been protracted over another year, has in my opinion been owing mainly to this cause; and if the colonial creditor is now trembling for his interest, and the colony overwhelmed with new difficulties, it is on Mr. Cardwell's despatch, and the Aborigines Protection Society's action, that they may justly lay the blame.

CHAPTER XI.

The Prisoners taken in the War—how they escaped.

A LONG chapter might be written on the escape of the 200 prisoners, who, from time to time, were taken in arms against the Queen's troops, and handed over by General Cameron to the Colonial Government for safe custody and final disposal. But since the Head Centre of the Fenians has escaped from Richmond Bridewell, it seems unnecessary to offer much explanation of the similar feat performed by the rebel prisoners at Kawau. If the British Government, with all the Irish constabulary, with all its troops, and with its perfect prison discipline, could not keep one dangerous man within stone walls, and behind iron bolts and bars, it cannot be surprising that the Colonial Government, with comparatively few appliances for such a purpose, should be equally

unsuccessful with the 200 wily Maories, who, no doubt, were quite as watchful for a chance as Mr. James Stephens. I shall, therefore, omit much of what I should otherwise have said on this subject, and confine myself in relating it to the briefest limits.

One hundred and seventy-eight of these prisoners were taken at Rangiriri, in November, 1863; a few more taken from time to time at other places, brought up the total number to 214. These were all, with one or two exceptions, taken fighting with the Queen's troops, and handed over by General Cameron to the Governor, who passed them on to the Colonial Government. There being no available prison ashore, they were placed in a hulk of 347 tons measurement, with two decks, carefully fitted up for the purpose, and which lay in smooth water in Auckland Harbour. According to the official certificate of the immigration officer of the port of Auckland, there was space and accommodation for 219 adults; and had the vessel been fitted up for a sea-going voyage, she would have been allowed to proceed to sea with that number. As to the

manner in which they were treated, I may summarize a vast amount of certificates and returns on the subject, by quoting the words of the Rev. Charles Baker, of the Church Missionary Society, who gratuitously performed the functions of chaplain to the hulk for several months. "The provision," Mr. Baker writes, "was good in quality, and sufficient in quantity. The comfort of the prisoners was promoted in every practical way. Cleanliness and order were enforced; their moral and spiritual welfare were cared for. A very decided improvement in their appearance was manifested, and expressions of surprise were frequently heard among them of the kind treatment they received at the hands of the Government. The officers in charge were unremitting in their attention to the prisoners. In short, under the peculiar circumstances, the Maories could not have received better treatment." Ti Ori Ori, the principal chief among them, wrote to his sister ashore,—“Sister, our place is very good, and also the treatment we receive from our masters.” The whole body of prisoners also, after their escape, bore similar testimony. “The

GOVERNOR WISHES TO RELEASE PRISONERS. 161

Government," they said, to Mr. White, their chief officer, "have been very kind in providing for us clothing, provisions, and utensils; and great is our unkindness to you, who have been a father to us, and have attended to all our wants in sickness as well as on all other occasions." *

Very shortly after the capture of the first lot of prisoners the Governor began to press his ministers to release some of them on parole. They consulted a great number of experienced persons, and the almost unanimous opinion was that the parole of a Maori was not to be relied upon. The ministers, however, expressed their readiness to bring them all to trial. This the Governor declined; and he continued to press for release on parole, expressing in the strongest manner his conviction that the honour of a Maori once pledged was inviolable. Ministers, however, seeing no reason for such a step, and believing, on the contrary, that the imprisonment of these rebels had a very beneficial effect on those still at

* See C. P. P. 1856, E. No. 1, p. 46 *et seq.*, where very full documentary evidence relative to the custody and escape of the prisoners will be found.

large, they continued firm, and refused to release them except after trial. The Governor, however, found means to place his advisers in a very painful position, by charging them in his despatches to the Home Government with cruelty towards the prisoners, and conduct "derogatory to the British name." As Mr. Fitzgerald lately observed in a letter to Mr. Cardwell,—“Amidst all that the colonists have suffered, nothing is more galling than to see Sir George Grey earning a great and ill-deserved reputation for humanity at their expense.”* This was exactly a case in point, and the position of ministers became so painful that they determined on the first opportunity to get rid of the responsibility of the prisoners. They had not long to wait. On the 8th of July the Governor made them a definite proposal to send the prisoners on parole to the little island of Kawau, about 30 miles from Auckland, his own private property, where he had a country seat, and where there were no inhabitants but his own servants. On the 2nd of

* C. P. P. 1865, A. No. 5, p. 38.

August the hulk and its contents were towed down to Kawau, and the prisoners were liberated on their parole that they would not attempt to leave the island. From this time they were practically in the Governor's hands, and under his personal charge. He spent a considerable portion of his time at Kawau, fixed the place of residence of the prisoners (unfortunately a locality from which they could the most easily escape), and employed himself in superintending their operations in clearing land and building houses. Early on the morning of the 11th September, just six weeks after they had been liberated, news was brought to Auckland that on the previous night they had all, with the exception of some three or four, broken their parole and gone no one knew whither.

The Colonial Government has been much blamed for allowing the prisoners to be at Kawau without a military guard. They really had nothing to do with it. After the prisoners were sent to Kawau, the Governor was the person responsible for their safe custody. He had over and over again asserted his belief in the in-

violability of their parole ; and it does seem that it would have been a very Hibernian proceeding to release prisoners on parole, and at the same time place a military guard over the persons released. Besides which, constantly among them as he was, if a guard were necessary, he must have known it ; its appointment was in his own power, and no one but himself could have appointed one.

The subsequent history of these prisoners was remarkable. They landed on the mainland, and took up a position on an isolated circular hill, "Omaha," in the midst of a district somewhat densely occupied by small farmers. By some means they got a large supply of arms, and they were provided with food partly by neighbouring natives and partly by purchases at the stores of the European settlers, which they visited in small armed parties. Several officers of Government and colonists visited them on their hill, and were received in the most friendly manner. The Governor first tried to coax them back ; then he laid a trap for them ; but they were suspicious of his intentions, and declined all his advances.

Though only 35 miles from Auckland, where there was a large military force, and though only about a mile from the sea-shore, their position relatively to unprotected settlers and surrounding natives was such that to attack them would have been to run the risk of setting the north in a blaze. So there they remained on "the top of the lofty Omaha," exchanging compliments with the Governor and the colonists, and feeling, according to their own account, extremely comfortable. At last the Governor invited them to go back to Waikato. Their reply was that they did not intend to move at all till they had eaten their Christmas dinner with a friendly chief at the foot of the hill, and then they would decide what to do. Ultimately they broke up their party. Some, I believe, did return to Waikato; others remained among the friendly natives north of Auckland.

I believe that the long imprisonment of these men on board the hulk had worked a great change in their character. It would have been very easy for them after their escape to have deluged the country north of Auckland with blood,

and involved us in a war with the northern tribes. It is believed that attempts were made to incite them to do it; but they had had time in the quiet of their prison to reflect on passing events, and they were evidently not prepared to plunge again into hostilities with us. And I am inclined to think that the kind treatment which they had received on board the hulk, and to which after their escape they on several occasions referred in grateful terms, had softened them, and convinced them that the Pakeha did not, as many of them had been told, seek the destruction of the Maori or look upon him with unkindly feelings. I cannot say that they left their prison sadder men, but certainly they left it wiser than they entered it; and it was well for us that they did so.

The reports made by Mr. T. A. White of his interviews with the natives subsequently to their escape are extremely interesting. The Colonial Office, however, has not thought proper to publish any of the papers relating to the prisoners, except a few of the Governor's early despatches. They were asked for in the House of Commons in March last, but Mr. Cardwell made some excuse

for not producing them then ; they appear not to have been subsequently laid before the House, and I suppose never will be, as they certainly reflect no great credit on the Governor.

When the Head Centre of the Fenians escaped, the English Government vindicated itself by dismissing the governor of Richmond Bridewell. When the 200 prisoners escaped, the Colonial Government had not the power to dismiss the Governor of Kawau, or they would have done it without hesitation.

The bitter experience of Kawau does, however, seem to have taught the Governor a lesson, as he has confined a number of Hau Hau prisoners since taken at Wanganui and elsewhere on board another hulk in Wellington harbour, though in one most important case—that of old Pehi—we shall see that he could not resist the temptation of trusting to Maori parole again, and with a result quite as little satisfactory as at Kawau.

CHAPTER XII.

Wanganui and Taranaki Campaign of 1865—Why Undertaken—
Number of Rebels in the District—Number of Troops—
Distance over which Operations to be carried on—Attack by
Rebels on Road Party at Waitotara—Attack on General
Cameron's camp at Nukumarū—Advance up the Coast
towards Taranaki—Reaches Waigongoro—Campaign closed
for the Season—General Cameron goes to Auckland—
Quarrel between Governor and General Cameron.

It will be remembered that almost immediately after the outbreak at Taranaki and the murders of the 4th of May, 1863, military operations were suspended in that settlement, and General Cameron recalled to Auckland in consequence of the threatening aspect of affairs in Waikato. Before leaving Taranaki he had one engagement with the rebels at Kaitakare, and inflicted considerable loss upon them; but unfortunately it was not the perpetrators of the murders whom he encountered on that occasion, but a party of Upper

Wanganui natives, who, instigated by the love of fighting, had gratuitously come a distance of 120 miles to take part in the strife. During the Waikato campaign, the troops at Taranaki did little more than stand on the defensive; but the rebels continued to scour the country and attack our outposts. It was there also, as we have seen, that the horrid Hau Hau superstition originated; and it was Taranakis and other south-west coast natives who attempted to attack Wanganui, when they were so gallantly defeated by our Maori allies. In addition to these acts of open aggression, they had for five years closed the road along the coast between Taranaki and Wanganui, threatening death to any one who might attempt to travel on it. On one occasion Bishop Selwyn made the attempt, when they stopped him, imprisoned him, and finally sent him back by the way he had come.

The Governor had never abandoned the idea of punishing these natives. He "always considered," he writes to Mr. Cardwell, "that the safety of the southern settlements required that these tribes, who were among the most guilty of

all the tribes in New Zealand, should be reduced to submission." As early as June or July, 1864, preparations had been commenced for the prosecution of this campaign, but had been suspended partly by the lateness of the season, partly by the Governor's attempts to carry out Mr. Cardwell's abortive cession schemes, and partly by his own futile amnesty proclamation which tied his hands till December, 1864. In the interval the Weld ministry had taken office. Their views as regarded Taranaki were identical with the Governor's, and with those of their predecessors. They "considered it indispensable to the permanent safety of Taranaki and to the general pacification of the country, that a passable road should be opened between Taranaki and Wanganui as soon as possible ; that the settlements of New Plymouth and Wanganui should be strengthened and extended ; that military posts should be established between the two ; and finally that as the tribes referred to had always been among the most turbulent of the native population, had committed the worst and most unprovoked outrages, and were then in a state of open rebellion, there could

be no permanent peace until they should be reduced to submission and their country opened." *

It was to carry out these views that the Wanganui-Taranaki campaign was undertaken.

The Governor's plan was to begin at both ends, to force a way along the coast till the troops met, in the course of which operation there was little doubt that the rebels would be encountered and thoroughly beaten.

The total number of natives in the rebel district of all ages and sexes was estimated at 1,500; of these perhaps 700 might be fighting men. Allowing for a few contingents from Taupo or Waikato, it was not probable that their force would ever reach 1,000. The General had with him 4,497 Queen's troops; colonial forces and transport corps, 600; military settlers, 800; irregular cavalry, 60; and bush-rangers, 100; in all, 6,000 enlisted soldiers; with nearly 1,000 more of friendly natives and local militia. If our troops had adopted the Hau Hau religion and eaten *all* their enemies, there would not have been

* See also Mem. in C. P. P. 1865., A. No. 1., p. 9.

a leg or an arm for each of them. The General had also artillery and several steamers on the coast capable of entering the various rivers which ran through the district.

The distance from Taranaki to Wanganui is 128 miles, all of which, except 90 miles, was already in our possession. Colonel Warre, C.B., commanding at Taranaki, offered with his column of 600 men, to clear 90 miles of the 128, leaving General Cameron only 34 miles, 18 of which were in our possession, and half of that cultivated and occupied by Wanganui settlers. With these figures it does not seem as if the General had much work before him.*

Before, however, he could begin his work, whatever it was, the rebels challenged us to the fight. The provincial government of Wellington was engaged in making a road over Queen's land in the Waitotara block, about 12 miles north of Wanganui. Some rebels residing on the north side of the Waitotara river had threatened to stop

* These and previous figures are Governor Grey's. See Despatch to Secretary of State, 10th July, 1865; C. P. P. 1865, A. No. 5.

the road ; but after some discussion they agreed that it should go as far as the river ; if we crossed that, they said they would fight. While it was still some miles from the river a party of Taranaki natives came down the coast and attacked one of the road parties. A few days afterwards they most barbarously murdered in cold blood, in his own district, a friendly chief and some of his followers. On the 24th January the General's force advanced towards the Waitotara river, but before reaching it a skirmish occurred, in which we lost Lieutenant Johnstone of the 40th, and three others killed, and had seven men wounded. On the next day a force of 600 rebels (according to General Cameron)—400 (according to the Governor)—boldly attacked the General's camp at Nukumarū, a place on land belonging to the Queen, on the south side of the Waitotara river. The attack was made both on flank and in front, and it is stated that at one time the rebels got within 150 yards of the General's tent. The pickets were driven in with considerable loss, and had the Maories brought up a reserve in time, it is doubtful which way the fortune of the day

would have gone. The fight lasted a long time, but eventually the rebels were repulsed and driven to the bush by a small party of cavalry. Only eleven bodies of rebels were found on the field ; but it was "estimated" that their loss was "heavy." Ours was 11 killed and 19 wounded. We had 46 officers, 45 serjeants, and 878 rank and file engaged.

This was the only occasion in which the forces under General Cameron became engaged with any considerable number of the enemy during this campaign. With the exception of the skirmish of the previous day and another running fight near Patea on the 13th March, it was the only occasion on which an enemy was seen at all. On the 5th of February the General crossed the Waitotara river with half his force, leaving Brigadier-General Waddy and Colonel Weare of the 50th to follow him a few days afterwards. On the 16th February the united forces got to Patea, a considerable river about 40 miles from Wanganui, where the head-quarters were established. Thence detachments were advanced to Kakaramea, Manawapo, and Waigongoro, where posts were

established; the latter being the farthest point to which General Cameron advanced. Not any enemy was seen on the whole march, except the small party with which a skirmish took place near Patia. The native villages were all deserted, large quantities of food being left growing around them; the rebels had gone to the much-dreaded "bush," where, as the General says, "it would be useless for us" (*i.e.*, the Queen's troops,) "to follow them."*

The whole distance traversed between Nukumarū and Waigongoro did not exceed 50 miles. General Cameron stuck close to the sea-beach, travelling by a road which was ordinarily traversed by horses, and, I believe, most part of it by carts. The natives, who had retreated into the bush three or four miles on his right hand, where he says "it would be useless for us to follow them," called him in derision "the lame seagull." The 50 miles' march occupied from the 5th of February, when he crossed the Waitotara, to the 7th of April, when he reached Waigongoro, exactly eight

* C. P. P. 1865, A. No. 4.

weeks of summer weather, being at the rate of rather less than one mile a day. His whole marching column was 1,948 rank and file, with the usual proportion of officers.

The autumn now set in, and occasional rough weather occurred on the coast. A boat-load of groceries intended for the troops was upset in the surf, and accidents happened to one or two more. General Cameron, who, as Sir George Grey remarks, was the only General who ever thought it necessary to go into winter quarters in New Zealand, conceived it time to terminate the active operations (if they may be called such) of the campaign, and about the end of April he departed for Auckland.

No one can suppose for a moment that General Cameron and his army of 6,000 men were really doing their best all this time. It must have been a matter of considerable difficulty for him how to contrive to do so little. All our conjectures to discover how he solved the problem, would, I fear, have been futile, had there not reached us certain "Blue Books, presented to the General Assembly by command of

his Excellency," which contain the key to the Wanganui campaign. They are entitled, "Correspondence between his Excellency Sir George Grey, K.C.B., and Lieutenant-General Sir D. Cameron, K.C.B.," and they contain the record of one of the most remarkable quarrels between "two able and distinguished men," as Mr. Cardwell calls them, which probably ever occurred in official life. The English public has been wondering why the New Zealand war would not come to an end, and why the five regiments which they were told a year ago were on their way home have not arrived. The documents, of which I shall proceed to give an abstract, will enable them to discover the reason why they have been disappointed in these matters, and will also give them such an insight into the manner in which wars are conducted with Imperial troops in our colonies, as must make them more determined than ever, that if it be possible this shall be the last occasion on which such an event shall ever happen in the history of the British Empire.

CHAPTER XIII.

Serious Differences between Governor Grey and General Cameron

—1. As to asking for Reinforcements—2. The War denounced by General Cameron as an “Iniquitous Job”—3. Question of Removal of the Troops—4. The Expediency of capturing Wereroa Pah—5. About Colonel Warre’s Expedition—6. Secret Correspondence and Private Letters—How Mr. Cardwell disposes of the “Difficulty.”

THE campaign between Sir George Grey and General Cameron seems to have been by far the most “vigorously prosecuted” of any which was ever carried on in New Zealand. If those “two able and distinguished persons” had exhibited as much energy and determination in fighting the rebels, as they did in fighting each other, the war might perhaps have been brought to a much earlier termination; at least there is an old proverb about a house divided against itself, which seems to favour such a conclusion.

I shall endeavour to give as concise an outline of the leading points of the quarrel, and as

nearly in the very words of the official documents as I can.*

1. General Cameron immediately on receiving orders from the Governor to commence the Wanganui campaign on the 5th January, intimated "that he thought he should not be wrong in informing Earl de Grey that there is no prospect of an early reduction of the force or the military expenditure; indeed he thought that they ought at once to apply for reinforcements." On the 30th of January, having got to Wanganui, he writes, "I would therefore recommend that your Excellency should apply by the first opportunity for a reinforcement of at least 2,000 men, and for a still larger reinforcement, if, in addition to the occupation of the country between Wanganui and Patea, the road between Taranaki and Wanganui is to be opened," &c. The Governor seems to have given no reply; so again on the 8th March, the General "strongly advises

* The entire Correspondence, which extends over more than 73 folio pages, has been printed among the Assembly papers. It is C. P. P., and further papers, A. No. 4, and A. No. 4 A. See also most of them just published in P. P. House of Commons, Feb. 1866.

his applying for a reinforcement of 2,000 men ; you may depend on it your plan of occupying the whole line of coast cannot be carried out without them." On the 12th March he renews the subject :—"I was anxious to hear whether you intended to apply for the reinforcements I recommended," &c. On the 13th March the Governor intimates that he has consulted his Ministers, and entirely concurs in their opinion, that reinforcements were unnecessary, and gives reasons for that conclusion. General Cameron replies, 15th March,—“ All the reasons you mention for deciding not to apply for reinforcements are, to my mind, the strongest reasons they should be applied for. In my opinion what is now taking place does not afford the most distant prospect that the natives will submit. Their submission never appeared to me so far off as at present. I do not agree with you that the colony will be able to occupy the country between Patea and Taranaki in two years ; twenty would, in my opinion, be nearer the mark.”

“ The reinforcements thus asked for,” says the Governor, writing to Mr. Cardwell, “ would

have raised Sir D. Cameron's force in officers and men at Wanganui alone (to open the last 16 miles of road to the Patea river,) to upwards of 6,500, and including Taranaki, to upwards of 9,000 officers and men.

"I felt it to be my duty to decline to ask for the reinforcements applied for, which I judged to be obviously unnecessary, and I did not think it right that any stop in the operations entered on should take place. Had I consented to the applications made, and had I stopped operations until reinforcements of at least 2,000 men had arrived from England, rebellions would have broken out in other parts of the island, and an enormous useless expenditure of money and loss of life would have been incurred.

"If anything could have at once alarmed and dispirited troops, it was knowing that their commander believed that they were opposed to a numerous and determined enemy, with whom they were unable to cope without being reinforced by at least 2,000 men."

It should be observed that the number above given by the Governor, "upwards of 9,000,"

would have been in addition to some 5,000 other troops, regular and colonial, in other parts of the colony. I think the British tax-payer will quite agree with the Governor, "that such reinforcements were obviously unnecessary."

2. The next ground of difference which arose was this :—On the 11th January General Cameron wrote to the Governor,—“Major Greaves says one thing is very certain, and that is, that the man who sold the block had no right to do so, and it is the old Waitara dodge for getting up a war, and the consequent military expenditure at Wanganui.” On the 28th January he further wrote,—“Since I have been in this part of the world I have made inquiries about the purchase of Waitotara, and have reason to believe that it is a more iniquitous job than the Waitara block. I am not surprised that the natives have opposed our road-making.” I do not know “Major Greaves,” but I do know that neither he nor General Cameron can have the smallest acquaintance with the subject of native titles in general, or of the title to the particular block referred to. If the Governor has any touch of humour about

him, he must have been greatly moved when he was seriously told by the General, that "Major Greaves is quite certain that you are using her Majesty's forces in support of an iniquitous job." However, he simply replied, "that the expedition was essentially necessary ; that the question of the possession of the Waitotara block had never entered into his calculations ; and that what he desired to see was the subjection and punishment of tribes which had been guilty of great atrocities, and had instigated others to commit similar acts. Until they are put down I am sure there can be no peace or safety in this island for her Majesty's European subjects, or loyal and well-disposed natives."

But the charge made by the General was too serious to leave where it was. The Waitotara block had, by the Governor's authority, been sold by the provincial government of Wellington to a large number of purchasers, on the faith of a title guaranteed by the Crown, through whose representative, Governor Browne, it had been bought from the natives. The Governor, therefore, referred the General's charge to his ministers. His ministers instituted inquiries, intending, if they

found that any dispute existed as to the completeness of the purchase, to request Sir William Martin, ex-chief justice of the colony, to investigate it. They, however, could meet with no one who had a word to say on the subject; and having no complaints before them, they were entirely at a loss what they should direct any commission they might appoint, to inquire into. On this the Governor wrote to the General as follows:—

“As I am very anxious to do justice in the matter, to do my duty to the Home Government, and to keep nothing back from them of which they should be informed, I should feel very much obliged to you if you would inform me of the nature of the inquiries you made about the purchase of the Waitotara Block—what are your reasons for believing that it is an iniquitous job, and upon whose information your opinions are founded?”

“Immediately I am in possession of this information, a full inquiry shall be instituted, and ample justice done, as the state of the country will now, I believe, shortly permit of such proceedings being carried out.”

To this the General replied,—

“SIR,—It is no part of my duty to collect information for your Excellency on such a subject as the purchase of the Waitotara Block, regarding which you have ample means of obtaining all the information you require, and

I therefore decline entering into any correspondence with your Excellency on the subject.

“I will now, however, make her Majesty’s Government fully acquainted with the information on which the opinion expressed in my private letter of the 28th January was founded.”

General Cameron, when he penned this reply, did not apparently observe that the Governor had never asked him “to collect information” for him; but had requested him to state the grounds of a most serious charge which he had made, and to let him know on whose information he had alleged “that an iniquitous job had been perpetrated.” Neither was General Cameron’s reply in other respects exactly what might have been expected from a gentleman of his profession, when challenged to substantiate the truth of his statements.

As regards the Waitotara purchase, it passed, in revision, under my own eye, when I was Native Minister; and I have no hesitation in expressing my conviction, that there is no real foundation whatever for the allegations made on the subject by General Cameron.*

3. Contemporaneously with these differences,

* See Appendix, note A.

others of a more immediately practical bearing had arisen. The question of the time at which the troops could be safely dispensed with was clearly one of a political character, and such as ought to have been left to the sole discretion of the Governor. When, however, the Imperial Government determined to remove five regiments from New Zealand, it thought proper to depart from the usual practice, and left it to "the discretion of General Cameron to determine the period at which these measures could be carried out." General Cameron writes to the Governor, "I should be glad to know your Excellency's views as soon as convenient." The Governor, no doubt hurt at the slight put upon him by the Home Government, replied, "I should not think it right to interfere with the large discretion left to you," and declined to express any opinion. General Cameron, who had a month or two before been urging the Governor to send for reinforcements of 2,000 men, and saying that the submission of the rebels never seemed so far off, now expressed his intention of sending away one regiment immediately, and another as soon as

the first should be embarked. The Governor replied, that the removal of the two regiments at that moment "would plunge New Zealand into greater difficulties than any it had yet had to encounter." He then criticised the instructions received by General Cameron, and showed that the latter had misunderstood them; and he pointed out that, however large a discretion they might leave to the General as to the time of removal of the troops *from* the country, &c., they did not give him the power of moving a single man, or changing the disposition of the forces *in* the colony. "To assume the power of determining these questions (although you have probably overlooked this fact), is to violate the terms of my commission; to assume the entire government of the country, and to place it in a position of the greatest difficulty." Now, as the troops could not be sent away without first moving them through the colony, and without an extensive change of military posts in it, the General was placed in a very neat dilemma, and compelled to abandon the idea of sending away any of the troops, "protesting that the responsibility for

their detention, as well as for undertaking any operations on which they might be employed, would rest on his Excellency."

Ultimately this Gordian knot was cut by fresh instructions from the Home Government, which restored the decision of the time when the troops should be sent away to the discretion of the Governor, the only person who could form a correct opinion on political grounds of the safety of the step, and who ought never to have been deprived of the function.

4. But the greatest feud of all, and that which ultimately gave the greatest triumph to the Governor, was one which directly involved the character for military skill and judgment of the two disputants, and which, as the one was, and the other had been, a military officer, assumed a very interesting aspect.

When General Cameron advanced up the coast in February, he left immediately in his rear, and a little on his right flank, a fortified native pah, called Wereroa, supposed to be a place of great strength, and occupied by about 300 rebels. It was a post of the utmost importance, as it not

only commanded the General's rear, but threatened the town of Wanganui, compelling a large force to be maintained there, and it kept open the only available line of road which the rebels had between the sea-coast and upper Wanganui, where a large rebel force was still seeking the opportunity of attacking the settlement, and was actually engaged in operations against our native allies and colonial forces. The General, however, did not like the look of the pah. He wrote to the Governor on the 28th January,—

"I consider my force insufficient to attack so formidable a work as the Wereroa pah. It would be necessary to establish two posts to keep our communication open with Wanganui, and we should have to furnish escorts daily for convoys. This would reduce my force to 700 or 800 men, which would not be sufficient to provide for the protection of the camp in such a country, and at the same time to carry on all the laborious operations of the siege. Instead of 1,100 men, my present available force, I should require 2,000. Besides, I should not have a single soldier left in reserve, and if anything should happen in any other part of the settlement, it would take a week or ten days to remove all the stores and raise the siege. For these reasons I do not intend to attack the pah, but to cross the Waitotara, and see what can be done on that side."

As the General would not attack the pah, the Governor proposed to let the friendly natives do it; he writes to General Cameron,—

“The natives of this place and their friends, about 500 strong in all, wish to be allowed to attack the Wereroa pah at Waitotara. Will their doing so interfere with your operations? If not, I will give them permission to do it. I am satisfied if they enter upon this task that they will not commit any acts of cruelty, but will proceed in entire conformity with the rules of civilized nations.

The General, who had no faith in “friendly” natives, replies,—

“So far from interfering with my operations, the friendly natives will materially facilitate them by attacking the Wereroa pah; which Mr. Mantell affirms they will take ‘in little more time than they will require to march thither.’ I am quite sure that we could not take it in that off-hand manner, nor take it in any manner without considerable loss—that is, supposing the natives defend it in earnest, which there is no reason to think they will not do.”

And a few days after,—

“I was anxious to hear what the friendly natives are about. I expect to hear that their supposed desire to attack the Wereroa pah was all bounce, though both

you and Mr. Mantell seem to have believed in it. However, if our operations should have the effect of drawing the greater part of the garrison out of the pah, which I expect they will, the friendly natives may have an opportunity of attacking it with some prospect of success."

The Governor replies,—

"Mr. Mantell tells me that when the natives arrived at Wanganui, elated with their late victory over Pehi, they were anxious at once to have proceeded against that place, but he did not feel justified on his own responsibility in allowing them to do so. Since that time many of them have dispersed, and although they have repeatedly pressed me on the point of their going there, I have thought it better for a little time to watch the course of events, and see what opportunities presented themselves, and what your movements may be, and what results flowed from these."

The General rejoins, with a chuckle,—

"I was very confident that the desire stated to have been entertained by the friendly natives to be allowed to attack the Wereroa pah was mere bounce; and I was astonished that you should have believed in it, that is to say, if you really did believe in it; *and yet you could hardly have proposed that 500 natives should attempt what I told you I would not undertake at that time with fewer than 2,000 soldiers*, if you did not really believe that they would succeed. As to Mr. Mantell, he appears

to me an excitable person, entirely devoid of common sense, and I shall pay no attention whatever in future to his opinions."

A few days afterwards, however, he writes more soberly,—

"The country north of Wanganui to the Patea can not be subdued without taking possession of the Wereroa pah; indeed I believe that the capture of that position is all that is necessary to give us possession of the whole country between the Kai-iwi and the Patea, for between the Waitotara and the Patea the country is perfectly open, and not likely to be defended. I wish, therefore, you would inform me whether you consider the immediate possession of the Waitotara block of such consequence that you wish me to attack the Wereroa pah at once notwithstanding the risk to which I have referred; or whether you wish me to continue my advance towards Taranaki."

The Governor answers :—

"You have in your own correspondence, answered the question whether or not I can wish you to attack the Wereroa pah at once. However necessary I might think the capture of the pah to be, to prevent wrong impressions in the native mind, or to attain the important objects, which you have pointed out in your letter of the 17th instant, would follow from the capture of that pah, *it is quite impossible for me to request you to attack it at once, when you have told me that you consider your force in-*

sufficient to attack so formidable a work, and that to enter upon this task you would require an available force of two thousand men; that the natives have rendered the pah so formidable a position, and have at the same time occupied it in such strength, that it could not be taken without serious loss, uncompensated by any corresponding loss on the side of the rebels, who could at any time escape into the bush with impunity. The other alternative presented to me, must, therefore, necessarily be the one that I choose, viz.,—that you should continue your advance towards Taranaki, so far as the means at your disposal will admit.”

The General now left the coast and retired to Auckland without having attempted to take the pah. Then the controversy was renewed, the Governor writing on the 19th May,—

“I have said that I have not taken so gloomy a view of the state of affairs as you appear to have recently done. I believe that large numbers of natives were prepared to submit to the Government. I think that they have in some measure been led to pause in this intention from what has taken place in regard to the Wereroa pah, and the rumours which have for the last two months been circulated of the intended withdrawal of the troops; but I still think much may shortly be done to bring about the submission of many of their leading men.

“My own view of the course which ought to be taken in the present circumstances of the country is, that a

sufficient force should be collected with the least delay practicable, to take the Wereroa pah in such a manner as, if possible, to secure a marked and decided success on our part; that the local government should then, occupying as it would an advantageous position, attempt to come to terms with the leading rebel chiefs, which I believe it could speedily do; and that then, as a consequence naturally and properly following the pacification of the country, the proposed reduction of the troops should be promptly carried out. The colony having in the interim made such arrangements as it thinks necessary for raising additional local forces to take the place of the troops which are to be sent home. In this way I think effect might safely be given to the instructions of her Majesty's Government."

To this, General Cameron replies,—

"In regard to your Excellency's proposal to collect with as little delay as possible a sufficient force to take the Wereroa pah, I must inform your Excellency that I consider it impossible to take that position by any formal operation in such a manner as your Excellency wishes, viz., so as to secure a marked and decided success, inflicting a large loss on the enemy, and sustaining but a trifling loss ourselves. I believe that in any formal attack on this position, (which it must be remembered cannot be surrounded, and from which the natives can effect their escape at any moment,) our loss would most probably be heavier, much heavier, perhaps, than that of the enemy; and that, under such circum-

stances, the mere possession of the place would not be followed by the important advantages which it is your Excellency's desire to attain.

"On the contrary, it is possible that its capture, with a loss on our side exceeding that of the enemy, might have an injurious moral effect on the natives, and instead of hastening their submission, encourage them in postponing it.

"It is, indeed, a matter of surprise to me, that any one with a knowledge of the country between Wanganui and Taranaki, can entertain a hope of striking a decisive blow there. The nature of the country forbids the idea, and if her Majesty's troops are to be detained in the colony until one is struck, I confess I see no prospect of their leaving New Zealand."

And again :—

"With reference to your remarks as to the expediency of now attacking the Wereroa pah, I would observe that the numerous army which you state to be at present in the colony (and which I may remark is distributed in posts on lines amounting to some hundreds of miles in length, with the finest artillery in the world, and abundance of scientific appliances), is not wanted for such an operation as an attack on the Wereroa pah ; and were the army in the country much more numerous than it is, I should consider it *unadvisable* at the present time to assemble a large force for a formal attack on this position, by which there is, in my opinion, no reasonable grounds for expecting that the advantages your Excellency

desires could be obtained. I stated my opinions fully on this subject in my last letter, and expressed my readiness to attack the position if, after the expression of those opinions, you thought proper to instruct me to undertake the operation.

“As your Excellency, however, still confines yourself to the expression of opinions in which I find it impossible to concur, and leaves the decision of the question to me, I must exercise my own judgment as to the time and manner of getting possession of the place; and I shall not allow myself to be influenced by remarks, however disparaging, to undertake an operation for the success of which, I alone am responsible, in a manner which I do not fully approve.

“Under any circumstances, I consider that the capture of the Wereroa pah, at the present moment, is not of sufficient importance to justify the detention of the whole force in the colony, after the instructions received from her Majesty’s Government.”

Remembering all that the General had said about not being able to attack Wereroa with less than 2,000 men, and that he was now at Auckland expecting his relief, these last quoted letters clearly amounted to a positive refusal to attack the pah.

The Governor now applied to Brigadier-General Waddy, who had been left in command on the

coast, to know "whether the instructions under which he was acting would permit of his investing Wereroa and to carry on operations for its reduction." General Waddy replied :—"I cannot undertake this operation unless I receive the orders of General Cameron." *

The Governor at last determined to take the matter in hand himself. He got together a "scratch" force consisting of 309 friendly natives (the same whose "bounce" General Cameron had derided), 139 (colonial) Forest Rangers, and twenty-five Wanganui Cavalry, in all 473. He persuaded General Waddy to lend him 400 Queen's troops, not to take part in the operations, but to parade in front of the pah *in terrorem* of the enemy, like Chinese wooden guns, while the colonial forces attacked the pah. 200, however, of the Queen's troops only arrived, and the Governor ingeniously added to their apparent number by leaving the tents of the colonial force standing. He then despatched

* General Cameron denies that he had given any instructions which would prevent General Waddy from acting. Possibly it was *the absence* of instructions that the latter referred to. See C. P. P. 1865, A. No. 4A. p. 8.

the native contingent and colonial force, under Major Rookes and Major McDonell (both of the local forces) by an extremely difficult bush track, over a precipitous country, in a deluge of rain, to attempt the capture of an outlying redoubt in the rear of and commanding the pah. The service was most gallantly performed, with the capture of fifty prisoners (a contingent of rebels who were coming to relieve the pah), and without the loss of a life on our side. The pah was now no longer tenable, and in a few hours the rebels were seen to be hurrying out of it pell-mell. There was only one route by which they could escape, and had that been stopped by the Queen's troops not a man could have escaped. Owing, however, to their not being on the spot, or not available for combative purposes, the Maories got off without loss. The next morning the little force of natives and colonial troops entered the evacuated pah, which had been the subject of so much controversy on paper and so little conflict in the field. The whole operations occupied barely two days.*

* See Correspondence between Grey and Cameron, *ante*, and Wereroa papers, C. P. P. 1865, A. No. 7.

5. Another serious difference arose between the Governor and General relative to the expediency of allowing Colonel Warre, C.B., commanding at Taranaki, to force his way, as he offered to do, with a column of 500 men from that place to Patea, where he might meet General Cameron on his advance from Wanganui. General Cameron received the offer with the utmost contempt. Writing to the Governor, he says,—

“You will have heard of Colonel Warre’s advance to the Stoney river, and the apprehension of the natives suspected of murder. *Colonel Warre talks (how easy it is to talk) of marching down the coast with a flying column of 500 men and meeting me at Patea; but for what object he does not explain. He calculates on meeting with no opposition, and his march would of course only be possible on that condition, for 200 men in a good pah would effectually bar his progress, and if attacked by such a body as that by which we were attacked on Wednesday he would inevitably come to grief.*”

This estimate of the relative prowess of the natives and the Queen’s troops is not a little startling, and if such views were known to be entertained by the General, it would certainly

(as the Governor remarked) not be very encouraging to the soldiers serving under him.

Immediately after General Cameron left for Auckland, Colonel Warre seems to have started on his expedition, marched without opposition to a place twenty-five miles from Waigongoro (General Cameron's advanced post), where he was met by Colonel Weare of the 50th regiment, and the line of coast from Taranaki to Wanganui opened from end to end, without the loss of a man, or an enemy seen, except in the three skirmishes in the months of January and March already recorded.

6. Two other bones of contention require notice as they have a very serious bearing on the public service. General Cameron appears to have corresponded with the authorities at the War Office by despatches and private letters, the contents of which he never showed to the Governor, though he made in them charges of the most serious character against him and the Colonial Government. When the quarrel became hot and open, and the Governor called on the General to give him copies of these despatches

in which, as he said, he had “ traduced him behind his back ;” he distinctly and positively refused to do so ; and the Governor found himself in the position of having to reply to the repeated censure of the Colonial Office without having seen a line of the documents by which his conduct had been impugned. One can scarcely believe that such an un-English practice would be tolerated by two departments of the Imperial Government—the War Office and Colonial Office : but the perusal of these papers not only shows that it was so, but apparently that Lord de Grey and Mr. Cardwell thought it was the proper thing to encourage. The Governor’s complaints of it are very bitter and justly so ; though I should have felt more sympathy for him had I not myself repeatedly suffered and seen others suffer at his hands, by a similar practice, in his correspondence with the Home Government, when his quarrels were with the Colonial Ministry or private colonists.

The remaining topic of dispute to which I will refer, was the Governor’s publication of the correspondence between the General and himself, and its communication by him to his Ministry

and the Colonial Parliament. Until the middle of April, 1865, all Sir George Grey's and General Cameron's letters to each other, on public and official subjects, except a very few, such as the reports of engagements, returns of killed and wounded, and the like, commenced "My dear General" and "My dear Sir George." Though in this form, they were practically official letters, and the Governor generally, if not always, showed them to his Ministers. When the Governor and General quarrelled, the Governor gave these letters to his Ministers, they were laid before the Assembly by "his Excellency's command," and printed in a voluminous parliamentary paper. General Cameron was so indignant when he found out that his letters had been shown to the Colonial Ministry, that he sent off, at a great cost to the public, an express steamer to Melbourne, carrying a supplementary mail containing his complaints to her Majesty's Government on the subject. It turned out, however, that General Cameron had already sent, from time to time, copies of his "private" letters to the War Office; and the Governor justified the course he had pursued on

the ground that in doing so the general had made his letters public (official?). This argument would, I think, have been conclusive, but for one fact. In the course of the previous year, when the Colonial Government were printing papers for the General Assembly, they had asked the Governor for two letters of General Cameron's which they had been shown, for the purpose of establishing a point in dispute between the Governor and themselves. They were exclusively on a public subject; but being in the form of "private" letters, the Governor declined to allow their publication, without the General's consent, which being refused, the Governor would not allow the letters to be published.* After this General Cameron certainly had a right to expect that his letters of the same class written subsequently would be similarly respected, and not treasured up by the Governor against a day of wrath, then to be converted into official documents.

I shall not further turn over the leaves of this

* C. P. P. 1864, E. No. 1, p. 4.

remarkable "State Paper." There were besides these important grounds of quarrel, a dozen more or less material differences; but they have no particular interest except as showing a state of discord between the two high contending parties, utterly subversive of the public service, and most fatal to the prospect of good government. Of the tone and style of the correspondence I shall say little; it must be perused to be appreciated. "My dear Sir George" and "My dear General" disappear from its pages, and the recalcitrant writers become the most formal of "obedient servants." Such expressions as these are of frequent occurrence:—"I deny your right to traduce me behind my back"—"It is not true"—"If I wished to traduce you behind your back, I had only to follow your own example"—"Your unwarranted statements"—"Your misrepresentations of fact, some of the most important of which you have omitted"—"Your proceedings are calculated to undermine the discipline of the forces"—"I regret to be unable to perceive that your proceedings were guided by a sense of public duty"—till at last the Governor's private secre-

tary is found returning to the military secretary a letter of the General's, stating "that if Sir D. A. Cameron will be good enough to put it into more usual and becoming language, his Excellency will lose no time in replying to it," which the military secretary on the part of the General refuses to do.

I have not raked the ashes of this unhappy quarrel for the purpose of disparaging two "able and distinguished persons," who, in England, are supposed to have done the State some service, but because, under those ashes lie buried the best interests of the colony. We are expected to pay 40*l.* per man for troops which march at the rate of a mile a day, and whose General tells us that 500 of them can be stopped by 200 Maories, and that it is useless to let them follow their enemies to the bush! When we complain we are denounced as ungrateful. Again you send us your "able and distinguished men;" we cannot get on with them; we are denounced as impracticable colonists. We reply, "Read this State Paper; you will then see who is impracticable. If you wish to know what sort of man a captain

of a ship is, see him on his quarter-deck. In these State Papers you may see two of your great land-captains, each on his own quarter-deck."

But perhaps the most unsatisfactory thing connected with these serious differences, is the manner in which they are disposed of by Mr. Cardwell.* One would at least have expected from him some positive decision and some definite action. If General Cameron were justified in charging Governor Grey with deliberately involving us in fresh hostilities with the natives, and using her Majesty's forces in "support of an iniquitous job," what punishment could be too severe for such conduct? If, on the other hand, General Cameron had made such charges recklessly and without proof, and had allowed his military action, as the Governor implies, to be interfered with by his political views, what sentence could be too heavy for him? Mr. Cardwell entirely shirks this plain and formidable issue, and disposes of the difference as if it was a mere matter of opinion on a point of expediency,

* Despatch of 26th July, 1865, No. 50.

making no allusion at all to General Cameron's serious charges, but delivering judgment on secondary points only, in the balancing see-saw style, which leaves the merits of the case with either party according as this or that hypothesis might be true. He expresses profound regret at such a correspondence having occurred between two such "able and distinguished men," and he gives a sort of mild disapproval of the publication of General Cameron's "private" letters. No doubt these things to the official mind were grave offences. But on the serious consequences which must have resulted to the colony—the loss of life and enormous cost caused by the prolongation of an "iniquitous" war—Mr. Cardwell has not a word to say. Leaving those serious matters on one side, he hastens on to express the entire concurrence of her Majesty's Government in the policy of the Colonial Ministry, which held out a prospect of a discontinuance of the expenditure on the part of the Imperial Treasury. The despatch, in short (which is an exceedingly well written one,) would afford an excellent illustration of some of the rules laid down in Taylor's *Statesman*, or

Single-speech-Hamilton's book on political logic, to enable an official writer to evade giving a decision on a troublesome or difficult question. The subject, however, is of far too much consequence to be shelved in this summary manner. It is not the official *régime* of the public service which is the real issue at stake. The question is, who is to bear the responsibility of having prolonged the New Zealand War, and rendered utterly useless the enormous expenditure incurred by the Home and Colonial Governments. Mr. Cardwell has not thought it necessary to look at the question at all from this point of view; but it is hoped that if the subject is brought before the House of Commons, the interests of the colony and of the English tax-payer will be taken into consideration, and not merely the interests of the two Government departments, or the merits of the two "able and distinguished men" who have been engaged in this most discreditable and unfortunate controversy.*

* See Appendix, note B.

CHAPTER XIV.

Wanganui River and Interior—Gallant Behaviour of friendly Natives at Ohoutai—Capture of Pehi and eighty Rebels—Pehi released by Governor—Joins the Rebels again—Captain Brassey's brave Defence of Pipiriki—Governor throws away Advantages by issuing a foolish Proclamation—Murder of Kereti and Mr. Broughton.

I HAVE now, I am glad to say, completed the record of dilatory military operations, and vigorous contentions between the able and distinguished men whose office it was to direct and conduct them. What remains to be told is of a much more satisfactory character, and, as regards military operations, affords in all respects a most remarkable contrast to what has gone before.

Perhaps the most difficult portion of New Zealand for military operations is that through which the upper part of the Wanganui river flows. Volcanic action, and the rush of many mountain

streams in one, have forced a great cleft 120 miles long, through a rugged semi-mountainous country, broken by innumerable ravines running at right angles to the course of the main river. Where these minor ravines cut the river, there will be a delta of a few acres of level ground, the intervening space between one delta and another being a solid wall of perpendicular rock several hundred feet high, commanding from that height the course of the short river reaches below. The country is for the most part clothed with dense forest, interlaced with supplejacks and vines, and slippery with the roots of huge trees which twist along the surface of the ground like gigantic serpents. The river which is the only key to this country, rushes in broken foam in successive rapids over jagged rocks and great boulder-stones. The natives when they ascend it, throw away their paddles, and with great labour and an immense amount of "capstan songs," they force their canoes of a few inches draft through the rushing water. The navigation of the Wanganui, is, I believe, the only thing of the kind of any magnitude in New Zealand.

It was up this river and into this country that

our native allies showed us the way when they stopped the threatened inroad of the Haus Haus. and fought, as I have already related, the brave battle of Moutua.

After that victory they built three redoubts in the neighbourhood, and held possession during the ensuing winter. When the campaign began in the following summer, they offered to come down to the coast, to go in advance of the troops and sweep the enemy away between Wanganui and Taranaki. These offers were, however, not accepted, but acting under the Governor and the Colonial Ministry, the native contingent, which appears to have amounted to about 400 men, continued to hold possession of the posts up the river, and to prevent the descent of a large rebel force congregated there under Pehi, a chief of high rank and prestige as a warrior. The hostile parties were encamped in strong pahs on either side of a line which was held to be the Rubicon between them, the crossing of which by either party was to be the signal for immediate hostilities. The principal pah of the rebel party was Ohoutai, but they had several smaller redoubts

near it. Some rebels having crossed the line were captured and sent back; but they soon re-appeared in larger numbers, endeavouring to outflank the loyal natives. Then "General Mete King" gave orders and the fighting began. The principal attack was led by Hoani Hipango, better known as John Williams, of Putiki. The assault was carried on with vigour, and the rebels were driven from pah to pah, till at last they sent out Pehi's wife with a white flag. "O Hori Kerei," they heard her crying, "when will light come out of darkness?" Then they ceased firing, and white flags were run up at the rebel pah. Pehi and his people came out unarmed and in single file, and agreed to go to Hihuarama (Jerusalem) as prisoners. Fifteen rebels were killed; five only of the friendly natives. But among them was John Williams, who was shot from the pah when holding the advanced post of the attack. From the earliest days of colonization he had been the firm friend of the colonists; he was a Christian native, a man of peace and civilized habits, and had just built himself a good eight-roomed house on the European model, on his valuable property

close to Wanganui. In 1852 he had been in England and been presented to the Queen. In 1846 he had, at great personal risk, arrested the murderers of the Gilfillan family at Wanganui. When shot at the head of his men he did not fall, but walked quietly away, and was taken down the river to Wanganui, where in a few days he died, respected and honoured by all who knew him. He was buried with all the honours that could be bestowed.

Pehi, the rebel chief, now a prisoner, was taken down to Wanganui. He was well known to be one of the most slippery and untrustworthy Maories in New Zealand. At the same time his influence was very great with the rebel party. If there was a rebel living whom it would have been wise to keep in safe custody it was Pehi. The Governor, however, according to his usual practice of throwing away by diplomacy what he gains by action, was satisfied with his taking the oath of allegiance and let him go up the river again; writing to General Cameron, "Wanganui is now quite safe; your mind may be at rest on that point." I need scarcely say that before many

weeks were over Pehi had broken his oath of allegiance, rallied his people around him, and gone again into the thick of the war.

Indeed, at the moment he was writing, the Governor must have felt that Wanganui was not "quite safe," for he determined at once to send up a force of native and military settlers to Pipiriki, a strong position a few miles above the spot where the native engagements had taken place, and which if occupied would give us the permanent command of the river, as well as cut off the rebels on the coast and at Wereroa from all communication with the interior. Captain Brassey of the colonial forces, with 250 "Military settlers," succeeded in getting up the river and taking possession of Parakino and Pipiriki, which he held without opposition till the removal from the river of the friendly native contingent which the Governor had sent for to attack Wereroa pah, as recorded in the last chapter. Then Pehi and his followers, who had so recently taken the oath of allegiance, and been released by the Governor, appeared in force, and prepared to attack Captain Brassey and his weakened post at Pipiriki. When

the Governor was engaged in the capture of Wereroa, news reached him of the critical position of that officer, hemmed in by a superior force, and short of supplies. Fearing that his letter might fall into the hands of the rebels, Captain Brassey scraped together the little Latin that a life of colonial adventure had left him, and wrote, "*Sumus sine rebus belli satis*," which he got a friendly native to undertake to carry through the enemy's lines for 15 $\frac{1}{2}$. The moment that Wereroa was captured, the Governor despatched reinforcements of colonial forces and friendly natives to his relief. Before these got there, however, Captain Brassey had relieved himself. His post was attacked by a large force of rebels, whom after a sharp engagement he repulsed, inflicting upon them, with his "*rebus belli*," a very heavy loss.

We had certainly now gained something by our military operations. Ohoutai, Wereroa, Pipiriki, and the junction of the forces under Colonels Warre and Weare, all except the first the work of a few days, had re-established our prestige, no less than given us substantial advantages.

It must be admitted that Governor Grey had exhibited very considerable military skill ; and that the course he had taken in carrying on operations with friendly natives and colonial forces, which General Cameron had declined with the Queen's troops, had been eminently successful. As usual, however, he proceeded to throw away by his pen what he had won by his sword.

Although the rebels on the coast and up the river had made no submission (except the sham submission of Pehi and his followers), though they still held strong positions in the bush where General Cameron had said it was useless to follow them—though not a soldier could straggle a few hundred yards from camp without being shot down, the Governor thought that the time had come for his favourite panacea, the issue of another Proclamation. This singular document announces to the natives of New Zealand that the war which commenced at Oakura is at an end.

“ The Governor,” it says, “ took up arms to protect the European settlements from destruction, and to punish those who refused to settle by peaceful means the diffi-

culties which had arisen, but resorted to violence, and plunged the country into war.

“ Upon those tribes sufficient punishment has been inflicted. Their war parties have been beaten ; their strongholds captured ; and so much of their lands confiscated as was thought necessary to deter them from again appealing to arms.

“ The Governor hopes that the natives will now have seen that resistance to the law is hopeless ; he proclaims on behalf of the Queen that all who, up to the present time, have been in arms against her Majesty’s authority will never be prosecuted for past offences, excepting only those who have been concerned in the murders of the following persons.

* * * * *

“ The Governor will take no more lands on account of the present war.

“ As regards the prisoners now in custody, the Governor will hold them until it shall be seen whether those who have been in arms return to peace. If they do so, the prisoners will be set at liberty.”

The only effect this document was likely to have was to increase the contempt of the natives for us. They always regard the party who makes the first overtures of peace as beaten ; and must have been greatly surprised and encouraged, when after our recent undoubted successes they found us in the position of what they would consider

suppliants for peace. The Governor asserted that the war was at an end. They knew that it was not, and that as it takes two to fight, it takes two to make peace ; which they also knew they had no intention of making. They said, "What is the good of all these proclamations ? This is the ninth which the Governor has issued. At first he told us we must give up our arms, our persons and our lands ; then it was, that we must give up our lands and sign a declaration of allegiance ; and now he says the war is over, and we need give up nothing, and he will take no more land." The mandarins of China, according to Sir John Davis, used to try the effect of government by proclamations. The Chinese rebels called them "paper tigers." There is a story of one of these dignitaries being found as our troops rushed to the breach of one of their forts, complacently sticking a proclamation on the wall, informing the outside barbarians that it was "trespass to come that way." The Maories have learned to look on Governor Grey's proclamation, much as our soldiers and sailors must have regarded this warning. Such "paper tigers" only exas-

perate the enemy, and increase their contempt for us.

So when a messenger was sent with a file of this last paper tiger to one of the rebel pahs on the coast between Wanganui and Taranaki, a few days after it was issued, he was barbarously murdered, and the proclamation torn up and trodden under foot with every mark of insult and contumely.

A few days later Brigadier-General Waddy sent to these people with whom the Governor declared we were not at war, a Government interpreter, Mr. Charles Broughton, well known to, and formerly on most intimate terms with them. He was by specious pretences, and the hoisting of a flag of truce, inveigled into their pah, and then, after (it is said) the most horrible tortures, he was barbarously murdered. Such, and such only, down to the latest dates, were the fruits which this ill-judged proclamation had borne.

But what must have increased the astonishment of the natives when they read it, was that in the same gazette appeared another proclamation, declaring martial law in the Opotiki district,

on the east coast, and the intended punishment of the murderers of the Rev. Mr. Völkner and others. These murders had been committed by, and at the instigation of members of the very tribes with whom the first proclamation declared the war was ended. There probably was not a man among them who did not glory in the murders, and as they showed a few days after, were ready to commit similar atrocities. Yet here they saw the Governor holding out the olive-branch to them on one coast, and the sword on the other. It must have puzzled them exceedingly.

When the latest news left the colony, General Chute was preparing an expedition to chastise the murderers with whom the proclamation had just announced "to all the natives in New Zealand," we were no longer at war.

And this brings me to the last stage of the war, the campaign by the colonial forces at Opotiki and the east coast.

CHAPTER XV.

Campaign on East Coast—Murder of Rev. C. S. Völkner—Murder of Mr. Fulloon and others—Colonial Force and Native Contingent sent to punish the Murderers—Great Successes—Evacuation of Pukemaire—Storming of Hungahungatoroa—Five hundred Prisoners taken—Gallant Action between the Arawas and Rebels near Matata.

THE origin of the hostilities of 1865 on the East Coast was the murder of the Rev. C. S. Völkner, a missionary of the Church of England, by a party of Hau Hau fanatics. The sad tale has been so often related that I shall give it a very brief space in my narrative.

Mr. Völkner was a Prussian by birth and a Lutheran by profession. He came to New Zealand in connection with a Hamburg society, but subsequently joined the English Church, and was ordained by Bishop Williams of Waiapu.

He was a man of remarkable simplicity of character, of the most single-minded and devoted piety, and an extremely conciliatory and kindly disposition. He had been placed, five or six years ago, at Opotiki, in the lower part of the Bay of Plenty, among some of the rudest tribes in New Zealand, who had had little or no intercourse with Europeans, and no religious instruction. He gradually won his way among them till he had gathered a considerable body of converts around him, who gave outward evidence of the effect of his teaching by building him a comparatively handsome church and dwelling house. When the war broke out in Waikato, and the East Coast tribes were getting implicated in it by sending contingents to it, Mr. Völkner was put under temporary arrest by some of the more violent of his people, but was released after some weeks, when he availed himself of the opportunity of taking Mrs. Völkner to Auckland, where he, however, remained a very short time himself. Notwithstanding the rude treatment he had already received, nothing could persuade him that he was in any danger; and during the

height of the war in Waikato and Tauranga, he paid repeated visits to his missionary district at Opotiki. Unfortunately for him, during his absence at Auckland in the month of February, a party of Hau Hau fanatics from Taranaki, led by Patara, arrived at Opotiki, carrying along with them the cooked head of an European, and a soldier, who had been taken prisoner and dragged through the country with them in great misery and wretchedness.

On the 1st of March, Mr. Völkner, accompanied by the Rev. T. Grace, another missionary who was about to visit a neighbouring place, arrived at Opotiki in a small schooner called the *Eclipse*, owned and commanded by Captain Levy, who had a trading store there, conducted by his brother. The vessel was no sooner inside the bar than she was boarded by a strong party of Maories, and the two missionaries dragged ashore. It was soon announced to Mr. Völkner that he was to be killed. Almost to the last, however, he refused to believe it; and there was apparently, for a time, a wavering among the natives and a talk about ransom. A night of miserable

suspense ensued. The next morning, Mr. Völkner busied himself in kind offices among his people, and executed some little commissions which he had undertaken at Auckland. "I could not help noticing the calmness of his manner and the beautiful smile that was on his face," writes his companion, Mr. Grace. About 2 p.m., some twenty armed men came to the house where they were, and after performing some ceremonies outside, called Mr. Völkner out, and took him away, locking in his companion, whom they would not allow to accompany him. He was taken first to his own church, where his coat and waistcoat were taken from him, and then they led him away to a willow-tree at a little distance, where they had rigged up a block and tackle which they got from the schooner. He knew now what they meant, and asked for time to pray. After a few minutes he rose up, and said, "I am ready." While he was shaking hands with some of his people (consenting to his death), a rope was thrown over his neck, and he was run up to an arm of the tree. There he hung for an hour, when they cut him down. They then cut

off his head, and a savage, called Kereope, tore out his eyes and swallowed them. They drank his blood, and smeared their faces with it. Some of his old friends took part in this. The women were the worst, and scrambled for his blood as it dripped on the ground. His body was then thrown to the dogs and the pigs, but was taken away from them, and afterwards buried by Captain Levy and some of the natives. Mr. Grace remained in captivity, expecting every day to be his last, till the 16th of March, when H.M.S. *Eclipse* having arrived off the river, Captain Levy, at imminent risk of his own life and property, got him into his boat, and pulled him off to the man-of-war.*

An attempt was made by sending a man-of-war to capture Mr. Völkner's murderers, but without success, and nothing further was done at the time. On the 22nd of July, Mr. Fulloon, a half-caste interpreter in the Government service,

* Mr. Grace's journal, C. P. P. 1865, A. No. 5. See also very interesting articles on the Pai Marire superstition, by an Army Chaplain P.C.B., in *Good Words* and *Frazer's Magazine*, October, 1865.

very highly connected on the mother's side with the East Coast natives, went in a small schooner belonging to the natives, but commanded by an European, and with an English crew, to Wakatane, a few miles from Opotiki, where Mr. Völkner had been murdered. A party of natives, who avowed themselves to have been sent by the Hau Haus, boarded the vessel, and barbarously murdered Mr. Fulloon in his berth, and then killed the captain and crew; after which they burned the vessel. They spared Mr. A. H. White, a trader, and one half-caste boy, who escaped to tell the tale.

The instructions which the Governor had received from Mr. Cardwell prohibited his employing the Imperial troops on any new military operations, beyond those in which they were already engaged. The local forces were too busy at Wanganui and elsewhere to be spared till after the fall of Wereroa, and relief of Pipiriki. Immediately after those events, however, a strong force of Colonial troops under Major Brassey, and friendly native contingent under Major McDonnell, and other officers who had distinguished

themselves during the war, amounting altogether to 580 men, was despatched to Opotiki. There Mokena, a loyal chief from East Cape, joined them with a considerable body, said to be 500, of friendly natives. They found the Hau Hau rebels in great force ready to meet them, with numerous fortified pahs, some of extraordinary strength. The landing was effected with great difficulty, and owing to a rising gale, Captain Brassey was left all night on the beach, with only 250 men, few provisions, and little ammunition. Next day, however, the native contingent landed, and our force was immediately attacked, but it drove back its assailants, and captured several of their pahs. For the next month a succession of engagements and skirmishes ensued, in which the rebels were invariably beaten with heavy loss, while our losses were light. The country was a very difficult one ; many parts little, if any less so than that already described on the Upper Wanganui, and without the advantage of any river by which the interior might be got at. It is impossible to give a full account of the various engagements they had with the rebels, but to give an

idea of the way in which they did their work, I will extract from the papers most recently arrived from the colony, the account of the capture of Pukemaire and Hungahungatoroa pabs, places apparently of at least equal strength of any which had been captured by the Queen's troops in Wai-kato, and in a country beyond all comparison more difficult for military operations.

It had been ascertained that a large force of rebels were intrenched at Pukemaire pah near Waiapu, some distance south of Opotiki, and near the East Cape. A portion of the Opotiki force was sent down by sea. On landing an immediate assault on Pukemaire pah was determined on. It proved to be a place of immense strength, and defended by a strong force. The weather was most inclement, and the rain poured down in torrents. A small party under Lieutenant Biggs got up to the very fence of the pah, and a sort of hand-to-hand fight through it took place in which the natives appear to have lost at least twenty-one killed, while our loss was only two. At last, however, ammunition failed, and Lieutenant Biggs drew off his party and returned to camp.

Three days of very heavy rain succeeded the return of the troops to camp, rendering another expedition impossible ; but the interval was employed in constructing fascines, fuses, and all sorts of mining tools for the intended attack, which was fixed, weather permitting, for Monday, the 9th. On the night of Sunday, the 8th, Captain Westrupp and Ensign Ross, with the Forest Rangers, marched from camp at eleven o'clock, and spent the night at Tiki Tiki, an old pah about half a mile from Pukemaire. Before daylight on Monday they were up under the pah in skirmishing order. Surprised that no return was made to the polite salutations of the morning, and seeing no appearance of life, they entered the pah and found it evacuated, but showing signs of quite recent occupation. It was subsequently known that a woman who escaped from pah Te Hatepe on the previous night had apprised them of the intention of the troops to assault the pah on that morning. Although strong in number, and in a pah almost impregnable, the loss of Te Whini had so demoralized them that they were seized with a panic and fled. No loot was found

in the pah except by the Tuparoa natives, who, acting apparently upon information, dug up a box in an angle of the works, supposed to contain meris and other valuables. The work of destruction now commenced. Whares and fencing were ignited, and, very speedily, the stronghold of the enemy was levelled with the ground.

So far, the old tale, but not so the sequel ; for, having marched up the hill and down again, it was determined that the Pai Marire should not long have the laugh at the troops. Accordingly, next morning early, two bodies started in pursuit. Lieutenant Biggs, with thirty volunteers from his own corps and the military settlers, subsequently joined by ninety Tuparoa natives under the chiefs Ropata and Te Hotenē, and ten from Te Hatepe, started by the inland route. "With reference to the volunteers," says a correspondent, "it was not so much volunteering as a fight for who should go. I guessed pretty well the result, seeing the spirits the men were in. As soon as Biggs had started, Major Fraser, with about sixty Europeans, and the same number of natives under Mokena, started by the coast with

the intention of meeting the other party. They arrived, however, too late, as the sequel will show. Biggs, meanwhile, his force increased to 130 men, proceeded through the bush in the direction of Kawa Kawa, a native village on the coast on the Bay of Plenty side of the East Cape, situated at the mouth of the Awatere river. Tracks of the recent retreat of the enemy were seen at intervals the whole of the way. About half-way between Morgan's pah and the Awatere, they came upon a wounded Hau Hau, from whom information was elicited which induced Biggs and party to push on as rapidly as the state of the road would permit. Rather, we should say, the nature of the country, for road there was none. The course pursued was through dense bush, with steep hills to ascend and descend, and, in some places, up the beds of creeks. The men are said to have been never dry from the time they started, and it was just as much as they could do to make the village, distant about twenty-eight miles, but quite equal to an ordinary march of fifty. When within a mile of Kawa Kawa, smoke was seen from the village, and

some horsemen were seen to cross the river from Horoera. About this time, some of the men are said to have asked the, under the circumstances, not unreasonable question,—Where are we to sleep to-night? Upon which Lieutenant Biggs is reported to have pointed to the pah ahead, and said that they had to make quarters for themselves there. The troops got within 100 yards of the kainga before they were seen; but, instead of disputing the ground, the enemy, who seemed to be in considerable force, the instant they saw the assailing force, ran as hard as they could in the direction of a strong pah further on, Hungahungatoroa. They were followed about a mile, but their swiftness of foot far exceeded that of the troops who had just completed a severe march; so the men returned and made themselves as snug as possible for the night."

At 2 A.M. next (Wednesday) morning the men were again on the march, to follow up the enemy in the direction of Hungahungatoroa. On the way a spirited skirmish took place. Just after daylight, the Kawa Kawa being then about two miles behind, a large party came in sight,

and disputed every crossing of the river. (It had to be crossed no less than nine times.) It was of no use, however; they were speedily driven by the coolness and courage of the men, on to the large pah ahead, to which they were closely followed up by the troops. Meanwhile Major Fraser arrived at Kawa Kawa, without having seen an enemy. He then received a note from Lieutenant Biggs, stating that he had attacked the Haus Haus the previous day, and was now following them up the river. The major remained at Kawa Kawa, sending on a messenger to state that assistance would be sent if required.

Following up the retreating party to this pah, strongly situated on the top of a hill, two sides of which are precipitous—about eight miles distant from Kawa Kawa, Mr. Biggs and party halted when within 150 yards of the front of it, and opened fire, which was kept up for a considerable time. Finding that the process of reduction was likely to be somewhat tedious at this rate, Mr. Tuke and nine volunteers, accompanied by some friendlies, settled the matter by a very plucky thing. By scaling one of the precipitous sides of

the hill, in doing which they risked their lives at every movement—a false step would have been destruction—they reached a position behind, and partially overlooking the interior of the pah. The garrison was only made aware of the fact when a plunging fire from the rear began to make havoc in their ranks, and were very much astonished at a feat which they had deemed impossible. The fire became very severe from this point. About twelve o'clock, Lieutenant Biggs, acting, it is supposed, under instructions from the officer commanding, opened a negotiation with the people in the pah—offering to spare all who would give up their arms, and acknowledge allegiance to the Queen. A curious scene is said to have followed. The East Coast natives (Ngatiporou) began to haul up the white flag while the Taranakis (Ngatitohea), of whom there were fifty or sixty, vigorously opposed the attempt—the dispute between the two parties appearing to run high. At last, after the lapse of an hour, some of the East Cape people breached the pah, and expressed the willingness of the whole of them to accept the terms offered. The Taranakis, seeing this, breached

the pah also, and bolted over one of the precipitous sides of the cliff. Three of these were shot in the act, and their old allies in the pah, disgusted at their conduct, also favoured them with a few parting shots. The Ngatiporou, to the number of 200 men, and about 300 women and children, then surrendered—giving up all their arms, about 120 guns. The loss of the enemy in this affair was twenty killed and several wounded. On the European side the casualties were only two in number—Lance-Sergeant Dearlove wounded, not dangerously, in the arm and shoulder, and Private Hazell slightly in the face. Arapeta, one of the Tuparoa friendlies, received a dangerous gunshot wound in the thigh.

I think it will be admitted that these were very gallant actions. They certainly were extremely successful. And when it is remembered that Lieutenant Biggs, and the other officers commanding in this campaign, had had no military education, had never been at Sandhurst, nor ever read a page of Jomini, in short that they were merely colonists, it must be acknowledged that they showed a wonderful aptitude for their work,

and that with such men to show the way it could no longer be pronounced "useless to follow the rebels to the bush."

What the rebels themselves thought of it may be gathered from the following statement of one of the force:—

"From information received from Hau Hau prisoners I find that the moral effect of the active measures taken against them has been startling. They have lost all faith in their imagined invulnerability, and have a most wholesome dread of the 'long bullet.' They have a great amount of fear and respect for the men who can use the rifle with such effect, and who are ready to meet them in the bush or to assail them in their much-vaunted strongholds. They acknowledge to have been fairly beaten, man to man, without the aid of the 'pu repo' (cannon) shells, rockets, &c.—beaten in the bush, beaten in the open, and beaten at pah fighting. I venture to say it will be a very long time before any of the same men take up arms against us; in fact, such is their rage and disgust that they express themselves as anxiously wishing to join the Europeans in attacking the Hau Haus at Tauranga—to get 'utu' (payment) out of the false prophets who have so egregiously fooled them. A lesson has indeed been taught the rebels which will have a salutary effect all over the island. The prompt and decisive manner in which they have been followed up from place to place by a small body of determined

men, has done more to disorganise and demoralise them than the slow advance of a large army with all the pomp and circumstance of war."

Almost at the same time as these events were going on at the south end of the Bay of Plenty, our allies the Arawas led by Mr. W. Mair, a colonist and resident magistrate of the district, were defeating the Haus Haus, with heavy loss and the capture of upwards of eighty prisoners.

"On the 12th instant the Haus Haus evacuated their position at Matata, and proceeded towards Te Teko, where they took up their quarters. The Arawas, accompanied by the resident magistrate, Mr. Mair, followed on their track, and arrived at Te Teko on Tuesday, the 17th instant, where they found Te Ua strongly encamped. No other means presenting themselves to take the pah than by sapping, they commenced at once to drive. At 3 p.m. on Wednesday the rebels asked for a truce; and had twenty-four hours granted to them. On the 19th at noon fighting commenced, and ere nightfall Ngatikapakio had effected a lodgment within a short distance of the pah, which effectually cut off all communication with the river. A heavy fire was sustained on both sides the whole time. At four in the morning of Sunday, the 20th, the Pai Mariries, seeing all their means of escape cut off, asked for a truce to treat for terms of peace. The only terms granted were unconditional surrender.

“ At seven the same morning, they marched out and gave up their arms. Te Ua, the prophet, and twenty-eight of the men implicated in the atrocities of Mr. Fulloon’s murder, are in charge of the Arawa police ; the rest, some fifty-four men, are in the custody of the Arawa tribe. This important victory will be a most decisive blow against the Pai Marire party. It is reported that Kereopa is to be given up, either to Major Stapp or the Arawas.”

CONCLUSION.

Present Relations between Imperial and Colonial Governments—
Prospects of Self-reliance and Removal of Troops—Finance
—The Future of the Maori Race.

THE narrative of the war is now concluded. I have brought it down to the date of the latest advices from the colony before going to press, 11th November last.* It only remains to say a few words on the present relations of the Colonial towards the Imperial Government; the question of the removal of the troops; the financial aspect of affairs; and the position and probable future of the Maori race.

1. To make clear the present relations of the Colonial and Imperial Governments, it is necessary very briefly to refer to the past.

Representative institutions were given to the

* See Appendix, note C.

colony by Parliament in 1852. But they did not necessarily include responsible government, which means that the Governor is bound to act on the advice of his ministers substantially as her Majesty does at home. This, however, was added by arrangement between Governor Browne and the Assembly in 1856, confirmed by the Imperial Government, as regarded every political interest *except native affairs*. Those were reserved with the utmost jealousy in the hands of the Governor; and though he might consult his ministers upon them, he was not bound to take their advice, and he had another set of advisers in his native secretary and other officers of the Native Department, who were in no way controlled by the colonists or their Assembly. In two out of the three most important questions which arose during Governor Browne's administration, he refused the advice of his responsible ministers and acted either on his own opinion or that of his native secretary.

When Governor Grey arrived in September, 1861, he wrote to the Home Government, stating that this system of double government was alto-

gether impracticable, and he arranged with his then ministry to carry on the Government under their advice as responsible ministers. Practically from this date the native department was abolished by being brought under the absolute control of the colonial Government.

When the Assembly met in August, 1862, it refused to confirm this arrangement (by the casting vote of the Speaker); and the Governor again resumed the position which Governor Browne had held, of consulting his ministers, but not being bound to act on their advice, and this continued till November, 1863, during which period the new war broke out at Taranaki.

Before that date, however, the Imperial Government had (through his Grace the Duke of Newcastle,)* taken a very decided course on

* The death of his Grace the Duke of Newcastle was a grave loss to New Zealand. He had had the New Zealand question under his care from the commencement of our difficulties, and thoroughly understood it. He acted with great liberality and sympathy towards the colonists; and I think if he had lived, he would not have put that "interpretation" on responsible government, as intended by him, which has since been given to it.

the question of responsible government. The Duke, indignant at what appeared to him the fast and loose manner in which the colony had dealt with the question, told it plainly that it was no longer a question whether the colonists liked to take the management of native affairs or not; "the Home Government has resigned that function. This relinquishment does not require the consent of the colonists. It is completed by the act of the Home Government. . . . Your constitutional position," he writes to the Governor, "with regard to your advisers will be the same in regard to native as to ordinary colonial affairs." He then proceeds to point out the usual *negative powers* which the chief executive always possesses under responsible government, of an appeal to the Assembly, and finally to the constituencies; and he adds the further *negative* power of not allowing the Queen's troops to be used to enforce a policy of his ministers which he did not approve. Responsible government in native affairs was thus not only bestowed but forced upon the colony, and no powers were reserved to the Governor except of a purely

negative character. He had certain vetoes but nothing more.*

The Assembly accepted the position assigned to the colonial government by the Duke of Newcastle, and believing that it now had substantial power to control the great issues at stake between the colony and the natives, it authorized the raising of a loan of three millions sterling, an enormous liability for so young a colony, and enlisted 5,000 colonial troops for three years, in order to carry into effect the policy on which the Governor, his Ministers, and the Assembly, were all agreed.

Very soon, however, Governor Grey began to attempt to exercise a control over native affairs, not of the negative character to which he was limited by the Duke of Newcastle, but of an independent and positive character, and contrary to the advice of his responsible ministers. The difference was referred to the Home Government. Mr. Cardwell, who had then succeeded the Duke

* Despatch of his Grace the Duke of Newcastle, dated 26th February, 1863, C. P. P. E 7, particularly the last half page.

of Newcastle as Secretary for the Colonies, put what has been called an "interpretation" on his Grace's instructions, but which really was a simple reversal of their spirit and letter. What had been the duke's exception, he made his rule; and the duke's rule his exception. He intimated distinctly that so long as British troops remained in the country the Governor should act on his own discretion in native affairs, even though opposed to his responsible ministers.* In short, he simply and absolutely repealed everything that the colony cared for in the duke's arrangement; and the Governor taking him at his word, the Ministry, as soon as they were satisfied that it was to be so, resigned.

They were succeeded by the Weld Ministry, and the first thing it did was to pass resolutions through the Assembly, by which, after referring to the acceptance by the colony of the Duke of Newcastle's decision, and Mr. Cardwell's "interpretation" of it, and condemning the system of double

* See his despatch of 26th April 1864, 27th June 1864, C. P. P. E No. 1, p. 38.

Government which it had been attempted to re-establish as productive of great evils, it was resolved that rather than continue that system, the colony must adopt the alternative presented by Mr. Cardwell, namely the withdrawal of her Majesty's land forces at the earliest possible period consistent with the maintenance of Imperial interests; so that the colony might be restored to the same measure of responsible government in native as in ordinary affairs. And then by a memorandum addressed to the Governor, the Ministry pressed the removal of the troops, and declared the colony ready to undertake its own defence.*

The Home Government has demanded from the colony the sum of 40*l.* per head per annum, for all soldiers kept in the colony after 1st January, 1865, at the request of the Colonial Government. None have been so kept since that time, and the colony will pay nothing. Yet the troops remain. One regiment only, the 65th, has returned home. It is rumoured that four more are on the route.

* C. P. P. A No. 1.

This will still leave a force of some 5,000 men in the colony, *at the cost of the Imperial Government*. My own opinion is that these five regiments will remain there a long time. It is left to Governor Grey to fix the "epoque" for their departure. There is little doubt that he does not believe in the possibility, under existing circumstances, of carrying out, in its integrity, the "self-relying policy" of the Weld Ministry; a good horse, but one which it must be admitted they have done all they could to ride to death. "Self-reliance" has hitherto, in practice, been "tempered" by the presence of 10,000 Queen's troops, and though no one will deny the gallantry and efficiency of the colonial forces during the last year, yet it may well be doubted, if they could have done what they have, had not large bodies of Queen's troops given them, at least, moral support, and kept the enemy in check over a large part of the country. Many of us colonists think that a policy which was brave and chivalrous in design, had become in the hands of the Weld Ministry, rash and quixotic; and that by their continued cry to take away all the soldiers, they were de-

stroying the hope of successfully bringing the self-relying policy into operation. It is believed by many that the immediate and entire removal of the troops would be followed by a general combination of all the scattered and half-beaten, but unsubmitted tribes, which are now quietly, but sulkily, waiting an event which has been so much talked of; and that if it should take place too soon, a colonial army far larger than the finances of the colony could maintain would be required to enable it to hold its own.

2. But then it may be said if the Queen's troops have proved so inefficient in this Maori war, as you have described them, what is the good of keeping them there at all? The answer is they have been used in a wrong way. They are not adapted for the sort of operations necessary to conquer an enemy like the Maories; nor, it would appear, do their officers know how to handle them for that kind of work. The tactics have been to make the Queen's troops fight, and to use the colonial forces for holding posts, transport service, and similar work. *This is exactly the reverse of what recent experience has taught us*

ought to have been done. The colonial forces should have been sent to the bush to fight, and the Queen's troops kept to protect the centres of population, and (as Sir George Grey used them at Wereroa) to give moral support to the colonial troops, and take charge of the prisoners. For such purposes a few regiments may still be extremely useful. They might remain at Wanganui, Taranaki, or in the neighbourhood of Auckland, while the military settlers, native contingents, Hawke's Bay volunteers, and other similar corps, led by such men as Von Tempsky, McDonell, Brassey, Fraser, or Biggs, might go and do as they have lately been doing at Opotiki and Waiapu. We shall never beat the natives into submission till we satisfy them that we can fight them man to man (not 500 to 200), in the bush (where it is "useless" for the Queen's troops to go), and without Armstrong guns and all the pomp and circumstance of great European wars.

Before quitting this part of my subject, I must say one word in reference to the Queen's troops. In speaking of them as I have done, I

desire to be understood as criticising their operations as an army, and summing up the general result. That the men were personally brave, and their officers brave, that personal gallantry was the rule, and the reverse the rare exception, is readily admitted. But it cannot be concealed that the campaign has, as a whole, added little to the laurels of the British army. Except Walcheren, New Orleans, and some passages of the American War of Independence, I can recollect no military operations of which, as a whole, we have less reason to be proud. When we recollect what was done, or is said to have been done, by our armies during the Indian Mutiny, how small divisions, making forced marches under a tropical sun, drove ten or twenty times their own number of well-appointed and well-disciplined troops before them, how they fought eight or ten pitched battles in as many days, how they took great fortified cities like Delhi and Lucknow, how they suppressed in little more than a year a mutiny and rebellion, supported by many millions of determined and furious fanatics, we cannot help contrasting the work of the New Zealand cam-

paign, and becoming sceptics of modern history. The very regiments which are said to have done these great achievements have for two years been fighting in a temperate climate with a few naked savages, armed with old Tower muskets, with no fortified cities, but only a few rifle-pits and earthworks often thrown up in a night, without any of the appliances of modern warfare, never having in the field a fifth part of our force, and yet at the end of it the enemy is unbeaten, and we are told on the highest authority that 200 of them can stop 500 of the Queen's troops, and that it "is useless to follow them into the bush." Therefore, I say when this campaign is talked of, let no man "stand on tiptoe and rouse him at the name of Crispian." Let it rather be admitted that we have yet to learn the art of fighting savages. God grant that it may be the last occasion on which the British army may have it to do.

3. The principal difficulty in the way of the full adoption of the self-reliance principle is the financial state of the colony. The revenue, amply sufficient for the ordinary expenses of govern-

ment, is not equal to the special demands upon it caused by the war, which can only be met by a loan, as such extraordinary expenditure is in older countries. And here, I think, the treatment of the colony by the Home Government has been hard in the last degree. At the close of 1864, when the war was at its crisis—when the colony was making the utmost effort, by taking on itself a pecuniary burden to the extent of three millions sterling—and *at the very moment when it was offering to send away the Queen's troops*, Mr. Cardwell pressed for payment of an accumulated debt due to the Home Government of 500,000*l.* The colony did its best, by handing over to the Home Government debentures to the amount; and then, in consideration of all it had done and was ready to do, it asked the Home Government either to guarantee the balance of its loan in the London market, or give it some direct, but temporary, pecuniary assistance towards the self-defence which it was prepared to undertake. Mr. Cardwell has refused this reasonable request in a despatch which, for hardness and want of sympathy, is, I think, unequalled; summing up by

anticipation every possible argument which could be used against it in Parliament, and refusing positively even so much as to ask the House of Commons for the assistance requested.*

The colony's case is this. At the commencement of the war it assumed a liability of three millions sterling, in return for the very liberal aid in the form of Imperial troops given by the Duke of Newcastle. If these troops had been effectively used, the three millions ought to have covered all the cost necessary to be incurred by the colony, and left a good balance towards future self-defence. But owing to the length to which the war has been protracted solely by bad management, the resources of the colony have been almost entirely wasted; and now, when it is called on to undertake its own defence, it has not the funds to do it with, nor the credit to raise more. The colony contends that the consideration given by the Home Government in the shape of troops has almost absolutely failed. They appeal to the correspondence between Sir

* Despatch 26th July, 1865, No. 50.

George Grey and General Cameron, to show that the failure has been owing to the conduct of Imperial officers ; and they urge that they are entitled to consideration when, under these circumstances, they ask for a guarantee, which will not really cost the home country a shilling ; or a moderate amount of pecuniary assistance, which, if it enable the colony to undertake its own defence, will prove the truest economy to Great Britain.

It is not an answer to say that the colony has itself offered to dispense with the troops. At the time that it did so it asked for the assistance I have mentioned. If the Home Government persists in refusing this assistance, and at the same time removes the troops, it will incur a very serious responsibility. And it may depend upon it that the cheapest thing it can do (and that seems to be the main point kept in view at the Colonial Office), will be to give some reasonable assistance in the way of guarantee or pecuniary aid, and bring its troops away altogether. If with such assistance the Colonial Government is left free from that interference by the Colonial Office for which the presence of troops is made

the excuse, to finish the war and protect itself for the future, I have no doubt it can do it. But there must be no more restrictions placed by the Home Government on confiscation, and no longer any power vested in the Governor to take an initiative policy to which his ministers and the Assembly of the colony are opposed.

I do not for one moment advocate the retention of troops in the colony, except for the most temporary purpose. I cordially agree with almost every word that was spoken before the committee on colonial military expenditure by Lord Herbert, Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Lowe, and Mr. Godley, and what has been written by Mr. Adderley on the same subject. But New Zealand affords grounds for temporary exception. By retaining the management of native affairs in its own hands, the Imperial Government got it into difficulties ; by interference during their existence, it has prevented its getting out of them. Let it be done with the present war, on terms which afford a profitable basis of future peace, and I am content never to see the face of another British soldier in the colony. But let the rule

be applied fairly to all the colonies ; do not relieve the Australian colonies from troops, and keep up little armies in Mauritius, New Brunswick, Seychelles, or Hong Kong.

4. The position of the natives at this moment is far from satisfactory. Except the small remnant of the Tauranga tribe, a few prisoners, and a few other individuals here and there, none have yet made submission. No large tribe which has been engaged in the war has submitted or laid down its arms, or made any approach towards the re-establishment of friendly relations with the Europeans or the Government.* They have retired from the country which we have occupied with troops, and there they wait, making no sign, but apparently watching the opportunity for renewing hostilities. The vacillating policy which has been pursued towards them, and the recent talk of the removal of the troops have no doubt encouraged them in thus holding out.

* The submission of Wm. Thompson I think nothing of. It has been attended with no result, and he and his people, the King and Rewi included, seem just as far from recognizing the authority of the Queen and British law as ever they were.

The native question is, however, only one of time, and I regret to say of very limited time. The race is melting away; and if there were no more war, and the Europeans were to leave the country to-morrow, the extinction of the Maori, in an exceedingly brief period, is as certain as any thing human can be. A very few figures will show this.

In 1842, according to the best estimates which could be made, on the authority of missionaries and other long residents in the country, their number was 114,000. In 1850 a well-informed Wesleyan missionary estimated them at 70,000. In 1858 a Government census, generally supposed to be in excess, returned them at 55,970. The war and natural causes have by this time probably reduced them to 45,000. Carry on the calculation and it is evident that the certain extinction of the race, except a few individuals, is a thing which many of us may live to witness.

The one great cause of this has been, and is, their utter disregard of all those social and sanitary conditions which are essential to the continuing vitality of the human race. The result is, the

constitution of the Maori is absolutely decayed, and they do not produce children to replace the current generation of adults. A people that has no children must die out.

Shortly before leaving the colony I endeavoured to obtain statistical returns on this point; but at the time I left I had only received a few. They were, however, collected from various parts of the country, and represent tribes living in all the varied conditions of life which exist among them; some near large towns, some remote from any, some closely intermixed with Europeans, and some with scarcely an European among them. The result was an average of 100 males to 70 females, and less than 50 children under 15 years of age. If these be the relative proportions all through the islands, and I have reason to believe that they are certainly not more favourable, only one conclusion can be arrived at as to the future of the race.

The proportion of children also is a conclusive proof of the cause which has really effected the reduction, and will, unless some great change takes place in the domestic life of the Maori, as

certainly lead to its extinction. The habits of life which lead to this lamentable result, are in no way attributable to the presence of the European in the country. They are, according to Wilkes, Cheever,* and all who have studied the condition of the Polynesian race, universal wherever the race is found, and the one great cause of its rapid decline in all the islands which it inhabits. So long as the communistic and vicious social economy exists among them which has hitherto existed, the destiny of the race is certain. The missionaries had before the war altered the habits of the natives in many particulars; but this great evil they had barely, if at all, succeeded in touching. It is true scarcely a hint of it appears in their reports home; but they know well, and in conversation freely admit, the magnitude and-

* Cheever, in his *Island World of the Pacific*, writes, "The national blood is so corrupted, the constitution is so venomously diseased, that there is little hope of the preservation of a race. Unless there speedily ensue a great change . . . the race will run out and cease to be. Whether it is not too late to apply a remedy remains to be seen." He considers that they were already on the decline, owing to their own vices, on the arrival of Capt. Cook. In Cook's time the native inhabitants of Tahiti were estimated at 70,000, now they are 7,000.

universal prevalence of habits which are sweeping the natives into an early grave. It has not been their intercourse with Europeans which has led to the result. That, for the most part, has led to the adoption of better food, better dwellings, better general habits of life. This cause was in existence long before there was an European in the islands, and there is little doubt that the race was on the decrease when Cook first landed there. I say there is little doubt, because it is impossible that a race with such habits of life as he describes could do otherwise than decrease.

If the Aborigines Protection Society had devoted its energies to some systematic attempt to ameliorate the sanitary condition of the natives and to teach them the laws of life, not by writing feeble homilies in baby English, but by sending among them medical officers capable of teaching those laws, they might have earned the title they have assumed, and would have had the cordial co-operation of the colonists. Here is a field of practical utility open to them yet, though one which would cost both money and labour. Their interference with the political relations of the

Maori, and especially their encouragement to him to hold on to that Nessus' shirt, the occupation of large unused tribal territory, has done much to bring him to his present forlorn condition. They have had pretty much their own way at the Colonial Office, and with Governor Grey, and the result of it is, that the war which was begun for the suppression of rebellion, has now degenerated into a war of extermination, as far as a great part at least of the native race is concerned. They boast in their last report of the extent to which they have influenced the minds of the Secretary of State and Sir George Grey. I think both of those gentlemen must deeply regret having listened to such councillors, when they look at the "bitter end" to which their advice has brought affairs in New Zealand. The opinion, which I have before expressed, "that the prolongation of the war has been owing to the interference of this society," has by its secretary been pronounced "monstrous." I can only say that in the colony it is very generally entertained. The *New Zealander* paper, which the Society has commended for its "noble" advocacy of native

rights, speaking of a recent interference by it, says, "Nothing can be more inexcusable than the conduct of the Aborigines Society *throughout the New Zealand war*; and to none has it rendered itself more truly obnoxious than to the party of moderation in this colony, which ardently desires peace, but declines to slander its fellow colonists, or to give the natives counsel which must lead them to destruction."

My own conviction is, that had the colonists from the first been allowed to arrange their own relations with the native race, and conduct their own political intercourse, no serious difficulty would have arisen between the two races. It is to the representatives of the Imperial Government, in whose hands the administration of native affairs, and the function of purchasing native lands, were jealously reserved, and to the injudicious advice of self-constituted friends of the Maori at home, that all the troubles of that unhappy colony are attributable.

1

APPENDIX.

NOTE A.

SINCE the preceding pages were sent to the press, the December mail, and a telegram forestalling the January mail, have arrived. The former reports the continued successes of the Colonial forces and friendly natives at Poverty Bay on the east coast. After several days' fighting, a large body of the fanatics (180 fighting men, besides women and children,) surrendered. The fighting pah in which they were entrenched is described as being in all respects equal in strength to those which General Cameron found so troublesome ; and "the fact that a few hundred militia and natives readily do what General Cameron with his large force of men and appliances was so often urged in vain to do, requires to be stated, if only in its nakedness, as an act of justice to the gallant men of whom the Colonial forces and native contingent are alike composed."—See *London Times*, February 15, 1866.

The later telegram reports that General Chute has taken a pah on the west coast; that the war is now practically at an end, and that the troops are returning home. The fact that the war is practically at an end, may well be doubted. The same thing has been stated a dozen times in telegrams, and in Sir George Grey's despatches during the last two years; but hostilities have continued notwithstanding.

NOTE B.

"Further papers on the affairs of New Zealand" have recently been laid on the tables of the Houses of Parliament. They contain the correspondence between Governor Grey and General Cameron, which had reached me in the papers of the Colonial Parliament, and several despatches from Mr. Cardwell to Sir George Grey, and other documents later than those I had seen when these pages went to press. There is nothing, however, in them to alter anything which I have written. Mr. Cardwell still continues to regard the "bitter personal controversy" between the "two able and distinguished men" from the same point of view—that is, simply in reference to its bearings on the "public service," and the great official scandal which it involves. The idea has not yet presented itself to his mind that the colony of New Zealand has been nearly ruined by it; that the vast expenditure going on while

these gentlemen were quarrelling, has been utterly thrown away; and that in consequence the colony has as strong a claim as ever was raised to consideration, not to say actual compensation, at the hands of the Home Government, for the injury inflicted on it by the acts of the Governor and General. Mr. Cardwell thinks that the "time has arrived for putting an end to this painful chapter" and to the "painful disputes" between Sir George Grey and the General; but I cannot believe that the colony will submit, at least without remonstrance, to have the subject disposed of in this summary manner, without the smallest regard being paid to its interests in the question.

In reference to the financial question, Mr. Cardwell gives prominence in one of his despatches, to the fact that the colony refused the guarantee offered by him for a million of the loan which the Colonial Parliament authorized in 1863. It is necessary to offer a word in explanation. The colony having estimated its probable requirements at 3,000,000*l.*, to enable it to co-operate with her Majesty's Government in suppressing the rebellion, asked the Home Government to guarantee a loan to that amount; without which it was certain it could not be raised, or at all events only on ruinous terms. Mr. Cardwell agreed to guarantee 1,000,000*l.*, "on conditions," the first of which was, that upwards of 560,000*l.* of it should be immediately paid over to the Home Government, in satisfaction of an existing, and in part disputed, debt to the Imperial Government. The result would have been, that the colony would have received the guarantee to a little over 400,000*l.*, or about

one-seventh part of what it required towards suppressing the rebellion! To have accepted such an offer would have been as derogatory to the colony as it was to the Home Government to make it. And setting aside any idea of that sort, it would have been practically of no perceptible value. That is simply why it was refused; but we do feel that it was an act of extreme hardness to attempt to screw this 560,000*l.* out of the colony at such a crisis in its fate, and such a day of its necessities. The colony, however, though declining the guarantee on those terms, has sent to the Home Government 500,000*l.* of debentures, expressing a hope that they would be accepted at par; a value which could at any time be given them in the market by the guarantee of the Imperial Government. That Government, however, refuses to receive them, *except at their value depreciated by existing circumstances*, and as a collateral security, which they hold with power to sacrifice at any discount, at their pleasure. This explanation will, I think, make it apparent that the offer of a guarantee of one million was not capriciously refused; and that such refusal ought not to be any bar to the favourable consideration of the colony's claims to such reasonable aid as may enable it to carry into effect its *bonâ fide* intention of relieving the Home Government from contributing any further military assistance towards the termination of the present struggle, so long protracted in consequence of the inefficiency and the quarrels of officers of the Imperial Government.

NOTE C.

There is one more point in the recently published papers, which requires a word of comment. I refer to two documents relating to the Waitotara purchase, which, as we have seen, General Cameron denounced as "an iniquitous job." It now appears from his own statement, that he made this charge on no other authority than that of a casual conversation with a perfect stranger, who accidentally picked him up while riding into Wanganui; and he appears to have had no other authority for it while he remained in New Zealand. Since he left New Zealand, a Mr. Field, who I presume is the stranger referred to, writes a long letter, dated September 7, 1865, in which he gives his version of the circumstances attending this purchase. The value of the statement may be judged of from the fact that though the purchase was effected some three years ago, Mr. Field appears never to have communicated his facts to the Governor or his ministers, even when in consequence of General Cameron's charges, they endeavoured to discover any foundation for them, but could meet with no one who had any complaint to make. It does seem a very unfair thing that the Colonial Office should have laid this document before Parliament and allowed it to be published in a Blue Book, without first communicating its contents to the Superintendent of Wellington, whose conduct is seriously impugned by it, and who has had no opportunity allowed him of refuting the statements made by Mr. Field and General Cameron,

which, I have no doubt, when referred to the Colonial Government, will prove to be what Mr. Carlyle calls, "A story of a frog and a roasted apple." When a charge is made against a Governor, it is an invariable rule with the Colonial Office not to receive it unless forwarded through him; and in this case where it is made against a high colonial official, the Superintendent of a Province, acting as Land Purchase Commissioner, under the Governor's authority, it does seem ungenerous that the spirit of a rule so fair in itself should not have been adhered to.

THE END.



7/a 12/6

